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ABSTRACT
Public authorities are a popular form of quasi-governmental institutions and have
been extensively chronicled in regards to effective public service delivery. Authorities
are exceptionally popular within the public transportation industry but have slowly lost
their fiscal power due to the strengthening of parent governments. This dissertation
examines the authority structure in public transportation to understand the linkage
between this loss of fiscal power and executive management of public authorities by
studying the governing board-executive manager relationship. In particular, this
dissertation examines the structure and relationship by studying factors impacting
relationships and connections between deceased fiscal power and the members recruited
to serve on authority boards.
This exploratory study examines five public transportation authorities in the cities
of Memphis, Nashville, Chattanooga and Jackson, Tennessee in addition to the city of
Lexington, Kentucky. Utilizing qualitative interviews this research collected primary
source, subjective data on perspectives and opinions of authority executives and board
members related to fiscal power, policy preferences, representation and executive
support. Findings suggest a distinct connection between fiscal power and the types of
board members appointed to serve on public authority boards. In the case of public
transportation, higher fiscal power saw higher-level board members with less inclination
for executive micromanagement. Lower fiscal authority had the effect of attracting lowlevel members with service-related agendas falling under executive authority with more
opportunity for micromanagement and conflict. Unique was the lack of conflict despite
increasing occasion for encroachment on executive authority; this was due to executive
vi

management of board agendas to create positive relationships with strong support. The
study also revealed boards place tremendous value on representation and therefore
translate experiences, expertise and personal agendas to board activities and decisions.
Finally this study argued that James Svara’s duality-dichotomy model of local
government (1985; 1989b; 1990) provides understanding of public authorities due to
parallels with the council-manager system. The research indicates that first, the study is
applicable to public authorities and second, board-executive relationships offer a new
contextual dimension along board member orientations toward policy activities, advisory
functions and community representation.
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CHAPTER I
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: STRUCTURE,
PERFORMANCE AND GOVERNANCE

INTRODUCTION
Public authorities play an important role in public service delivery, as they
provide an alternative structure and form of governance in the pursuit of achieving
results. The collective study of public authorities operating across the U.S. has yielded
considerable insight to the form, function and value of authorities yet there is still much
we do not know. This dissertation expands our understanding of authorities through an
exploratory study of the factors impacting the relationship between public authority board
members and executives. Specifically, this research examines board-executive
relationships through the lens of public transportation authorities.
Despite their popularity, public authorities are an oft-ignored structure of
government, holding many forms and making comparison difficult. Most research
focuses on the purpose of the public authority—taking the government structure out of
government service—resulting in an emphasis on flexibility, accountability and
productivity. While these are salient issues, little existing research focuses on the
structural functioning of the authority, in particular internal and external relationships
among the members of the authority and how the relationships influence decision-making
processes and shape policy decisions.
When considering the critical roles the board and executive play in the public
authority structure the interaction and relationship between the board and executive is
tantamount to understanding the connection between structure and organizational
1

performance. Despite considerable attention to public authorities in many other
important areas, scholars have not yet focused on the board-executive relationship. This
research seeks to explore this relationship and its impact on organizational performance
by addressing three closely related questions. First, what are the perceived roles of board
members serving on public transportation authorities? Second, under what circumstances
are public transportation authority board members more likely to seek involvement in
decision-making that falls under executive authority? Third, what impact does this
encroachment on executive responsibility have on board membership support for the
executive? This research should also offer significant insight into the roles of public
authority board members and executives at both the individual and collective level while
examining the specific values and goals of public transportation authority board
members. Most important, this dissertation provides an understanding of how board
members’ role perceptions and preferences impact the executive-board relationship and
therefore organizational performance.

THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY
STRUCTURE
Overview of Quasi Governmental Institutions
Scholars of public administration and public policy have long been concerned
with the structure of local government (Hansen 1975; Lyons 1978; Morgan and Pelissero
1980; Svara 1985; 1989b; 1990; Deno and Mehay 1987; Schneider and Park 1989; Box
1995; Benton 2002). Urbanization of the American city center and the vast expansion of
government service placed local government structure at the forefront as research
2

examined the impact of these structures on program efficiency and effectiveness, citizen
satisfaction, and more recently the powers and interaction among executives and elected
officials. As James Svara asks, “Is governmental form—and, by extension, the pattern of
interaction in the governmental process—related to certain outcomes” (1990, 60)? While
a tremendous volume of research is available on the standard forms of council-mayor and
council-manager systems, significant interest lies in quasi-governmental structures such
as government corporations, government sponsored enterprises, special districts and
public authorities, which are also known as hybrid organizations.
Quasi-governments are a unique and important phenomenon in public
administration. They are often employed as an approach to specialized and often difficult
public programs and services, which frequently utilize a mix of public and private sector
organizational models; they are designed to be innovative while juxtaposed with
decreased levels of oversight and accountability. Quasi-governmental institutions are
government structures that “combine characteristics of public- and private sector
organizations” to achieve optimum results in public service delivery “through the best of
both worlds: public accountability and private efficiency” (Koppell 2003, 1). By nature,
hybrid organizations are heterogeneous and outright ambiguous, making definition
exceedingly difficult, yet they share a number of characteristics that distinguish them
from traditional bureaucratic structures. They are publicly or privately owned (fully or
partially), profit-seeking entities that charge user fees to offset operational costs.
Additionally, hybrids are frequently exempt from various federal and state laws and
regulations and are organized with a flexible structure that permits greater achievement of
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specific public policy objectives (Perry and Rainey 1988; Koppell 2003) and limited
accountability (Moe 2001).
While these characteristics are generally vague, is easier to understand hybrids by
what they are not rather than what they are. Hybrids are not traditional bureaucratic
agencies, which are typified by: formalized and standardized roles within a rigidly
ordered organizational hierarchy; highly centralized and structured decision-making
authority; and a complex system of specialized job functions spread across a large
number of hierarchical levels (Robbins 1983). Additionally, hybrids are not
governmental departments, which are funded directly by tax revenues and direct
oversight by an executive or legislature like the U.S. Department of Labor. Quasigovernmental institutions should not be confused with independent agencies, such as the
Environmental Protection Agency, which are fully funded by the federal government
with a director appointed by the president (Meier 1993) or commissions such as the
Security and Exchange Commission that perform regulatory or investigative functions for
the government and are more independent and insulated from executive branch influence
through partisan appointments and lengthy, overlapping terms (Koppell 2003).
Hybrids are popular because they are able to achieve greater organizational
effectiveness, often with a reduced cost. This makes quasi-governments appealing to
politicians—especially in times of budgetary crisis and revenue shortfalls—and
generally palatable to the public because hybrids are modeled after private organizations
and approach government service with business-like processes. Even if they are not more
effective than traditional bureaucracy, hybrids offer the promise of a business atmosphere
while avoiding suspicion of “all things governmental” (Koppel 2003, 3). As traditional
4

government seeks innovative alternatives to public service delivery, hybrids are readily
available and can be tailored to virtually any scope or shape (Moe and Stanton 1989) and
hint toward the popular trend of privatization (Koppell 2003, 7).
There are numerous types of quasi-governmental institutions; however emphasis
is on four main types. Very common at the federal level are the first two types of
hybrids: government corporations, publicly-owned and funded through private revenues
(Mitchell 1999); and government sponsored enterprises, which are privately-owned and
government sponsored (Siedman 1975; 1988; Moe and Stanton 1989). Traditionally,
government corporations have received the lion’s share of attention, primarily because of
their long history and organizational mission. A key example is the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) (Selznick 1949; Lilenthal 1944; Pritchett 1943), a program affecting
almost the entire southeastern U.S. for more than fifty years and among the most
extensively chronicled programs in U.S. political history. Recently government
sponsored enterprises have gained more attention due to major enterprises such as
“Fannie Mae” and “Freddie Mac,” mortgage lending programs that are among the largest
companies in the United States or the “Sallie Mae” federal student loan corporation that
funds billions of dollars of education annually (Koppell 2003).
While the emphasis on quasi-governmental structure is typically at the federal
level the vast majority of hybrid organizations exist at the sub-national level (Foster
1997) and incorporate the two additional structures. Special districts, which often operate
with an independently elected board, are supported primarily by private funding and
augmented by significant public dollars generated from specialized taxing authority
(Smith 1969; Mitchell 1999; Foster 1997; Koppell 2003). Finally, public authorities are
5

fully owned by the public with a board of directors appointed by elected officials and
utilize a hybrid structure to bypass regulatory measures and red tape to generate high
revenue levels to offset expenses (Mitchell 1992).
The evolution of special districts to public authorities is unique. Until the late
1940s, special districts were sufficient to maintain and deliver public services because the
scope of service required limited government involvement. A special tax to meet lowlevel policy or project needs was effective until the close of World War II when revenue
bonds became common stemming from previous special district failures to collect taxes,
especially on real estate during the Depression. President Franklin Roosevelt went so far
as to encourage the use of authorities, as they allowed for growth and development of
public goods and services without complex legal entanglements or heavy imposition on
the tax base. Attention was on facilities, not services, and authorities established a new
mechanism for building and operating large infrastructure projects. By the mid-1960s a
new phase of special purpose governments was in full swing, spawned by swelled
authority coffers from user fees collected at tolls roads. What was significant from this
new phase was the reinvestment of surplus into additional projects (rather than servicing
the existing public debt) and the development of a planning function that entrenched the
ad hoc agency and created a permanent organization (Smith 1969).
Smith notes that the two concepts of special districts and public authorities are
often used interchangeably since they “are formed to take advantage of special sources of
revenue which will not count as an obligation against debt-burdened local governments”
(1969, 248). Distinct in Smith’s discussion is the understanding that special districts
operate within a fixed geographic area, lending itself to a fixed constituency that can be
6

assessed with special tax levies, especially on real estate. Meanwhile, the public
authority is less reliant on a single constituency for revenues, as it emphasizes revenue
bonds and user fees and is beholden to a wider constituency of bondholders, users,
residents of the impacted area and finally the parent government (1969, 246; 269).
Why Study Public Authorities?
The growing trend among local governments is to create public authorities for the
express purpose of avoiding typical mechanisms of bureaucracy and politics to achieve
limited, yet critical public functions. Yet, most scholarly and journalistic treatments of
authorities tend to ignore the emphasis on hybridized structure and instead focus on
particularly successful or disastrous organizational undertakings. Robert Smith’s (1964;
1969) detailed analysis of the formation of the New York City Metropolitan Transit
Authority, Austin Tobin’s treatments of the Port Authority of New York New Jersey
(1953) and Robert Caro’s study of “Master Builder” Robert Moses’ pioneering efforts to
create the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority (1974) are excellent case studies of
the politically charged environments and success stories of these unique organizations.
The reverse is the well chronicled and infamous Washington Public Power Supply
System, an $8 billion public works project that involved more than $700 million worth of
projects subject to bid rigging, kickbacks and the “single largest default in the history of
the American municipal bond market” (Henriques 1986, 11). While these are without
doubt fascinating examinations of organizational successes and failures that provide a
wealth of knowledge, understanding and consideration of the formation of public
authorities, these studies yield limited understanding of how structure impacts the
governance and execution of public service delivery.
7

Public authorities embody the belief that certain components of public service can
operate with the efficiency and effectiveness of a private business because they are
structured to function free of public and political pressure or bureaucratic red tape (Smith
1969; Mitchell 1991). The structure of public authorities is extremely important to
political scientists, especially public administrationists, for a number of reasons. First,
public authorities are the most popular and growing quasi-governmental form and unlike
extensively chronicled government corporations and government sponsored enterprises
little attention has been paid to the authority format’s growth and relevance. Second,
public authorities are publicly created and publicly owned organizations that operate
outside the standard forms of government to achieve performance levels unavailable to
traditional governmental entities.
Third, unlike most traditional forms of government and quasi-governmental
structures, public authorities operate on a very clear and narrowly defined scope of
purpose established by the parent government and with little room for variation. Fourth,
public authorities are employed almost exclusively at the state and local level involving
the largest number of governmental institutions and a high level of structural variation.
Finally, while public authorities do vary in structure, this form of quasi-government has a
number of unifying characteristics that permit study across a wide swath of policy areas
and contribute to critical topics of state and local governance, public management, policy
analysis, and organizational theory. Fundamental issues of neutral administration,
accountability, and government reform are inherently tied to this form of governance.
From a structural standpoint, the public authority employs a corporate approach
delivering to public service. Unlike traditional government structures, the authority is
8

designed to bypass mechanisms employed in government practice such as civil service,
competitive procurement and regularized public hearings. What is distinct about the
public authority structure is the streamlining of procedural and decision-making steps to
enhance performance and deliver public goods and services more efficiently and
effectively.

An executive free to make decisions, restructure organizationally and

creatively deploy resources to achieve the policy objectives of a board of directors (all
while insulated from political influence) makes this model appealing.
While the emphasis is on policy outcomes and organizational performance, the
essential components of the public authority are the governing board, which is the policymaking and oversight component of the authority, and the executive charged with
executing policy and guiding the organization. Despite the critically important nature of
the executive-board relationship, implicit in the success of the public authority model, no
existing research focuses exclusively on this relationship within the public authority and
what impact this may have on the executive’s ability to manage and lead the
organization.
Structure, Accountability and Financing in Public Authorities
The literature on public authorities is quite limited and generally falls into three
main categories: 1) defining and describing the structure, purpose and benefits of public
authorities; 2) problems and consequences related to accountability and control of public
authorities; and 3) financing of public authorities. As discussed above, public authorities
are quasi-governmental institutions differing from general purpose (traditional)
governments and exist at local, state, and national levels (Smith 1964; Mitchell 1992).
Public authorities are used primarily in housing (45%), environmental protection (18%)
9

and economic development (14%) while transportation, health, port, and utility
authorities rank in single digits by percentage; however, this does not mean these are not
policy areas of growth for public authorities. In fact, these are amongst the most fertile
areas of growth because they permit small to mid-sized urban areas to make forays into
unfamiliar policy areas (Mitchell 1992, Table 1.2).
Defining public authorities is difficult, as they are hybrids of government, private
business, and non-profit corporations (Tobin 1953; Smith 1964; 1969; Mitchell 1990;
Mitchell 1992; Doig and Mitchell 1992; Leigland 1994; Foster 1997; Koppell 2003).
Jerry Mitchell’s working definition of a public authority is a “corporate entity chartered
by one or more governments (national, state or local), governed by an appointed board,
and responsible for various public service functions” (1992, 2). Public commissions or
publicly-owned corporations with similar structures are considered public authorities
under this definition but special districts or commissions with individually elected boards
or governments are not.
Public authorities are a “child of the neutral competence wave” that began during
the Progressive Era and peaked shortly before the start of the First World War (Doig and
Mitchell 1992, 19). The independent public authority, in its ideal form, is structured to
develop revenue-producing public services or facilities insulated from political pressures
(Smith 1964; 1969; Horn 1976; Henriques 1986) to ensure the critical separation between
administration and implementation. As described in his classic work "The Study of
Administration," Woodrow Wilson argued that "Public administration is detailed and
systematic execution of public law . . . but the general laws . . . are obviously outside of
and above administration. The broad plans of governmental action are not administrative;
10

the detailed execution of such plans is administrative" (Svara 1998). The public
authority structure is extremely helpful in delivering services in this form because the
executive is isolated from the normal public pressures common in typical state or
municipal services in hopes of “banishing [politics] . . . from administration” (Doig
1983). Authorities also foster high levels of expertise and specialization, “increasingly
required for the technological needs of government” in these key, often single-purpose,
policy areas (Smith 1969, 141; Mitchell 1991). They are extremely popular not only
because of their ability to specialize in a single policy area but also due to their flexibility
and variation among numerous policy networks.
Authorities are also designed to provide solutions in areas with large-scale
problems, in politically decentralized areas or when difficulty arises regarding
coordination of services across multiple jurisdictions on either a permanent or temporary
basis (Smith 1964; 1969; Doig and Mitchell 1992; Hamilton 1999). Public authority
power is typically single-purpose and narrow in scope, such that decisions do not
negatively impact general-purpose government functions and are seen as a relief, not a
threat (Smith 1969, 185).
What distinguishes the public authority from standard government is its
operational structure. Authority leadership is comprised of an independent governing
board and a staff selected, promoted, and retained based on neutral competence—this
encourages decision-making independent from elected officials terms while encouraging
long-range thinking (Kaufman 1956; 1969; Smith 1964; 1969). Public authorities are
usually comprised of a board of governors with three or more members appointed by
elected executives or legislators. The governing board is charged with five main
11

functions: 1) making policy; 2) supervising administrative activities; 3) oversight of bond
issuance; 4) safeguarding the public; and 5) keeping the public informed and involved
through hearings (Mitchell 1990). Although appointed, boards do not necessarily work
for elected officials. Rather, the board is designed to function outside of political
pressure while making decisions that will advance the goals and objectives of the
authority operation. To protect against pressure from elected officials, most boards
incorporate staggered, fixed-length terms and include provisions to ensure members
cannot be removed from office until their term expires (except in obvious cases of public
malfeasance) (Smith 1969).
The majority of public authority board members serve without financial
compensation, yet there is often considerable competition for these seats. Board
memberships are positions of power deeply involved in significant policy decisionmaking (Mitchell, 1990) but “without the necessity of a political campaign” and with
limited technical oversight (Smith 1969, 328). Many seek board appointments because of
their particular interest in a policy issue and authority boards are highly attractive because
membership does not require a full-time commitment.
The second key component of the authority structure is the executive director,
appointed by the authority board or parent government, responsible for carrying out
policy decisions and directing service (Smith 1964; Henriques 1986; Mitchell 1990). The
executive is envisioned as ideologically neutral and is expected to undertake assignments
without partisan or community concern. Executives can usually expect elected officials
to enhance managerial power by exercising political influence in support of policies
developed and recommended by management (Horn 1976; Leigland and Lamb 1986).
12

The executive in the ideal public authority relies on staffing based on performance—not
party affiliation or political contacts (Kaufman 1956; Waldo 1984). Neutral competence
and performance are considered to be “crucial in legitimating an authority’s insulation
from elected officials” and is linked to entrepreneurial orientation—developing new
strategies along with improving old programs (Doig and Mitchell, 1992, 21). Along with
an insulated staff, the agency’s management structure, personnel system, budget process,
and accounting system should be under the agency’s control, not tied to rigid systems that
constrain traditional government. This system of self-management translates into
significant discretion in deciding changes and priorities. The “ideal” agency is the
authority that maintains control over new initiatives with approval by the legislatures and
elected officials being readily obtained. As one public manager states (Boschken 1989,
158):
When you have a commission that concerns itself with broad policy matters . . .
and doesn’t get into minute details of the administration and an imaginative staff
left free to create and improve, there flows through the whole organization, . . . a
feeling of mutual understanding and respect. . . . Things get done.
The public authority structure has been identified as a highly successful
mechanism granted powers to achieve services and meet specific policy goals that
typical government structure is unable to achieve (Doig 1983; Braun 1992;
Muniak 1992). Authorities can bypass red tape and avoid fiscal and staffing
limitations of traditional government (self or legally imposed) to achieve new
large-scale programs and projects (Eimecke 1992; Heiman 1992). It also permits
collective or regional approaches to problems that a single entity could not handle
alone (Finn 1992). Smith (1969, 278) described the benefit of authorities:
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As a guest, who would run in, build a bridge, pay for it and depart, leaving behind
the modern structure, the public authority has been a welcome patron. Its
brashness in flouting red tape and getting things done on a large scale could
provide for the host government a vicarious sense of power and achievement. It
was fun to live during the bond maturity, with an agency that dared to innovate
with different merit systems, salary scales, single contracts, attractive advertising,
and pricing polices. It afforded a chance to think big, if only through association.
The benefits of the public authority go beyond the mere avoidance of
bureaucratic red tape. As Smith mentions, governments constrained by limited
fiscal strength or administrative staff to take on a vast project is able to offer new
programs and services that citizens desperately need. Moreover, it allows
governments in a region to tackle problems collectively with crosscutting
jurisdiction and power to solve problems that a single local or state entity could
not handle alone.
The second main area of public authority literature is on accountability
and control, a salient issue due to the paradoxical nature of limited authority
control and their susceptibility to mismanagement (Henriques 1986; Doig 1983).
The first paradox is authorities are decentralized from parent governments with
great latitude and little oversight but are internally centralized with little direct
influence from the governing board or outside organizations or forces. This
opportunity for mismanagement can be exacerbated by incompetence among the
board, executive and staff, while the limited oversight and increased discretion
can lead to political bias or the more dangerous problem of outright corruption
(Walsh 1978).
This leads to the second paradox: the lack of oversight among public authorities
(one of the self-described benefits of the authority model) is a perennial problem.
14

Oversight is the very thing authorities seek to avoid, yet it remains the best way to stop
problems related to mismanagement, incompetence, and corruption (Henriques 1986).
The key issue of accountability remains “how to build an accountability framework that
brings together political responsiveness and functional expertise” (Mitchell 1990, 9).
There is considerable debate over where oversight power should rest (elected officials or
public) and what mechanisms of regulation should be used. A more important issue is
what impact oversight has on the effectiveness of authorities. Innovation is at the heart of
the public authority model and the growing level of restriction and regulation threatens
their success.
The third paradox is the very things authorities are designed to avoid—
bureaucratic red tape and constraints—are imposed by outside forces as a mechanism to
control the very functions the authority was formed to do. These constraints yield a high
number of costs to the system and reduce efficiency and effectiveness while disrupting
the structure (Doig and Mitchell 1992; Leigland 1992). Despite these costs there is
considerable value in such bureaucratic red tape, as red tape is an instrument established
to ensure proper procedure, due process, fairness, equity, and equality before the law—
fundamental values in the execution of programs and policy among democratic regimes
(Kaufman 1977).
The parent government holds a tremendous amount of control as it establishes the
authority’s characteristics and powers: functions, structure, time frame, and financial
authority (Doig and Mitchell 1992). Post-formation control has been predominantly
focused on the financial aspect of authorities. Auditing and accounting requirements,
authorization for budgets and direct representation through ex officio or statutory
15

positions have been highly effective in controlling authorities. Appointment power also
plays a significant role as board members likely to represent the parent government’s
viewpoint are recruited and installed. One of the most direct, effective and popular
reforms has been for state and local governments to expand their own powers to absorb
the controversial functions and perform them for the authority. This allows the authority
to succeed in its primary mission but incorporates oversight in essential areas (Leigland
1992).
The third and arguably most important aspect of the public authority structure
relates to the financial elements of essence to quasi-governments. The force behind the
public authority model is policy-making, intentionally insulated from outside influence,
to achieve public goals unachievable by standard forms of government. All government
activity requires a process of raising and expending public resources and the power to
control this process and establish the scope of service delivery while providing insight
into the winners and losers in the struggle for political power (Smithies 1975). The
budget is at the center of service delivery: setting and controlling the “translation of
financial resources into human purposes . . . and a mechanism for making choices among
alternative expenditures” (Wildavsky 1979, 2)—it is the essence of public purpose and
political power.
Initial public authority powers included issuing bonds, setting tax rates and
establishing user fees (Council of State Governments 1953) with early emphasis on the
power of issuing bonds. In 1969, Robert Smith writes, “Basic to any definition of a
public authority is its reliance on the revenue-bond method of finance” (3) but notes that
authorities such the New York City Transit Authority operate without a capital budget
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but is instead included in the city’s capital budget (77). Expansion of general purpose
government powers and controls on authorities limits this power, forcing authorities to
finance programs and projects through a more creative mix of bonds, federal grants,
dedicated tax revenues and direct subsidies (Mitchell 1992). From a financial
perspective, this creates a myriad of issues. Authorities are now project-specific with
limited ability to raise direct revenue (Smith 1969; Mitchell and Miller 1992) and bond
market difficulties (Leigland and Lamb 1986; McKinney 1986; Leigland 1993) force
authorities to greatly rely on grants, local subsidies and unreliable dedicated funding
sources (often varied and inconsistent) (Smith 1992).
The impact on authority decision-making power is significant, as the parent
government absorbs powers of budgetary functions and imposes control (Henriques
1986). Mere changes in accounting and reporting practices are essentially oversight;
however, when authorities must rely on the parent government for direct subsidy, budget
approval, procurement processes and approval of almost all financial decisions, the board
and the executive are essentially stripped of the broad policy-making power necessary to
execute organizational mission. Instead of guiding the broad mission of the authority and
directing the organization toward new policy areas, the board and executive become
caretakers.

BOARDS IN GOVERNMENTAL, NON-PROFIT AND FOR-PROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS
Boards are used in a wide variety of organizations and come in numerous forms
and functions. The term ‘board’ is frequently thrown around without a clear
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understanding of the actual power or role of a board. First, when understanding boards, it
is essential to understand where a board may fit, both in terms of authority and
organizational placement. Governing boards are exceeded in power only by the owners
or the enabling organization (or parent government as the case may be) and have key
roles of both authority and accountability. Next, advisory boards do not have this type of
delineated power but rather provide advice and counsel for the executive; however, this
advisory capacity can carry substantial weight depending on the organization. Other
types, such as line boards that act in very narrow and limited capacity, or workgroup
boards, which have no staff and are actively involved in researching decisions and
organizing proposals for consideration, comprise other organizational roles (Carver
1997). This research and subsequent discussion is focused on the governing aspect of
boards.
Another key aspect of understanding boards is by organizational nature—
governmental, non-profit, and for-profit. These three types of boards have a number of
distinct differences. Their place in the organizational structure and the power they wield
results in great variation, as does the level of public scrutiny (based upon governmental,
non-profit, and for-profit status). There are also many different specified operational
procedures required (or at least permitted) under law, agreement or corporate charter that
impact their operation. Methods of operation are driven by distinctly different traditions
in both government and private sector boards and often impact control and influence
from within the board, from the executive or even outside players and “the people” at
large (Carver 1997).
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Despite these differences, Peter Drucker wryly argues that all board have one
thing in common—they do not function (1974, 628). His argument is that few boards
perform as intended or able to because there is little control of, or training for, members
(Juran and Louden 1966; Waldo 1985; Witt 1987). Reasons for this are identified by
Carver as a focus on trivial minutiae as opposed to large-scale matters facing the
organization. Short-term bias also plays a role when board members abdicate their longrange organizational and policy vision in exchange for near-term issues or “even more
dysfunctional[ly], with the past” (Carver 1997, 9). Finally, boards tends to take reactive
positions based on staff recommendations, fail to be proactive in setting their own
agendas, tend to focusing on what has already been done, poorly develop proactive
interaction with the executive and generally have unclear lines of authority.
Attempts to improve on these problems generally fall flat as the recommended
remedies to these maladies are cosmetic and simply fail to address the fundamental issues
causing board ineffectiveness. The most common reaction to is to adjust the level of
involvement: a more involved board helps get things done because they are less detached
and are able to help direct the talents of the organization; yet a less involved board acts as
a better governor and is more businesslike. Another issue is the improvement of boardstaff relations by acting as a watchdog to ensure high levels of accountability for the
public good. The other recommendation is to act more as a cheerleader or champion of
the organization, helping develop trust relationships and rubberstamping executive
recommendations. There are even conflicting recommendations regarding what type of
board involvement is best suited for governance: a managing board, which emphasizes
interaction and decision-making on personnel, financial management and program
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leadership; a planning board that develops long-range agendas and creates a framework
for organizational success; or a communicator board with an emphasis on increasing the
humanistic relationship among the board and staff. These recommendations are not
particularly helpful because they have limited applicability and seem to offer a proverbial
“pick your poison." How the board functions, the relationship with the executive, and the
perceived problems on which focus is directed are the more significant issues that impact
boards and their effectiveness (Carver 1997).
Research related to governing boards in political science is very limited, with
most research and analysis conducted in social work and non-profit management.
Literature on effective board composition is generally inconclusive and primarily
descriptive, as in the case of representative composition of board members (Austin and
Woolever 1992; Gibelman, Gelman and Pollack 1997; Saidel and Harlan 1998; Abzug
and Galaskiewicz 2001), effective board size and its impacts (Miller and Weiss 1988),
board roles and responsibilities (Louden and Zusman 1975; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978;
Fama and Jensen 1983; Fligstein and Freeland 1995) and general board effectiveness
(Allison 2002; Brooks 2002; Miller-Millesen 2003; Nobbie and Brudney 2003; Brown
and Iverson 2004).
Despite scores of articles on governing boards in the volunteer non-profit sector,
the emphasis remains almost exclusively on the board, its composition and effectiveness
with a considerably large gap in research on the executive-board relationship. One of the
most popular and relevant models on governing boards stems from John Carver’s (1997)
fourteen prescriptive principles “to organize the thought, activities, structure, and
relationships of governing boards,” (17) that form the basis of his policy governance
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model. This model, developed for non-profit boards, seeks to provide guidance for the
board as policy is developed in four areas. The first is ends policies that surround the
intended impact on the external environment and purpose of the organization. This is
primarily mission-oriented policy and is generally comprised of three main components:
the impact of policy on those served by the organization; the characteristics of those
receiving results; and the cost achieving results for that population or its sub-set. Ends
policies identify what results are to be achieved, for what group, and at what cost (Carver
and Carver 1997; Nobbie and Brudney 2003).
Carver’s second policy type is means policies that focus chiefly on controlling
and directing resources, communicating objectives and maintaining active accountability.
The third and fourth policy types, board-staff relationships and governance processes, are
also means-oriented but are distinctly different. The board-staff policies establish the
level of authority delegated to the executive and staff as well as expectations and
accountability. Governance process policies incorporate how the board will organize
itself, what its own expectations are and most important, a clear understanding of “in
whose behalf the board acts” (Carver 1997, 33). While this model does not speak
specifically to the executive-board relationship, it does provide a more in-depth
understanding of the issues surrounding board effectiveness and the factors that may
impact the relationship under review.
The academic literature from the private for-profit sector follows the same general
tack as non-profit with a large volume of research oriented toward board composition and
selection (Baysinger and Butler 1985; Kosnik 1990; Barnhart, Marr and Rosenstein 1994;
Klien 1998; Luoma and Goodstein 1999) with concentration on the business acumen of
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members (Hermalin and Weisbach 1988; Baysinger, Kosnik and Turk 1991). Analysis of
board member success is primarily measured in terms of profit and loss while balancing
the needs of long-term planning and directing short-term market sensitive decisions
(Louden and Zusman 1975; Singh and Harianto 1989; Gulati and Westphal 1999;
Shivdasani and Yermack 1999; Harper 2005). Recognizing that board emphasis should
be on long-term planning with short-term execution, business research and practical
evaluations have been focused on the proper role of the board, member responsibilities,
organizational vision and results-oriented decision-making (Kosnik 1987; Demb and
Neubrauer 1992; Ford 1992). A considerable body of practical, axiomatic work on
developing board effectiveness exists; however, most are produced by former CEOs,
board members and consultants and draw on few limited academic studies or scholarly
research.
There is considerable debate regarding independent vs. collaborative boards and
the impact of executive-member relationships on organizational efficacy. The
independent board model suggests little executive-board interaction is most effective with
members serving on behalf of shareholders as independent watchdogs to monitor
decision-making and evaluate performance (Kosnik 1987; 1990; Walsh and Seward
1990; Westphal and Zajac 1995). The collaborative model takes the approach that higher
levels of executive interaction with the board creates an environment where boards
provide more advice and counsel with increased opportunity for oversight (Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978; Baysinger and Butler 1985; Westphal 1999).
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DICHOTOMY AND DUALITY AS A TOOL FOR UNDERSTANDING
The lack of existing scholarly research on the relationship between public
authority boards and executives exemplifies the relevance of this study, yet is
problematic in terms of the limited applicability of existing quasi-government research,
more specifically research pertaining to public authorities. On surveying literature
related to local government structures and organizations, the primary tool for
understanding executive-board relationships comes from James Svara’s dichotomyduality model of local governance (Svara 1985; 1989a; 1990). Svara’s subsequent work,
or the litany of research it spawned, made no attempt to study the public authority
structure but his review of the governmental process is applicable to virtually any
organization (Svara 1990, 17).
Although we long ago dismissed the notion of the supposed politicsadministration dichotomy, it remains integral to understanding the relationship between
those charged with developing policy and those responsible for implementing policy.
The idea of a dichotomy allows us to distinguish between policy-making and
implementation phases of governmental processes while openly acknowledging that the
phases, players, and functions of policy development and implementation overlap at
virtually all points and times (Svara, 1999b; 2001). The dichotomy, as originally
mentioned by Wilson (1889) was simply asking us to use neutral competence in the
pursuit of public programs; however, some scholars misinterpreted the dichotomy (Sayre,
1951; Svara, 1998) as a dividing line between what functions belong to elected officials
and administrators.
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Expanding Svara’s work becomes extremely valuable in understanding the public
authority structure, as the essence of the dichotomy-duality model is its ability to draw
lines that represent power and responsibility across the basic functions of government.
Using the classic policy-administration models (Goodnow 1900; Dahl 1947; Simon 1957;
Sayre 1958; Schick 1976; Frederickson 1971; 1980), Svara divides the policy component
into mission and policy while the administration element is reconfigured as
administration and management. Briefly described, mission is the guiding force of the
organization supplied by elected officials while policy is the mid-range policy decisions,
typically decided by the council with advice of staff. More elaborately, elected officials
(council members) are the primary mission builders with administrators (city managers
and staff) offering advice and education to the council on general trends. In the area of
policy, the elected officials and administrative staff have an almost equal share of
influence in the formulation of policy, with technical knowledge and staff expertise
playing a significant role in policy proposals (Svara 1985). This may invoke the image of
a “rubber stamp” council, but in reality the council members establish policy guidelines
which serve as a framework for staff development of these proposals (Svara 1990).
The administrator and staff role grows even larger in the area of administration
consisting of decisions and low-level polices used in the implementation of programs and
services. Some oversight by elected officials does occur through airing citizen
complaints or taking an active interest in the decision-making. Management is almost
exclusively the sole territory of administrators and includes human, material, and
informational resources (Svara 1985; 1989a; 1990). Mission, policy, administration, and
management are the four elements that exist regardless of the size, scope, or structure of
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government—it is just a matter of whether these functions are shared among players and
to what extent.
Most significant in Svara’s model is duality, the recognition that some form of
dichotomy does exist based on the above principles but that all functions of government
are shared by elected officials and administrators, only with varying levels of
involvement. In his research, Svara shows council has primary responsibility for
establishing organizational mission and policy but it occurs with an executive
“[providing] facts and technical assessment of consequences only” and on request (Svara
1989b, 31). Simultaneously, the administration is charged with executing the will of
elected officials but with full knowledge the council has a right and responsibility to
oversee the program outputs and hold the administration accountable for outcomes (Svara
1985; 1990).
Initially the dichotomy-duality model was used to explore council-manager
relationships but has since been upheld, expanded, and applied to executives in strong
and weak mayor systems as well as in large and mid-sized areas (Svara 1999a). This
broad framework of mission, policy, administration, and management helps us see the
four dimensions of governmental processes as one dimension blending “into the other for
form a continuum from ‘pure’ policy to ‘pure’ management” (Svara 1989a). More
importantly, this continuum allows us to see the governmental “black box” in clear light
(Svara 1990, 5). As Svara has shown, the dichotomy is not a proverbial line in the sand
but rather the zone in which the roles and functions of elected officials and public
administrators begin to overlap (Svara 1985; 1999b; 2001).
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The public authority is modeled on business principles and is expected to act and
perform differently than traditional government structures. If the dichotomy-duality
model is simply a tool for conceptualizing the relationship between legislators and
executives then it should have applicability to public authority structures as well. The
question is can the existing research on council-manager relationships be expanded to the
public authority? The problems are numerous. First, the four dimensions described by
Svara are generally disconnected in government, unlike the private sector where process
and flow is comparatively seamless (Svara 1990, 17). Second, business strategy requires
flexibility, restructuring and rapid goal-mission shifts as demands change; government,
where citizen-as-stakeholder is paramount, cannot do this. Third, government involves
greater electoral control over mission than in private enterprise. Boards, councils, and
citizens have greater opportunity for influence in all four dimensions in government as
opposed to the private sector where the board is selected by ownership and has a limited
scope of organizational leadership (Svara 1990, 17).
Fourth, authorities operate to provide more flexible, unencumbered, and
innovative services to citizens. As a result, authority boards often establish policy that
allows considerable discretion for the executive, providing an unusually free hand. Fifth,
board members are rarely elected to their seat on the authority but appointed by elected
officials or serve ex officio as part of their elected duties, not because of their knowledge
in the public authority’s policy area (Mitchell, 1990). Finally, authority executives often
have two masters, the parent government as well as the board. In many cases, the
authority executive reports to the board but is contractually and ultimately responsible to
the chief executive of the parent government.
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There are, however, stronger parallels. Most important, there are consistent
structural elements with public authorities relying on a “board-executive” relationship
while council-manager systems employ a similar system with a city manager (executive)
reporting to the council (board). The executive bears responsibility for carrying out the
broad policy decisions of the public authority board and directing the delivery of services
(Horn 1976). Another parallel is that authority executives are often hired by, or is at least
responsible to, their board and serve at the pleasure of the board or parent government
(depending on charter) just as city managers serve for councils. This requires patterns of
oversight and regularized approval of actions by the board, as would occur in the councilmanager format but at varying degrees. There is a politically neutral executive charged
with administrative and management functions who must simultaneously implement
policy without deference to partisanship or public involvement while providing expert
policy advice to a board that has staggered, overlapping terms and a strong missionpolicy responsibility and administrative oversight (Smith 1969; Horn 1976; Doig 1983;
Mitchell 1992). A less obvious parallel is supported by Svara’s strong-manager variation
of the dichotomy-duality model where managers are significant forces in policy
formation, mirroring the freedoms given to authority executives. City managers lack the
freedoms allowed an authority executive; however, in this variation the city manager is
also the chief policy maker.
The emphasis of the dichotomy-duality model is on relationships and a
framework of understanding. The differences between traditional and public authority
structures are focused on who holds power and the expectations of the relationship.
These problems and parallels also exist in comparing council-manager and council-mayor
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(strong or weak) structures but the value of the model has been borne out with strong
theoretical and empirical results. Most important, this dissertation is focused on a better
understanding of this relationship by utilizing an existing conceptualization of the
functions of government and an existing analytical framework to consider how public
authority boards and executives interact in the particular case of public transportation.

THE RISE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
ORGANIZATIONS AND GOVERNANCE
A Historical Perspective
In the case of mass public transportation, the public authority model is the most
common form of government structure. Of the 589 U.S. public transit agencies identified
by Federal Transit Administration’s National Transit Database (NTD) in 2003, 191
(32%) are listed as “independent agencies with an appointed board of directors.” Another
277 transit systems (47%) are listed as units of either municipal or county governments,
many of which operate under the public authority structure with the local government
serving as authorizing and parent entity (NTD 2004). In Tennessee alone, all four large
urban transit systems in the cities of Memphis, Nashville, Knoxville, and Chattanooga
operate under some form of the public authority structure.
Public authorities in the public transportation industry have been extremely
common since the 1950s. At that time, most major cities had electric trolley systems in
dense urban areas requiring tremendous infrastructure for effective operation. Trolleys
were typically owned by private companies that also held electrical utilities, allowing the
firms to operate the electric trolleys at minimal cost. Despite decades of public
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transportation provided by electric trolley systems, the post-World War II growth of
suburban development in conjunction with increased accessibility to personal
automobiles became a significant challenge to traditional modes of public transportation.
The population shift from downtown to the city’s edge made it exceptionally difficult in
both cost and speed of construction for transit companies to keep up with the booming
suburbs.
By the time public transportation caught up with the movement away from the
urban center the public was no longer reliant on mass transit and ridership plummeted.
Many of the companies reverted to operating only profitable routes or opted to
completely eliminate the dying public transportation market from their holdings. Cities,
frustrated with the private companies’ limited service areas or threats to drop
transportation altogether, were forced to either buy the existing equipment and
infrastructure from these companies or create their own systems outright (Barnum 1971).
For most cities, public authorities presented the option of maintaining public
transportation without significant expansion of the scope of size of existing bureaucracy.
By simply establishing an authority, purchasing the equipment, and retaining the
managers and operators of the transportation system, the transition from private to public
mass transit was relatively painless. Cities unprepared to create new management staffs,
incorporate transit unions and undertake the massive infrastructure needed to maintain
effective service used the public authority model as a means to simultaneously govern
and manage this newly acquired enterprise.
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Memphis, Labor Unions and the Authority Formula
The classic example of this transition is Memphis, TN, where the Memphis Street
Railway Company (MSRC) had long-term financial problems and could not sustain
profitability, much less basic elements of service delivery necessary for a metropolitan
area. City leadership, recognizing that the MSRC was well managed but lacking in
financial support, decided to purchase the equipment from the company in the belief that
public ownership could provide better service at a profit due to significant federal and
state tax advantages—as a private organization, the MSRC’s railway’s revenues were
subject to 52% federal tax alone (Oestreich and Whaley 2001).
The former MSRC management team formed a private company and negotiated a
contract with the city to operate the transit system with public funds. The management
team kept the old employees most of whom were unionized under the Amalgamated
Transit Union (ATU), which was very supportive of this new private company’s creation.
ATU support was not driven by benevolence alone; had the city bought the assets and
absorbed the operations into traditional city government, the local ATU would have been
dealt a death blow. In 1958 the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that cities, counties and
other public agencies that participated in collective bargaining would violate Tennessee’s
right to work laws (Oestreich and Whaley 2001). Had Memphis made transit a city
department the local union’s collective bargaining power would have been voided, setting
a potentially dangerous national precedent (in the union’s eyes), as many cities faced the
same crisis as Memphis.
Memphis’s City Transportation Commission was reorganized into the Memphis
Transit Authority (MTA) and designated as the organization responsible for managing
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the contract with the private management firm along with financial control of the
authority and the right to formulate policy. This new structure established several distinct
precedents in a city’s ability to absorb transit functions. The contracting of services to a
private company dealt efficiently, effectively and “ingeniously” with the need for quick
and virtually seamless transition from private to public ownership while protecting the
labor rights of the operators (term for transit drivers), especially in right to work states
where collective bargaining with public employees was prohibited (Oestreich and
Whaley 2001). Most important, the service operation was kept out of the hands of local
politics through the creation of the transit authority. An authority with financial and
policy power ensured city interests were expressed and followed through accountability
and oversight of the authority’s executive leadership; however, day-to-day operations
were divorced from the authority’s powers as was formal involvement with the union.
The labor contract, work rules and operational policies were the full domain of the
private management company in which the board simply had no formal authority.
This new “Memphis Formula” was not as cut-and-dry as it first seemed. The
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) questioned whether these arrangements were in
fact private companies, as they were fully supported by public funds and governed by an
authority board with membership and powers established by public law. The National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) excludes public organizations from its scope making this
decision crucial in upholding the authority-private firm structure as well as union
protections. Eventually the NLRB determined the scope of power and authority of the
private management firms were significant enough for them to qualify as private
companies—so long as the authority kept its distance from labor relations and system
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management (Oestreich and Whaley 2001). A process and structure for creating public
authorities in public transportation was born.
Power and Scope of Public Transportation Authorities
Early transportation authorities were empowered to oversee all aspects of
transportation including operating and capital budgets, taxation and fares, facilities and
equipment, routes and executive management. In most cases authority power was not
exclusive to mass transportation systems; authorities often had regulatory power over
most aspects of transportation including private rail, taxi, school bus and horse-drawn
carriages although emphasis was, and has been, almost exclusively on public
transportation. At the time of this transition from private to public transportation
streetcars remained the most popular method of public transportation, as rubber-tired
buses were just coming into widespread use. Therefore most authorities, especially those
created in the 1950s and 1960s were granted a variety of powers over system
management including route development and approval, fare structure, and financial
control. The authority to incur public debt through bonds augmented this zenith of power
for public transportation authorities. The high cost of trolley infrastructure along with the
ability to coordinate and regulate across a wide swath of transportation services required
the issuance of bonds to fund system expansion.
By the late 1960s, most transit systems had abandoned trolleys in favor of buses
for their decreased cost and higher flexibility—especially when following the population
into their suburban neighborhoods. However, unlike rail lines, buses could not be funded
through long-term bonds and the decline in ridership and revenues made short-term
bonds exceptionally difficult to market (Smith 1969; Anas 1982; Mitchell and Miller
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1992). As a result transportation authorities became heavily reliant on federal, state, and
especially local funding for capital expenditures. Before long, the cost of operating these
systems exceeded revenues requiring subsidization of operating costs (Anas 1982).
The Memphis formula was permitted due to the state’s enabling legislation.
Existing legislation permitted the creation of the Memphis Transit Authority and the new
Memphis Transit Management Company’s numerous contractual provisions created
“maximum independence [from the MTA]” by circumventing several controlling
statutory provisions. The ability to create contracts that could bypass state law and
provide the requisite protection for labor unions was an extremely important factor in the
nationwide push toward the transition from private to public ownership of public
transportation. As states began to pass the enabling legation to follow Memphis’s
example Congress was shifting attention to public transportation in order to help the state
and local governmental takeover of the crumbling private mass transit enterprise.
Congress was supportive of the need to take over transit operations but was extremely
leery of passing legislation to fund a process that had the ability to destroy collective
bargaining rights in right to work states, especially in an era where union power and
influence was at its peak. When crafting the Urban Mass Transportation Act (UMTA) of
1964, Congress correctly predicted the popularity of the Memphis formula and in
response developed a labor protection, now well known as Section 13(c) (Woodman et al.
1995; Oestreich and Whaley 2001). Section 13(c) established that employees of private
transit companies taken over with federal funds retained the same collective bargaining
rights as before they were taken over by public transportation authorities (Bodah 1990).
These 13(c) agreements are separate from the labor contract and require approval from
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the U.S. Secretary of Labor before the U.S. Secretary of Transportation is authorized to
release federal funds to the authority.
With Section 13(c) providing the necessary protections, Congress was able to
establish funding for state and local governments to acquire private transit company
assets while protecting collective bargaining rights. UMTA established the Urban Mass
Transit Administration within the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(eventually moved to the newly created Department of Transportation in 1966) and was
later supplemented by expanding the scope of federal grant funds to include training,
research, and planning (APTA 2003a). This funding policy remained relatively constant
until the Intermodal Surface Transportation Equity Act (ISTEA) of 1991, which
drastically reduced grant moneys by applying formulas to certain metropolitan statistical
populations and reducing the operational assistance provided to mid- and large-sized
cities. The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), passed in 1997
(APTA 2003a), marked a philosophical shift in funding operational costs, as the Federal
Transit Administration eliminated all operational funding for transit systems in
metropolitan statistical areas greater than 200,000. With federal dollars allocated for
planning and capital expenditures only, state and local governments were forced to
significantly increase subsidization for transit operations (APTA 2003b).
This increased subsidization by state and especially local governments (Anas
1982) created a greater need for cities to have increased fiscal control (Groves 1975;
Dunbar 1971). In addition to being parent governments, they were the primary financiers
of operations requiring an increased role in financial decision-making and resource
allocation. Over time cities slowly absorbed the financial functions of transportation
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authorities. With the parent governments having final control over budgets and grant
match funds (Leigland 1993) while instituting more stringent procurement procedures
most public transportation authorities had been stripped of its major fiscal authority
leaving them with authority over routes, fare structures, and low-level policy issues. This
loss of financial control has significantly reduced transportation authorities’ power and
influence.
The Modern Role of Public Transportation Authorities and the Impact on Organizational
Performance
Over time, the arms-length approach to mass transit provision has changed
dramatically. Fifty years ago, local governments were relatively small and unable to
create the high-level policy and structure required to operate complex services (Harrigan
and Vogel 2000) such as public transportation. Since then, the size and scope of city
government has increased dramatically, especially in the area of budgeting and finance,
as local-level public debt is more common and professional city administrators are
demanding a higher level of control over revenues and expenditures. Yet with this trend
toward greater fiscal control by the parent government, the public authority structure
remains the most popular form of mass transit governance nationwide. The essence of
the public authority is a structure focused on fostering business-like operation of public
services with reductions in political and bureaucratic interventions (Mitchell and Doig
1992). Of the many types of public services delivered, mass transit is one of the few
operating like a business. Unlike programs that seek to restrict client use and have high
costs per additional client served, transit sees the public as customers with purchasing
power who may choose to utilize the service and seeks to increase its ridership base
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through service expansion and marketing. In most cases, significant increases in ridership
result in no real increases in delivery cost (fixed cost per service hour) as revenue
generated from additional riders reduces government subsidy (APTA 2003c).
With a focus on increasing ridership, transit must act like a business in terms of
developing business partnerships, while planning and adjusting services to meet customer
needs. Freedom to develop public-private partnerships, oversee and direct service
planning, devise and implement marketing strategies, reorganize departments and staffing
while managing collective bargaining units are significantly inhibited within typical
government structures (Smith 1969). The most important element in the public authority
model is ability to undertake new and creative strategies to promote or maintain selfsufficiency, independent decision-making, and an entrepreneurial spirit of creativity and
innovation often lacking in typical government structure. It is in the environment of the
public authority in which the transit authorities are able to thrive.
Public transportation systems are operating in an environment that is seemingly
counter-intuitive. Despite the obvious need for public transportation to maintain its
hybrid status to develop new transit markets and expand services (especially mass transit
organizations in dense urban areas) public transportation authorities are trapped within a
structure that is slowly removing policy power from the authority board. As fiscal power
is pulled from the grasp of public transportation authorities and centralized within parent
governments the potential arises to weaken the strong working relationship required of
the executive and his or her board. As financial power is taken from the authority and
placed outside of the organization, an environment of increased conflict may emerge
based upon the following expectations:
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1. The shift of fiscal power from the public authority to the parent government
yields a significant loss of the authority’s political power, reducing the
willingness of influential and politically astute individuals to serve on the
authority board.
2. In the absence of high-level political actors, lower-level community activists and
players with service-related agendas fill public transportation board positions.
The lower-level agendas of board members will be focused heavily on servicerelated issues that fall primarily under the scope and authority of the transit
executive.
3. This will lead to greater conflict between the executive and board members as
agendas conflict or as the executive resists involvement by the board in those
areas. The result is decreased support for the executive by individual board
members.
Authorities are often created to manage specialized, high-profile projects that
receive considerable media attention and have meaningful impact on the community. If
the above expectations of reduced policy power caused by a reduction of fiscal power is
accurate then there are significant consequences for transportation authorities. First, the
public authority board is comprised of members with limited political prowess and
efficacy. This makes it extremely difficult for individual board members to develop and
maintain the external political capital necessary to effectively guide the transit system.
Second, the executive is drawn from the usual territory of administering policy and
managing resources into a more prominent role of mission builder and policy maker.
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Third, when the executive must gather and wield support for transit-related issues, the
board’s lack of political capital makes it a relatively weak tool.
Immediately tied to the problem of a board comprised of officials with lowerlevel policy focus is the tendency for these issues to fall under the scope of the executive.
Ideally, boards should view these service-related subjects as minutia to be dealt with by
the executive. In reality, a low-level, policy-focused board becomes overly concerned
with street-level service issues, which already is the members’ focus, is generally easier
to comprehend and requires little effort on part of the board member. This has a direct
impact on the operation and functions of the transportation authority board. The powers
and duties of board, outlined through city or county ordinances, are generally limited to
setting bus fares, approving route changes, and conducting public hearings related to
changes proposed by the transit system administration.
While there are more broad-based responsibilities related to grant applications,
the annual program of projects, and development of short- and long-range transportation
goals (Anas 1982), the board tends to focus on the low-level policies of transit operation.
Rather than spearhead policy initiates to promote dedicated funding, establish minimum
levels of operational efficacy for services or implement more transportation planning,
board members focus attention almost exclusively on system operation. Individual board
member agendas related to key service areas or populations tend to devolve into public
meetings about equipment maintenance, personnel issues, and passenger complaints. The
board members begin to see themselves as advocates of transit users instead of advocates
and governors of the transit system and transportation in general.
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Attention is often placed on issues that are under the established control of the
executive charged with managing and administering the mass transit organization. Issues
such as personnel management, vehicle utilization, and internal procedures are clearly the
responsibility of the system executive and management team; however, under this
scenario, the board seeks and expects to be involved in issues that are outside the scope
of their legal and structural authority. While these issues are undoubtedly important to
overall organizational effectiveness, the more critical component is the impact on the
relationship between the executive and board—the transit agency is likely to be governed
by a board with limited support for the executive. From an agenda standpoint, the main
issues for a low-level, policy-oriented board member tend to be street-level and service
specific that are in contrast to the executive’s preferences or at best have a lower priority
on the executive’s agenda.
Micromanagement of the transit system can result in an increasingly strained
relationship between the board and the transit executive. Considering the board is likely
comprised of some members with individual agendas related to public transportation,
members would have issues related to certain aspects of service, which are frequently
raised at board meetings. Moreover, board members who feel they represent transit
riders act as if they have constituents, despite the authority’s structure of reduced political
influence. These individual issues and preferences will likely conflict with the
executive’s authority and organizational direction to create an atmosphere of friction and
potential hostility. If the executive places emphasis on an area that is not important to the
individual board member, then conflict may ensue, placing a significant strain on the
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executive’s most critical relationship. Multiple board members with varying preferences
can make it more difficult to build and maintain support for the organization.
The result is resentment by the executive, the board, or both. The executive is
frustrated by board member incursions on executive territory and an executive dismissive
of board involvement frustrates the individual board member. Finally, these executiveboard member problems can evolve into conflict among individual board members, as
factions form and infighting creates inaction or counter-productivity. These potential and
likely problems may produce an executive with weakened support from the transportation
authority board. In addition to requiring the executive to spend more time on mission and
policy (and less on the internal organization), the executive must spend more time in the
“care and feeding” of individual board members. In essence the board becomes a
creature of the executive’s ability to build and form coalitions and less a reflection of
policy directives and guidance for the authority. It also makes it exceedingly difficult for
the executive to manage his or her organization, as resources, innovative practices, and
service improvements are delayed or obstructed by board members. It is also more likely
that decisions that result in customer complaints or concerns will be magnified by board
members and decrease confidence in the executive’s leadership and the staff’s ability.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This dissertation seeks to understand the relationship between public authority
board members and executives, an area of inquiry with comparatively little research
related to the board-executive relationship. When attempting to focus on the public
authority structure within the public transportation industry the problem looms greater, as
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public transportation is heavily reliant on this structure with the most important element
being the board-executive relationship. This dissertation seeks to understand this
relationship and contribute to public transportation management and the field of public
administration by employing multiple separately established theories and studies to
examine the board-executive relationship: the public authority structure and its
implications for governance and the dichotomy-duality model and framework of
governmental processes.
The purpose of this research is to understand what factors impact executive-board
relationships in quasi governments, which in turn contributes to policy and execution
related to organizational purpose, as exemplified through the study of public
transportation authorities. First, by applying existing models of local government
functions to transportation authorities, we are better able to identify similarities between
traditional and quasi-governmental organizations in order to understand the shifting lines
of executive and board authority. Second, by studying the expectations related to board
composition, agenda preferences and executive-board conflict, a deeper understanding of
how organizational structure and formal authority may impact organizational
performance is developed.
This research focuses on three research questions to provide this understanding:
1. What are the perceived roles of board members serving on public transportation
authority?
2. Under what circumstances are public transportation authority board members
more likely to seek involvement in decision-making that falls under the
executive’s authority?
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3. What impact does this encroachment on executive responsibility have on board
membership support for the executive?
Governing boards are stomping grounds for political players with political agendas and
interests that may be focused narrowly on the organization’s purpose of a broad base for
impacting services community-wide. The first question is important because it informs
on what individual board members are focused on—their perceptions of their actual and
preferred roles and levels of involvement. We are able to see how board members see
themselves and asks a simple question, “Why do board members do what they do?”
These perceptions allow me to gauge their interest levels in impacting mission, policy,
administration and management while “placing them” in the dichotomy-duality model
(for conceptual purposes only). This research question also allows us to understand both
the actual and preferred roles they play in the organization at the individual and collective
level, permitting us to evaluate the member and board as a whole. Simultaneously, we
are better able to understand what group the member sees as their “constituency” and
how they represent them through their agenda preferences.
The second question targets how the issues wrapped up in individual vs.
collective preferences, perceived vs. actual roles and representation manifest themselves.
To follow the above trend of simplicity, “When do they do what they do?” What agenda
does the board member have and in what ways is this agenda acted on? What factors
trigger involvement in organizational administration and management—is it because their
position requires it or because their individual preferences motivate them? Does this
action and involvement come as a result of perceived constituencies and representation of
because of their own specific preferences?
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The third research question gets directly to the purpose of the dissertation and
basically asks, “What does this mean for the executive?” What is the impact when the
individual seeks a low-level agenda while the executive is pursuing a high-level agenda?
What happens when the executive’s service agenda (low-level) conflicts with interests of
the individual? Is there a residual impact for the executive when board member agendas
conflict? Do the factors in research questions one and two create a strain in the boardexecutive relationship and what impact does it have on board support for the executive?
This research is seeking to further understand and contribute to the scholarly
literature on the public authority structure because structure matters. This dissertation is
attempting to discover nuances in public authority performance and governance through
exploration of the board-executive relationship in public transportation authorities. It is
essential that research reflect back on why structure was created—the assurance of
delivering efficient and effective public services through and organization subdivided
between insulated policy formation and neutral execution of that policy. These research
questions allow us to understand the extent to which this structure functions as designed
and reflect on how the politics of administration operate within the dichotomy-duality
framework. Board member role perceptions, how these perceptions manifest and the
impact of this manifestation on the organization are central to this prescribed reflection.

STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS
This dissertation is designed to inform on how the board-executive relationship
impacts public authorities and examines the broad authority structure through the study of
public transportation authorities. Public transportation provides an excellent forum for
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this research because the industry has a long tradition of authorities and continues to be
heavily reliant on the structure for governance and service delivery. As a result, the
industry remains generally consistent in its application and trends; even with the
multitudes of variation of both board and organizational scope and power the regularized
features and performance objectives permit study across a diverse subset of authorities.
In studying public transportation authorities, a sampling frame constructed to meet
the needs of the research methods employed in this study is essential. Considering the
large number of authorities and available board members and executives eligible for
inclusion in this research, a sample size must be small enough to permit the completion of
the research yet is large enough to yield relevant data for thorough analysis. The sample
must also remain methodologically flexible to fit the exploratory nature of the study, as
this is an attempt to develop deeper understand and build toward theories of governance
and models of public service delivery.
In selecting the sample from the national population of public authority boards,
several conditions for inclusion were established. For purposes of consistency in
information and comparison across individual responses, once an authority was selected
for inclusion in the study, the executive and all individual members of the board were
included in the sample provided the board member had served in their position for least
six months. This ensures the member has sufficient opportunity to learn the norms and
behaviors of the board and become familiar with the transportation system and executive.
In cases where the board member has not filled their seat for six months and has been
excluded from the sample the person previously holding that seat is included, so long as
they have not vacated their position longer than six months. This time frame seeks to
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exclude former board members who may have become unfamiliar with board activities
and interaction with the executive.
This sample is further narrowed by selecting public transportation authorities
from a single state. Within a single state there is increased likelihood for consistency in
structure, powers and patterns of behavior due to limits of enabling legislation and
regulation, state and local funding practices, institutional history and the general trend of
organizations to model themselves after one another. For this study, authorities in
Tennessee were selected for a number of reasons. First, access to board members and
executives can be a significant obstacle to research, as this sample consists of political
and elites. My position as a researcher from The University of Tennessee, the flagship
state university, is expected to spark interest from subjects and access is further enhanced
by my additional role as Chief Operating Officer at Knoxville Area Transit, the public
transportation system for the City of Knoxville, Tennessee. As a transit professional, I
have established contacts with public transportation executives across Tennessee, who
can offer significant encouragement to board members to participate in this study. The
selection of Tennessee’s public transportation authorities as a sample is also beneficial
for matters of convenience. As a practitioner, I have general knowledge of statewide
public transportation activities and have specific knowledge of the systems included in
the sample, which significantly reduces information costs in preparation for data
gathering. Finally, as described above, Memphis was the epicenter of the major
transition from private to public ownership of public transportation resources and the
enabling legislation that permitted it ensures a certain level of consistency in the creation
and governance among the authorities.
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The authorities in this sample are from the cities of Memphis, Jackson, Nashville
and Chattanooga, Tennessee in addition to Lexington, Kentucky. Lexington has been
selected in place of Knoxville, Tennessee for methodological purposes 1 —namely my
close working relationship with the Knoxville Transportation Authority board and
executive at Knoxville Area Transit. Lexington has several similarities to Knoxville:
both serve the same general geographic areas and population levels, have comparable
organizational structures and board powers, operate similar numbers of vehicles and
serve similar numbers of customers.
These cities are of particular interest for a number of reasons. First, local
governments utilize public transportation authorities in five of the six largest urbanized
areas in Tennessee and in the three largest urban areas in Kentucky and these cities
represent five of these eight authorities (U.S. Census Bureau 2004; APTA 2005). Second,
of these five authorities, all use different forms of the public authority structure with
variation occurring in authority power, board size, executive role, and fiscal
responsibility. These states permit, but do not closely regulate local government
formation and management of these authorities. Third, the transit systems are different in
terms of geographic area, service type, size of budget, and both the type and number of
customers served. Despite this variation, these systems are relatively comparable in
terms of range and size; no authority represents an excessively large or small system,
which makes it much easier to draw comparisons. For example, Memphis provides 10.7
million passengers trips annually and the next largest is Nashville with 4.8 million

1

See Chapter II for a complete explanation of this substitution of the public transportation authority in
Lexington, Kentucky for the authority in Knoxville, Tennessee.

46

passenger trips (NTD 2004). In Georgia, the Atlanta transit system provided 70.5 million
annual passenger trips in 2003 while the next largest system in Savannah, GA provided
only 3.6 million trips (NTD 2004), an excessively high variation.
While there is considerable scholarly literature available regarding board
composition and efficacy in the public, non-profit and for-profit sectors, there is little
work that examines the nature of the board-executive relationship with a focus on
understanding this relationship or its potential impact on organizational performance.
The empirical challenge for this particular study is the lack of understanding of what
factors impact the relationship creating a methodological problem regarding the types of
data needed, the variables for measurement as well as the process of analysis. This
dissertation is focused on developing a deeper understanding of the public authority
structure by exploring the factors impacting this critical board-executive relationship and
its implications for governance. While designed to both fill the literature gap on public
authority board-executive relationships and weaving together divergent aspects of
political science theory and models, the thrust of the research is the perceptions of board
members and executives of public transportation authorities. By understanding the
perceptions of board members and executives, a much clearer picture emerges regarding
how future research on public authority relationships may be studied and evaluated.
Considering the emphasis on the relationships between these groups—boards and
executives of public authorities—a study design that permits the cultivation of data that is
highly subjective and attitudinal necessitates the use of qualitative research methods
(Zeldich 1969; Devine 2002). Of the available research instruments, interviews are the
most effective mechanism for obtaining data, as interviews allow subjects to talk freely
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and provide their own perspective on events or issues (Vidich and Shapiro 1969), which
is most effective in gleaning data to inform on the stated research questions.
As Zeldich (1969, 17) describes, institutional norms and statuses are best judged
through interviewing, as the technique is “the most efficient and hence best form” in
comparison to other techniques of qualitative research. In this dissertation, the ability to
obtain information on subjects’ personal backgrounds, their perceptions and preferences
related to board authority and power and what effect this has on the personal relationship
between the board member and the executive is best obtained through the technique of
personal interviews. A semi-structured interview process with a generalized agenda and
pre-selected topics will provide structure; however, the format permits follow-up
questions while “probing responses and ask[ing] for clarification or further elaboration”
(Arksey and Knight 1999, 7).

CHAPTER OUTLINE
Chapter Two presents the study design and methods. This dissertation examines
the broad authority structure through the study of public transportation authorities
because of the industry’s strong reliance across a variety of structural formats. There
remains a significant gap in available data on authorities in general, much less the
relationship between executive and board members in public transportation authorities.
This chapter discusses the research strategy in terms of the value of qualitative research
and the available methods for data gathering considering the type of data required for this
research and analysis. It also explains the rationale for personal interviews as the
preferred qualitative research method, describes the sampling frame and choice of
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Tennessee for a sample (including descriptive statistics of the transit systems involved
and subjects selected for inclusion). Finally Chapter Two offers a detailed description of
the techniques used in the research; i.e., the techniques and questions employed to glean
information from the subjects and the analytical framework used to evaluate the research
questions.
Chapters Three and Four are heavily descriptive and present interview results
regarding relationships between individual board members and executives, board member
backgrounds and experience, and the various viewpoints on board roles and power
including representation. The chapter also presents findings regarding board member
agendas—relating to the authority—and the board member’s actual and perceived roles
in terms of fiscal and high-level policy power. These chapters also examine the actual
and preferred roles in low-level policy formation as well as actual and preferred
involvement in administrative and management issues. In addition to considering the
findings at the individual level this chapter examines data at organizational and collective
levels, identifying differences and similarities in perspectives and preferences.
The research questions and expectations are evaluated in Chapter Five with an
analysis of the data in relation to available fiscal power and high-level policy and the
impact of this power to draw high-level policy players. Attention is paid to the
composition of board transportation authority boards and what impact board composition
has on support levels for the executive and the factors that influence the board-executive
relationship and the issues that lead to increased conflict among board members and
authority executives. Additionally the chapter answers the three research questions
pertaining to the perceived roles of public transportation authority board members and the
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circumstances where these members seek involvement in decision-making under
executive authority. Finally the chapter examines how this encroachment on executive
responsibility impacts board members support for the executive.
The perspectives of board members offered in Chapters Three and Four with
analysis conducted in Chapter Five culminate in Chapter Six’s typology of board member
preferences and behavior that articulates three distinct types of public authority board
members in the areas of policy, advisory and community orientation further subdivided
along lines of broad and narrow focus. This identification of six different board member
types is then considered in relation to the dichotomy-duality model of local governance,
which allows conceptual application of the model to public authority structures while
adding a new dimension that expands the well-known and highly-tested model to
consider individual preferences and incursions on executive authority along with
implications for legislative-executive relationships.
Chapter seven concludes the dissertation. Focus is predominantly on evaluating
what impact fiscal power has on board composition and political influence and the
potential for these factors to increase board-executive conflict. These issues are
discussed in consideration of the dichotomy-duality model and its applicability and utility
in studying public authorities while examining other critical factors or components that
should be contemplated. This chapter presents the full analysis of the research questions
of board member preferences, the circumstances of managerial incursion and the impact
on support for the executive. In addition to analysis of these issues and the applicable
conclusions, this chapter outlines the ancillary results of the interviews in regards to other
factors that have impacted board-executive relationships, allowing for a series of
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recommendations of use to public authority executives and boards, especially those in
public transportation. This chapter also makes a number of general statements regarding
the value of public authorities and the implications of this research for public authorities
in general.
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CHAPTER II
STUDY DESIGN AND METHOD

INTRODUCTION
To provide deeper understanding of the public authority structure and its
implications for governance it is essential to develop an appropriate study design that
answers the research questions outlined in Chapter One. This chapter details the study
design, explaining the strategy of personal interviews to produce the data necessary to
explore the relationships among fiscal authority, board composition and its impact on
executive support while focusing on the subjective aspect of board-executive
relationships. Chapter Two offers the rationale for selecting public transportation
authority board members and executives in Tennessee and Lexington, Kentucky followed
by a description of each transit system included in the study. This description outlines
service-related elements such as ridership, fleet size and organization size—all
standardized characteristics within the transportation industry to permit base-level system
comparisons. This is supplemented with a summary of the authority including board
structure and powers along with recent organizational history, key issues and future
planning. The balance of the chapter is directed at data collection methods and
techniques employed in the research process.

THE CHALLENGE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
Scientific research is a function of process and criteria “for deciding how conflict
about differing views of reality can be resolved” while allowing “‘consumers’ of research
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the ability to critically assess how evidence has been developed and used in reaching a
conclusion . . .” (Hoover and Donovan 1995, 5). While elementary on its face,
employing the scientific method—translated through varying research designs,
populations, devices and techniques—is an object of intense scrutiny and controversy in
the social sciences due to the complexity of human behavior. A successful study design
overcomes many of the obstacles to effective social science and “guides the investigator
in the process of collecting, analyzing and interpreting observations” (Nachmias and
Nachmias 1976, 29) while progressing toward the contextual understanding of results.
Historically, case studies have been the most popular study design for research on
public authorities for two main reasons. First, authorities tend to be organized around a
single service or function, such as housing or port management, which permits
researchers to examine and compare authority response to new services or program
changes across multiple authorities. The benefit of the case study in authority research is
that we are able to make somewhat larger, yet quite limited, generalizations “to
theoretical propositions [but] not to populations or universes” (Yin 1994, 10).
Comparative case studies are highly beneficial to this type of research, as they can “yield
valid causal inferences”, beyond the few cases when systematic description is employed
to help identify key characteristics and phenomena (King, Keohane and Verba 1994).
Second, case studies are frequently used to examine authorities because authorities are
usually formed to solve highly complex and controversial issues and researchers will
examine a single authority by focusing on its individual characteristics such as enigmatic
leadership, distinctive organizational structures or exceptional results. In this instance,
the research is heavily descriptive and surrounds very unique circumstances that have
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virtually no applicability outside the organization but provide an understanding of the
specific expectations that impacted the authority and its outcomes (Yin 1994).
This research is premised and designed differently from previous studies in light
of the expectations stemming result from the loss of financial power and the three
specific research questions all aimed at making broad generalizations about the
effectiveness of public authorities based on the study of transportation authority boardexecutive relationships. While there is significant value in approaching this research
design with a national study to make the study directly applicable to transit governance,
the infancy of this research topic makes this highly problematic. Of primary concern is
the lack of existing scholarly research on public authorities yielding applicable theories,
models or data sets within the narrowed scope of authority board-executive relationships
or posited research questions.
At the same time, a national study is exceptionally difficult due to the unique
nature of public authorities. Authorities are atypical by design and are formed around the
parent government’s legal and cultural values within a framework created by the original
enabling legislation, also shaped by group and individual preferences. This level of
dissimilarity among authorities leads to the understanding—if not emphasis—that
variables of fiscal control, board political prowess and board effectiveness are relative to
the legal, political and cultural norms of the given authority’s community.
Organizational individuality exemplifies this key component of the authority structure
and descriptions of legislative and fiscal authority patterns, similarity of characteristics
among board members or organizational performance evaluation across specifically
defined measures may help to eventually develop a model with potential for nationwide
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applicability. While identifying existent patterns is important to the subject of public
authorities and the impact of structure in public governance this research is focused on
relationships. At this stage of the research process, we are exploring the degree to which
the basic expectations about the relationship among fiscal power, board composition and
political efficacy will be borne out.
The lack of established methodological approaches is also a challenge in
developing this research design. Although this is a unique subject of study there is a
considerable amount of existing research and method related to the duality-dichotomy
model. This model has established an effective and methodologically sound approach to
understanding local government structure by providing a conceptual demarcation of
power between managers and councils along shared responsibility of dimensions of
mission, policy, administration and management. The model uses these four dimensions
to understand the processes and expectations of governance but utilizes a line to
emphasize the fluctuations in the level responsibility for the city manager and the council.
The dichotomy-duality model recognizes actual and preferred power roles among
executives and council members but does not focus on the resulting relationships between
executives and councils. The study of well-defined, isolated variables such as fiscal
control and board composition along with variables outlined in the dichotomy-duality
model can stand alone for comparison; however, this study weaves together a number of
divergent elements for greater understanding of authorities. No established or preferred
methodological model or technique is distinctly tied to this type of study leaving open
numerous alternatives for consideration.
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The most important consideration in this study design is this research is seeking to
understand—to explore the board-executive relationship within the public authority
structure. This is a unique study of public authorities and there remains a gap in the
research for those interested in both public authorities and governance in general. This
research is a challenging first-step toward exploring the uncharted territory of boardexecutive relationships in public authorities. As Glaser and Strauss explain in Discovery
of Grounded Theory, exploration results in the expansion of knowledge through an
inductive process where initial, systematic research yields data on which theory may be
grounded to avoid the “opportunistic use of theories that have dubious fit and working
capacity” (1967, 4).
By focusing on conceptual clarity, cultivation of data and deep understanding of
data, theory is built by the accumulation of evidence through exploration. From a
scientific standpoint, exploration in the social sciences is defined as a “broad-ranging,
purposive, systematic, prearranged undertaking designed to maximize the discovery of
generalizations leading to description and understanding of an area of social or
psychological life” (Stebbins 2001, 3). Robert Stebbins explains, that phenomena tied to
a group, process or activity that is believed to “contain elements worth discovering” must
be approached with flexibility in looking for data and open-mindedness in where to find
it (2001, 6). Most important is knowing where to look and Stebbins echoes Abraham
Kaplan’s (1998, 17) distinction between the logic of discovery through scientific intuition
versus guesswork or trial and error in building a scientific body of knowledge (Stebbins
2001, 24). It is induction, deduction and exploration that are of value in the development
of grounded theory and the expansion of knowledge.
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SELECTION OF STUDY DESIGN
Qualitative Approach
This research is distinctly different from most existing research on public
authorities because emphasis is not on comparing functions or relative success of a type
or specified group of authorities, nor is it focused on the characteristics or composition of
a single particularly successful or flawed organization. The research is interested in
perceptions of executives and board members of public transportation authorities—data
that is highly subjective and attitudinal and which lends itself to qualitative methods of
research (Zeldich 1969; Holloway and Jefferson 2000; Devine 2002). Beyond the basic
concepts of attitude and perception, qualitative methods explore and capture experiences,
associated meanings and the interpretation of events. Most important, qualitative
methods directly capture the “thought processes or narratives that people construct” while
allowing individual and environmental contexts to emerge as part of the interview
process (Devine 2002, 199).
While some of the data sought can be obtained through surveys—especially data
related to descriptive characteristics, policy preferences and levels of executive support
(Sudman and Bradburn 1982; Holloway and Jefferson 2000) the research is focused on
the subjective nature of relationships. Survey instruments offer a highly structured
approach to ensure consistency of data across a statistical sample but a significant flaw in
survey as a technique is there is no environment to survey research, that —“findings will
have meaning only in the context of the ‘survey domain’ . . .” (Bostitis 1990, 42). This is
in direct comparison to other mechanisms to measure attitudes such as personal or
telephone interviews that “intrude as a foreign element into the social setting they would
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describe, [that] create as well as measure attitudes, [and that] elicit atypical roles and
responses” (Webb et al. 1981, 1 in Bostitis 1990, 42). Also, efficient and effective survey
instruments that intrigue respondents and ask the right questions quickly and concisely to
ensure a high response rate are not conducive to the unstructured free response necessary
in this study.
Open-ended survey questions permit the latitude to cultivate opinions and ideas
for the data required of this research (Holloway and Jefferson 2000); however, there are
major concerns with a reliance on open-ended questions to bypass survey instrument
limitations. The survey instrument is a document with no control over the length, depth
or breadth of responses and follow-up questions cannot be tailored to responses. The
instrument is painfully static in this regard. Simultaneously, open-ended questions are
unappealing to respondents because they are time consuming and require writing out
opinions and explanations—far less convenient than options of “circle one” or “check all
that apply.” In addition to a likely reduction of response rate due to an extended effort
those with poor writing skills or are suspect of more probing questions will shorten or
skip answers and introduce bias (Sudman and Bradburn 1982, 150-151; Johnson and
Reynolds 2005, 285).
Interviewing as a Methodological Technique
For this study, the ability to obtain data on subjects’ personal backgrounds, their
perceptions and preferences related to board authority and power and what affect this has
on the personal relationship between the board member and the executive is best obtained
through the interview technique. Here the focus is on institutional norms and statuses,
which are best judged through “the most efficient and hence best form” of interviews in
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comparison to other techniques of qualitative research (Zeldich 1969, 17). Interviews
allow subjects to talk freely and provide their own perspective on events or issues (Vidich
and Shapiro 1969) and “allow people to tell their own story in language with which they
are familiar” (Devine 2002, 199). A semi-structured interview process with a specific
agenda and pre-selected topics provides sufficient structure and latitude in “probing
responses and ask[ing] for clarification or further elaboration” (Arksey and Knight 1999,
7). Most beneficial to the semi-structured process is the blending of both structured and
unstructured interview techniques to amplify benefits and mitigate pitfalls (Arskey and
Knight 1999, Table 1.3).
The subjects in this study are board members and executives in public
transportation authorities—political elites who exercise power on behalf of the public.
Interviewing elites can be a formidable task, as discussed extensively by Lewis Anthony
Dexter in the social science standard, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (1970). Dexter’s
construct of elite interviewing expands beyond class and status; his description of an elite
interview subject is anyone receiving specialized, non-standard treatment. The
interviewer emphasizes 1) the subject’s definition of the situation; 2) encourages the
subject to structure the account of the situation; and 3) permits the subject a high degree
of latitude in including what the subject feels is relevant instead of the interviewer’s
assumptions. For Dexter, the focus shifts from an interviewer subject providing
responses to presupposed questions to an investigator “willing, and often eager, to let the
interviewee teach him what the problem, questions, the situation . . .” may be (1970, 5).
The interview process presents a significant series of challenges, most common is
the selection, identification and recruitment of subjects, all of which must occur before
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researcher and subject actually conduct the interview itself. Access becomes a greater
obstacle when conducting elite interviews, especially when participants are political elites
with limited opportunity to participate and may be suspicious of research interviews and
agendas (Arksey and Knight 1999). Another significant challenge in any interview,
especially elite interviews, is subject familiarity. The ability to develop and ask questions
the “right way” to yield the correct data is difficult but the interview process allows the
subject to “teach” his or her perspective. For elite interviews, the interviewer must
prepare intensely for the interviews by developing in-depth knowledge of the topic and
issues but most important an understanding of participants and mannerisms, including
individual and group behavioral norms and practices, language specific to the subject and
a knowledge of others within the group.
Following the interview is the cumbersome process of transcribing tapes and
handwritten notes, repeating these steps until the population or sample is exhausted or
until the variation in answers ends. Once the information is assembled, only then can the
researcher begin to read, absorb, think, re-read and re-think until the analysis is complete
and a picture emerges from the data. Raw, contextual information from those
experiencing it can be analyzed and interpreted into results and understanding.
Selection of Interview Subjects
Ideally, this dissertation would include a national study of public transportation
authorities by interviewing the national population of transportation boards and
executives or a stratified random sample with possible stratification based on system size
(Henry 1990). However, approaching this from a national perspective study is premature
at this juncture. This study is exploratory, attempting to build toward a deeper
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understanding of public authority governance and looking nationally when the research is
in its infancy would be ineffective. Additionally, the subject and specific research
questions dictate that qualitative research using elite interviews is the most appropriate
method for this study design. Central to selection of this method of inquiry is whether
the research can be completed as described (Dexter 1970; Arksey and Knight 1999).
With the challenging research topic and the difficulty embedded within the interview
technique—participant recruitment, access and subject knowledge—the pure logistics of
a national sample in performing elite interviews is extremely prohibitive in terms of cost
and time frame.
From a standpoint of feasibility and the value of the researched performed, the
question is simple: what sample will best represent the population? Public transportation
authorities in the southeastern United States comprises a probative sample, as they
represent an extremely diverse group of states encompassing a variety of authority types,
sizes and structures. Yet, the number of transportation authorities in the Southeast and
the sheer size of the region present the same logistical and empirical challenges as a
national study. Narrowing focus to a single state becomes a more logical approach, as
the research can be performed within a reasonable amount of time and a single state
creates a level of continuity that is more effective for a study of public authorities.
Tennessee and its public transportation authority board members and executives
have been selected for inclusion in this study. Tennessee was selected for a number of
reasons. First, there is an obvious level of convenience from a geographical and
logistical perspective with this dissertation being completed at The University of
Tennessee. Yet, the logistical benefits assumed are not as critical in consideration of the
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use of telephone interviews. Telephone interviews permit selection of any transportation
authority in the United States with the same logistical effort. What Tennessee offers has
more to do with the performance of the interviews in terms of access to and recruitment
of participants and the reduction of information costs required to properly conduct the
interviews.
Tennessee was selected for another reason. Memphis, Tennessee was the
epicenter of the transition from privately owned mass transportation to the public
authority structure within public transportation. Local governments and services
frequently model themselves after one another, as exemplified by the proliferation of the
Memphis formula across the U.S.; Tennessee’s transit systems’ geographic and political
proximity to Memphis creates an increased level of consistency in the organization of
public authorities in the urban centers of Tennessee. Equally important is the assurance
of consistent enabling legislation—a national or regional sample of authorities could pose
problems related to high variation among state and local laws and the structure of
authorities. By selecting Tennessee, we should see greater consistency through a single
state especially when the state created the model on which almost every other state has
based their transportation authority legislation.
There are number of significant benefits to this study design when focusing on
Tennessee. Reiterating from Chapter One, local governments utilize public
transportation authorities in five of the seven largest urbanized areas in the state (U.S.
Census Bureau 2004; APTA 2005), all with varying forms of authorities and with
considerable local government control. The systems vary in geographic area, service and
budget but are relatively comparable without any system representing an excessively
62

large ridership. In 2005 Memphis provided 12.0 million passengers trips annually with
the next largest ridership in Nashville with 8.0 million followed by Knoxville at 3.8
million (see Table 2.1, all tables located in the Appendix).
A final major benefit of selecting Tennessee is related directly to the elite
interviewing technique. As described above, there are a number of significant,
omnipresent obstacles in interviewing, especially elite and specialized interviewing. The
first major one is access. In terms of access to interview participants, most obstacles
were quickly eliminated due to my professional position of Chief Operating Officer at
Knoxville Area Transit in Knoxville, Tennessee and status as a researcher with The
University of Tennessee. I have established professional relationships with transportation
executives across Tennessee through my involvement with the Tennessee Public
Transportation Association (TPTA), Tennessee Department of Transportation (TDOT)
and system specific best-practice peer reviews and site visits. My position allows me
direct and unfettered access to transit executives across the state. These executives were
also able to provide accurate contact information for board members while encouraging
their participation, which was extremely effective in gaining access to this normally
challenging group of subjects.
The second major issue in elite and specialized interviewing is the researcher
being knowledgeable enough to complete the interviews and garner data that will inform
on the subject and permit detailed and thorough analysis of findings. The interviewee is
permitted greater latitude in determining “what he regards as relevant, instead of relying
upon the investigator’s notions of relevance . . .” (Dexter 1970, 5). The investigator must
be prepared for an interviewee providing nuances and interpreting situations through the
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participant’s eyes. An effective investigator must have a strong background and be adept
and fluent in the topic and language to understand responses, pose follow-up questions
and guide the interview (Dexter 1970; Arskey and Knight 1999).
I have had seven years of involvement with public transportation, the last six on
senior staff of the Knoxville public transportation agency, which is governed by a public
authority, albeit in a primarily advisory capacity. This experience provides expertise in
operational management, funding issues and allocation, board authority and awareness of
the political situations and implications associated with the authority structure. This
experience and work conducted on behalf of this dissertation provided more than
sufficient understanding and expertise to effectively perform this study. I am conversant
in public transportation terminology, trends and issues of nationally and those specific to
both Tennessee and Kentucky, which was critical in this study due to issues of research
bias described below.
My experience and professional interaction with the executive at KAT and the
Knoxville Transportation Authority board has created a high level of understanding and
awareness regarding the public authority structure and has fed much of the development
of the described ideas, exploration of expected patterns of relationships and research
questions. My employment with KAT—one of the five systems in Tennessee utilizing
the authority structure for public transportation governance—creates a direct conflict of
interest, as I am unusually close to the environment and actors that may introduce bias
within the study. Knoxville’s authority board members may be reluctant to be
interviewed or answers could be entirely false, partially true or completely truthful but
incomplete and guarded out of concern for trust.
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To eliminate this problem, I elected to substitute the public transportation
authority of Lexington, Kentucky for Knoxville, Tennessee. This decision is based on
several key factors, most important the relative similarities between the two cities and
their respective transit systems and authority boards. Lexington does differ politically,
employing unified city and county government formally titled the Lexington-Fayette
Urban County Government. The government services of Lexington reach approximately
260,000 people, while the City of Knoxville government serves 174,000 (U.S. Census
Bureau 2000). While this is a significant population variation, the daytime population of
both Lexington-Fayette and Knoxville swell considerably during daytime. Knoxville
expands dramatically at 46% and Lexington by only 11% to bring the daytime scope of
service to 291,000 in Lexington-Fayette County and 254,000 for Knoxville (U.S. Census
2000b). Knoxville’s metropolitan area is considerably larger than the Lexington-Fayette
County area; however, the emphasis is on similarities in the urban areas and in particular
the public transportation elements. The comparison of the public transportation system
elements of Knoxville and Lexington are described in the section below.

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS
Memphis, Tennessee (Memphis Area Transit Authority)
The public transportation system of Memphis, Tennessee is the Memphis Area
Transit Authority (MATA). MATA provides service to the city of Memphis, surrounding
parts of the unincorporated areas of Shelby County, and several incorporated cities
including Germantown and Collierville. MATA also operates subcontract services for
West Memphis, Arkansas, just across the Mississippi River from Memphis.
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Total ridership for the MATA system exceeds 12 million passenger trips annually
with a revenue fleet of 280 vehicles. Fixed route bus ridership is provided along 33
routes to 10.75 million passengers annually with 194 buses while approximately one
million passengers are served annually through the 20-car streetcar system operating in
revitalized, downtown Memphis. MATA-plus, Memphis’s complementary paratransit 2
service, uses a fleet of 65 vehicles to deliver more than 250,000 trips to persons with
disabilities. Approximately 600 employees deliver MATA services with 260 bus
operators, 98 maintenance employees and an additional 200 support staff to provide
customer information, on street supervision, service management as well as
administrative functions. Of the 600 employees, nearly 400 are collective bargaining unit
positions.
Presently, MATA’s greatest challenge is the development and implementation of
a new regional light-rail system to augment the expanded trolley rail system, including
the recently added Madison Avenue line. The new $400 million light-rail plan has
identified a Downtown-Airport corridor of which the FTA share may reach $200 million;
however, some members of the Memphis city council are balking at the grant match
requirement that will occur over the next five to seven years. The state of Tennessee,
also struggling with capital funding for public transportation, must commit funds similar
to the local match required of the city. Considerable local funds have been invested to
match federal dollars for the expansion of the streetcar system and new indoor transfer

2

Paratransit service is generally used to describe non-fixed route services or flexible services and has
gained in popularity due to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1992, which requires all public
transportation providers to offer services to persons with disabilities that are unable to used fixed route
buses due to their disability.
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centers over the past eight years and now political support is waning due to the city’s
budget issues. This declining support is not directed solely at MATA, as Memphis’s
riverfront redevelopment project has experienced similar struggles. The net impact is a
particularly difficult political environment for public transportation in Memphis. While
MATA presses hard for the expansion of services to support Memphis’s economic
growth and potential, the future of the light rail system is a subject that will shape
discussion of public transportation in Memphis for the next twenty years.
Governance is provided to MATA by a seven-member board, all appointed to
three-year terms by the mayor of Memphis and approved by the city council (see Table
2.2 for term comparisons for all boards). Board members are not term limited. The chair
position, appointed by the mayor, serves for two-year terms and is not term limited. The
vice-chair is selected from the board by the board membership for a one-year term and is
also not term limited. Presently, the board membership is comprised of four men and
three women, of which one man and two women are African-American. The MATA
board is responsible for policy and oversight that falls into a number of primary duties:
approval of all purchases and contracts over $50,000 (the executive may initiate
purchases and contracts less than $50,000) including bidding and procurement
procedures; approval and receipt of grant applications and funds; line item budget
approval for submission to the city government; approval of new routes and schedules
and changes to existing ones; setting public fares; holding public hearings; general
oversight of route, budget and management performance with direct hiring authority over
the president/general manager. The annual operating budget of MATA is $47 million
with a capital budget of $18 million.
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The general manager works directly for the MATA board; however, the board
contracts for the Director of Operations position through First Transit, Inc. The Memphis
formula from Chapter One delineates how a private company was established to separate
MATA from the city through a private firm. The private firm is a presently a separate
subsidiary of First Transit, Inc., a national company providing executive management and
support functions on a contract basis. Through a competitive process, management firms
such as First Transit, McDonald Transit and Professional Transit Management propose
management candidates from a recruited pool of experienced managers along with
possible services such as board and executive workshops or assistance in finance
procedures. All MATA employees except the Director of Operations are employed by
the First Transit subsidiary, including the President/General Manager.
The board has no involvement in taxi, limousine or industrial rail transportation—
just public transportation services provided by MATA. Executive management of the
system is the responsibility of the President/General Manager and a support staff that
reports to the executive, who is then responsible to the board membership. The board
utilizes a committee structure to review items on the board meeting agenda. There are
four separate committees: Finance, Marketing, Service Development and Personnel, each
with three board members that review and discuss proposals to provide feedback and
questions prior to the formal monthly board meeting. Proposals are typically initiated
and developed by staff for board review and vote; however, board members can direct
MATA staff to develop items and proposals for board review by a majority vote.
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Nashville, Tennessee (Metropolitan Transit Authority)
Operating in the state capital of Nashville and surrounding Davidson County, the
Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) is the second largest transit system in this study.
The MTA board is comprised of five members, two of who are women and include the
sole African-American on the board. Board members are appointed by the mayor and
approved by Nashville’s consolidated city-county metropolitan government council
(a.k.a. Metro Council) to five-year terms with a two-term limit. Present board practice is
three-year terms for the chair and vice chair, although they are selected to that position
annually with a majority vote of the board. The board utilizes a committee structure for
three separate committees: Finance, Transportation and a Planning & Marketing
Committee. Each committee has two members that review proposals and agenda items
and offer discussion and feedback prior to the formal monthly board meeting.
Executive management is provided through a formal position of Chief Executive
Officer/General Manager that is contracted by, and reports directly to, the MTA Board of
Directors and has gone through considerable evolution in the past few years. Originally,
the general manager was the executive of the system and was selected through a
management contract with McDonald Transit Associates in a manner similar to that of
First Transit Memphis. The board selects the general manager from candidates who are
employees of the management firms and not the board or authority—the MTA board is
the client of the management firm. If the board decides the executive needs to be
removed from the system the board votes to contact the management firm who removes
the manager and offers other qualified replacements for selection by the board.
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Although the board had control over the contract with McDonald Transit and the
general manager, the board wanted greater oversight but did not possess the collective
time or ability to adequately perform the level desired. When a performance and
financial audit outlined a clear financial crisis—near insolvency—the board identified the
necessity of someone working for, and directly accountable to, the board while directly
managing and guiding the general manager on a day-to-day basis instead of the board’s
monthly meetings. In 2002, the board created the position titled Chief Executive Officer
with national search for a candidate to hold ultimate managerial authority and better
guide the organization. The success of the CEO position prompted abandonment of the
management firm practice and on expiration of the contract it was decided to have the
CEO absorb the title and functions of general manager.
MTA has undergone significant change in the past few years, expanding service
and increasing ridership. In 2005 ridership reached 8.0 million passenger trips and can be
attributed to an increased focus on professional staffing and planning, greater emphasis
on capital allocation and vehicle replacement and the overall marketing of services. The
total system ridership saw 7.85 million on the 38-route fixed route system, which
includes a number of express route services for park-and-ride customers. The route
system is supported by 137 buses while a fleet of 57 vehicles supports the 150,000 annual
passenger’s trips on the MTA’s paratransit program. MTA employs 265 operators, 55
maintenance employees and approximately 110 on street, support, managerial and
administrative personnel for a total of 430 employees, 320 of which are represented by
the collective bargaining unit.
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In addition to expanding and restructuring service, Nashville’s focus is on the $40
million Music City Central Station intermodal transit hub in the downtown Nashville
Central Business District. Having secured a location, funding and the support of the
downtown community, the Central Station’s construction will be underway by fall 2006.
Service improvements bolstered by increased funding have allowed MTA to move out of
its fiscal crisis and expand its operating budget to $37 million annually in concert with a
growing capital budget of $13 million. As in Memphis, the board has oversight of
MTA’s comprehensive operation with specific powers of policy and authorization for all
purchases and contracts over $100,000, including: vehicles and services; approval and
receipt of grant applications and funds; line item budget approval prior to submission to
the Metro Council; approval of new routes and schedules and changes to existing ones;
setting public fares; holding public hearings; general oversight of route, budget and
management performance with direct hiring authority over the CEO/general manager.
Chattanooga, Tennessee (Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation Authority)
Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation Authority (CARTA) offers the most
unique and diverse set of services within Tennessee, operating fixed route and paratransit
programs in addition to the Lookout Mountain Incline Railway and an electric vehicle
shuttle system in the downtown core to connect two CARTA-owned and managed
parking garages with downtown businesses and attractions. The Incline railway is a wellknown tourist attraction to the popular Lookout Mountain and transports more than
436,000 passengers per year at a profit to help support the bus, electric shuttle and
paratransit services. CARTA’s sixteen bus routes serve more than 1.7 million passenger
boardings annually with a fleet of 54 buses. The paratransit fleet’s 14 vehicles provide
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40,000 trips per year while the Downtown Shuttle serves 1.0 million passengers through
a fleet of 12 all-electric vehicles. With 165 employees, 100 of whom are operators, 35
maintenance, 30 support and administrative personnel (100 in the collective bargaining
unit), the 3.2 million passengers that use CARTA services have a variety of options to
move about Chattanooga.
Several new projects are on the horizon, first of which is the inclusion of on street
parking within the scope of management and authority of CARTA. CARTA’s
experience in successfully managing two downtown parking garages prompted this move
by city administration. The need for increased parking to support downtown activity has
CARTA working on plans for a third parking garage that will join the others in funding
the Downtown Shuttle’s service. The largest board in the sample governs these diverse
services and of the eleven members on the board there are eight men, three women and
four African-Americans (three men and one woman). With oversight of a $13 million
operating budget, an average $5.0 million capital budget and several major construction
projects with combined value of $10 million, the board is actively involved in a number
of programs and services throughout Chattanooga.
The executive director reports to a board appointed by the mayor of Chattanooga
and approved by city council for five-year, non-staggered terms and no member or officer
of the board is term limited, allowing for a high level of continuity in the board’s
responsibilities of policy and oversight. The exception is a single board member
appointed by the Hamilton County executive to provide voice for the $100,000 the
county supplies to support service to an outlying retail area. The board approves all
contracts including legal, auditing, accounting and architectural services as well as all
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vehicle and equipment purchases. The board treasurer signs off on all expenditures over
$2,000 regardless of purpose. The board reviews and votes on all grant applications and
receipt of funds; performs line item budget review for approval before submission to the
mayor and council; advice, counsel and review of the union contract; approval of new
routes and schedules and changes to existing ones; setting public fares; holding public
hearings; general oversight of route, budget and management performance and direct
hiring authority over the executive director.
Executive management of the system is the responsibility of the executive
director and support staff. The board utilizes a committee structure comprised of five
committees: 1) the Incline Committee to oversee the Lookout Mountain Incline; 2) the
Downtown Committee for the shuttle and parking garages; 3) the Executive Committee
that reviews budget, finance and labor management issues; 4) a Service Planning
Committee to provide input on routes and services; and 5) a Strategic Planning
Committee to help shape the long-term vision of CARTA. Each committee has three
board members to provide insight and ask questions to help guide staff before the formal
monthly board meeting. As with most authorities, proposals are initiated and developed
by staff for board review and vote with guidance provided by the committees.
Jackson, Tennessee (Jackson Transit Authority)
The Jackson Transit Authority (JTA) is the public transportation system of
Jackson, Tennessee located approximately ninety miles east of Memphis. JTA is the
smallest transportation system in this study and is the smallest formal authority in the
state of Tennessee in terms of budget, fleet and ridership. For the past three years, a
storm that spawned a series of tornadoes and destroyed large sections of the city has
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shaped the focus and literally the landscape of Jackson. This city is still recovering from
the disaster and decisions made in the storm’s aftermath permeate all aspects of the
community, especially in public transportation. New construction and development are
competing with the rebuilding areas for resources and attention and creates a citywide
need for transportation; however, Jackson’s limited financial resources make it difficult
for JTA to expand much less maintain present services.
A total of thirty-eight employees provide and support service to eight fixed routes
with thirteen buses and a complementary paratransit service with a fleet of seven vans.
Of thirty-eight employees, 25 are bus and paratransit operators and 6 are in maintenance
for a remaining seven employees not in the collective bargaining unit. The JTA provides
approximately 480,000 passenger trips annually: 446,000 on its fixed route system and
34,000 through paratransit service. The struggles to rebuild Jackson are mirrored by
JTA. Housed in an outdated facility not large enough to allow for effective maintenance
and operations of its growing and modernized vehicle fleet, JTA has been stockpiling
federal state and local capital funds to build a new operations and maintenance facility.
The city is attempting to use in-kind property for local match funds but has had difficulty
obtaining environmental approval and commitment from TDOT to provide a consistent
stream of funding to begin and complete the project. If this site is not deemed noncompliant with environmental codes there may be issues related to additional city-owned
property or the cash contribution required of the city for project fruition.
The new maintenance and operations facility is the primary focus of the board and
executive management, as this modernized facility is expected to be the watershed of
public transportation service and support in Jackson. The board is comprised of seven
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members appointed to five-year terms by the mayor and approved by city council. Board
members are limited to two terms and the board president (chair) and vice-president (vice
chair) are selected by the board membership. The terms of the president and vice
president are limited only by their tenure on the board. The board has one woman and six
men serving, of which four men are African-American. The board is limited to services
provided by JTA and responsible for policy and oversight similar to the systems
described above. Powers include: approval of all purchases and contracts over $10,000;
approval and receipt of grants; budget approval and approval of the union contract;
approval of new routes and schedules and changes to existing ones; setting public fares;
holding public hearings; and the general oversight of route, budget and management
performance. The annual operating budget of JTA is $2 million with a generally
consistent capital funding stream of $400,000 annually.
The board also selects the executive management via an operational management
contract with First Transit, also through a competitive process. The general manager is
the employee of First Transit and the board is the client. The general manager serves at
the will of the board via the contract with First Transit. Executive management of the
system is vested in the general manager and support staff that reports to the executive,
who is then responsible to the board membership. The board does not use a committee
structure or pre-meeting workshop format. Business and discussion is conducted at the
monthly board meetings.
Knoxville, Tennessee (Knoxville Area Transit)
Knoxville Area Transit (KAT) provides public transportation service to the City
of Knoxville under the Knoxville Transportation Authority (KTA). KAT has
75

significantly expanded services over the past five years through a major partnership with
The University of Tennessee to provide transit services to the flagship campus in
Knoxville and a separate revitalization of an established but once-declining downtown
trolley system. These efforts combined with fixed route and paratransit service grew
ridership to more than 3.3 million passenger trips in fiscal year 2005 with an operating
budget of $14.5 million and a capital budget of $850,000. This capital funding does not
include nearly $20 million in allocated funding for an intermodal facility to be located the
heart of downtown Knoxville. This project has had a number of setbacks surrounding the
solidification of a construction site within the downtown core, despite secured FTA
funding. This project has been in planning phase for more than five years and is the most
significant challenge facing the organization. This facility is the hub of mass transit for
the third largest city in the state of Tennessee and like in Nashville is extremely important
for the sustenance of the system.
What is distinct about KAT’s services is the use of specialized services to
augment its core services. Of its 3.3 million passenger boardings, approximately 1.5
million trips came from university (1.1 million), trolley (450,000) and paratransit
(50,000) programs and services for a core system ridership of approximately 1.5 million
passenger trips. This level of ridership is extremely high in both university and fixed
route (15 routes) service in consideration of the limited size of the university campus and
the relatively small urban population of the city limits. KAT services are maintained by
an organization of approximately 270 employees, of which 175 are bus operators, 45
mechanics and service employees and 55 various other support and administrative staff.
There are approximately 225 employees in the collective bargaining unit. On street
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service is provided by 121 revenue vehicles, of which fourteen are trolley buses, thirtyone are paratransit vehicles and finally a fixed route bus fleet of seventy-six vehicles.
Executive management of the general manager is provided through a management
contract between the City of Knoxville and Professional Transit Management similar to
that of Jackson and what once existed in Nashville.
Oversight of KAT is provided through the KTA, which varies considerably from
authorities described above. The KTA is not limited to oversight of the transit system,
providing oversight of all ground transportation services in Knoxville including
community services organizations, van pools and taxi services. While the board has
these additional sources of authority, focus is on KAT and taxi cabs, including appeals of
taxi license denials and taxi fare rates. The most important difference from other systems
described is the primary role of the KTA as an advisory board. The City of Knoxville did
not establish KAT/ KTA as a truly separate entity, as the city requires KAT to operate
very closely in terms of utilizing procurement, technical and legal services of the City of
Knoxville. This significantly reduces the involvement of the board in terms of contracts
and procurement; however, the KTA must formally approve all grant applications, the
capital program of projects for capital grant purchases and sets public fares for all routes
and services. The board has a decreased level of involvement in the budgetary process
but does approve the budget for recommendation to the mayor and city council.
Unlike the other systems described above and Lexington below, the KTA board
does not have control of the management contract. The City of Knoxville initiates the
request for proposals and oversees the selection process, including control of the
selection committee and awarding of the contract, which must be passed by city council.
77

The mayor of the City of Knoxville accepts the recommendation of the committee and
the general manager of KAT serves at the pleasure of the mayor via Professional Transit
Management’s obligation to provide a general manager. If the mayor requests
replacement, the firm will provide candidates for interview and replacement for selection
through a method deemed acceptable by the mayor. In this instance, the executive truly
has two separate masters—the mayor who controls the organization’s funding, fate,
project authorization and direct employment and a nine-member board that votes on the
proposals for service changes fares and oversees financial and operational performance.
The KTA is very similar to the other transportation authorities in most other ways.
The mayor appoints seven of the nine members of the KTA board with council approval.
One additional board member is selected by the city council from their own membership
and the final board member is selected from the Community Advisory Committee to
Knoxville Area Transit, a group of community stakeholders that includes passenger,
business and government representatives. Terms are not limited, with exception of the
chair, vice-chair and advisory committee positions (two years each). The city council
representative is not term-limited by KTA bylaws but rather city charter, which results in
natural turnover of that position due to term limits. The board approves all service
changes, conducts public hearings and reviews the financial and operating performance
as measured through expenditures, revenue, ridership and general system operation.
Lexington, Kentucky (LexTran)
The most interesting system context in this study is LexTran in Lexington,
Kentucky, a city with government and university programs providing the bulk of
employment and economic development in the area. Unlike KAT, which was able to
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overcome the industry’s financial woes of the 1980s and 1990s through more supportive
local funding and increased capital support while leveraging a large university services
contract during the early part of this decade, LexTran struggled financially to the brink of
collapse. Beset with declining financial support from federal, state and local sources,
LexTran reached a breaking point during 2002 – 2003. The system had slowly
eliminated routes, decreased service hours, depleted its administrative support staff
through attrition and non-replacement and was in a downward spiral. Within this
environment unfolded an extremely poor labor-management relationship with the local
union and meanwhile general managers struggled to keep themselves and the system
afloat. The eight-member LexTran board, responsible for governance and direction of
the system experimented with professional management contracts, then direct
employment of executive management but decided new direction was needed to improve
the system and a management firm was hired to provide that direction. The board
selected Professional Transit Management with a new general manager that lasted only a
few months before being replaced by another, now present, general manager.
With its third general manager in a six-month period, LexTran was barely
surviving yet had ironically been green-lighted in June 2004 to place a property tax
referendum on the November 2004 ballot of consolidated Lexington-Fayette County
Urban Government. The referendum was pushed forward by local businesses and the
LexTran board in recognition of the link between public transportation and economic
development, especially within the service-oriented economy and the area’s desperate
need for entry-level workers. Needing a normal eighteen months to prepare the
marketing, advertising and political campaign necessary to raise support for the
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referendum the entire process was condensed into a six-month effort. Lacking open
political support of the mayor and council, many of whom would stand for re-election
that November, LexTran approached the referendum with a grass-roots effort. Focusing
on the university community, local churches, low-income neighborhoods, social service
agencies, small business and industries reliant on minimum wage and entry level
workers, LexTran board members and employees worked tirelessly to educate and inform
the citizens of Lexington.
When the referendum passed, LexTran had established a dedicated stream of
revenue that would allow it to not just survive but prosper. While the transit industry
raised fares and reduced service to offset the massive fuel costs of 2005 – 2006 (see
Chapter Three for a more detailed description), Lexington has restored lost services and
maintained lower fares. LexTran is the only authority in this study that did not pass or
prepare for a fare increase in the last year for the direct purpose of maintaining budget.
Change has been focused on returning lost service in critical areas while looking at
lucrative opportunities to expand ridership and grow revenue. Yet, change is slowed by
two factors. First, the hiring and training of new employees, developing new routes and
services and procuring equipment—all while readying the organization and the
community for new service—is a long process of planning and development where
patience is highly valued and extremely necessary. Second, there is keen awareness
within LexTran (especially the board) that taxpayers have placed trust in LexTran and
funding must be deliberately spent for an effective, efficient and highly used system.
Despite this success, there is a high level of labor-management tension playing
out politically with union leadership approaching elected officials, board members and
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the media to create increased awareness of problems in the community. The result is
considerable discord among employees, creating difficulty in system governance and
management despite a very positive era in LexTran’s history. The board has been pulled
into a number of issues surrounding labor issues and despite best efforts to keep a
distance it has pervaded board functioning and is a source of concern for city leaders, the
board and the general manager.
The board is evenly split with four men and four women, although there is only
one African-American female member due to the relatively recent resignation of a male
African-American board member. Board members are limited to two four-year terms and
are appointed by the mayor and approved by metro council to oversee the present
LexTran operations of 133 employees (91 operators, 19 maintenance and 23 support and
administrative personnel of which 110 are in the collective bargaining unit). Of these
employees, 51 positions have been added in the past 12 months. There are presently 51
revenue vehicles to support the 18 fixed routes that LexTran operates with an expected
August 2006 roll-out of four new routes supported by the addition of seven leased buses
for a fleet total of 58. With system ridership exceeding 2.0 million in 2005 and a 2006
ridership of 2.8 million, Lexington is clearly progressing. Of the $15.1 million FY2006
available operating budget, $11.mmillion was actually expended to operate and support
service allowing the $4.6 million surplus from the dedicated funding to combine with the
capital budget of $3.7 million to procure new equipment and implement initiatives.
KAT and LexTran System Comparison
LexTran ridership is significantly lower than KAT’s, as the University of
Kentucky (in comparison to The University of Tennessee) contracts with LexTran for a
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minimal level of service on two routes that combine for a ridership of 660,000 annual
passenger trips. Additionally, LexTran annually contracts with the local Red Cross at a
cost of $1.8 million to provide approximately 110,000 paratransit trips per year for
complementary paratransit rather than directly operate the service. When stripping away
KAT’s higher-levels of university, paratransit, downtown trolley system and additional
services the gap for comparison between Knoxville and Lexington lessens considerably,
with Knoxville providing nearly 20% more passenger trips; however, Lexington has
reestablished itself and is beginning to mirror the progressive approach KAT has taken
over the past five years. The approximate difference in the number of passenger trips is
450,000, transit buses are 7 and employees are 35 when accounting for the high level of
non-core system services KAT offers. The overall ridership gap between the two systems
in 2005 was 1.3 million passengers but in 2006 narrowed considerably to a difference of
only 600,000 total passenger trips due to LexTran’s massive service increases. It is
within this scope, along with the demographic similarities between the cities described
earlier in the chapter that allows for reasonable comparison of these two systems.
Similarities also exist between LexTran and KAT in terms of the organizational
management via the board and executive. Both executives have been system heads for
comparable periods of time—two and five years in Lexington and Knoxville respectively.
These lengths are close considering executive tenure ranges from more than 30 years to
two years, and Professional Transit Management employs both general managers for
executive management and consultation under contract. The authorities have similar size
with eight voting members in Lexington and nine in Knoxville.
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The LexTran board approves all purchases and contracts over $50,000, directly
approves the budget with near-final budget authority and directly oversees the
Professional Transit Management contract. The board’s near-final budget authority is
due to state statute that requires the budget to go before the mayor and council; however,
they typically approve it “as is” because the board has already formally approved the
budget. The LexTran board shares very similar functions with the KTA in terms of
responsibility for policy and oversight: approval of grant applications; new routes and
schedules and changes to existing ones; public fares and hearings; and general oversight
of route, budget and management performance—including direct involvement with the
management firm. There are clear differences in terms of fiscal power, as the City of
Knoxville is the fiscal agent of KAT and provides direction and oversight of procurement
and contracts, although the KTA does have voting authority over the annual program of
projects and can direct the reallocation of capital planning and expenditures.

THE INTERVIEW PROCESS
Research for this dissertation proceeded in two stages. Stage one was a pretest of
interview questions for the board members and executive in the sample. The pretest was
conducted with the executive of KAT and board members of the Knoxville
Transportation Authority because they were eliminated from the study sample as
described above. This process allowed for refinement of interview techniques to ensure
questions were crafted to elicit the appropriate response and to determine how
respondents reacted to more probing follow-up questions supplied by their answers.
Following each of these pretest interviews the content was discussed to identify questions
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and areas where they felt a tendency to be reserved in responses while offering
suggestions for taking advantage of opportunity to draw out more detailed answers on
potentially controversial subjects. This post-interview discussion also allowed for
explanation of question purpose and interview subjects provided feedback regarding
question content and intent and how they or other respondents might feel in revealing
certain types of information. No part of the responses from the pretest process was
included in the findings, analysis or conclusions.
Once pretesting was complete, stage two of the research began. Stage two began
by first making telephone contact with all the executives of the five transit systems who
agreed to participate in the study. All executives in the five transit systems were included
in the sample. I followed up with recruitment letters and sought their further assistance in
recruiting board members by obtaining board information, including position, term
length, mailing addresses and other avenues of contact. The executives also indicated a
willingness to encourage board participation, even going so far as to agree to mention the
research project at workshops and send out e-mails.
Recruitment letters were then sent to the board members by system in phases to
elicit clustered and delayed responses, attempting to create limited waves of responses
and scheduling to cluster interviews for subject topical continuity. Follow-up telephone
calls, e-mails and re-mailing allowed me to focus on system boards and schedule
interviews in clusters. Past and present public transportation authority board members of
these five systems were included in the study. Past members must have completed their
term no more than one year prior to the date of the interview and were only included if
the person filling the seat they vacated had been serving on the board less than six
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months. This was done to ensure all board members had sufficient time to learn the
formal and informal powers and roles while simultaneously avoiding interviews and data
from board members who had been removed from the processes for too long of a period
and might skew data.
Interviews were scheduled to have as many interviews as possible occurring from
the same transportation system before moving on to the next system. For example, in this
study as many Memphis board members as possible were interviewed before moving on
to Nashville, followed by Chattanooga, Jackson and finally Lexington. This approach
could not be rigidly followed for several reasons. First, some board members were slow
to respond to recruitment letters, telephone calls and e-mails, meanwhile I was receiving
a strong response and had need to schedule interviews with board members from the next
subsequent system. A small grouping, at least one board member from every transit
system—after considerable effort to contact them—either directly declined to participate
or indirectly declined by failing to acknowledge the original mailings, follow-up mailing,
telephone calls and e-mails (where possible). Efforts were not abandoned after several
weeks of attempts and this would have unreasonably and excessively delayed the
research process and seriously impaired my ability to recruit and retain executive and
board member participation as interest would weaken over time. Also, a number of the
interviews required rescheduling because of additional commitments on part of the board
member. Several of these required rescheduling to dates where I had already planned
interviews with the next system and could not maintain the rigid schedule without
sacrificing professionalism and a genuine risk of offending elite interview subjects and
compromising the overall study.
85

Of the forty-three individuals in the original sample, thirty-seven participated for
an overall response rate of 84%. All five executives and thirty-one of the thirty-eight
board members participated in the study for executive and board response rates of 100%
and 82% respectively. Of the six that did not participate, five declined directly or
through non-acknowledgement and one was excluded from the research due to the study
design-imposed requirement of at least six months experience on the authority board.
The individual this board member replaced could not be reached due to professional
commitments, which had actually spurred this individual’s original resignation. Of the
six that declined, only two directly informed me they would not participate. The
remaining four did not acknowledge the multiple attempts to contact them and efforts
were abandoned after approximately six weeks.
There were a total of thirty-seven interviews of board members and executives
with seven from Memphis, five from Nashville, ten from Chattanooga, six from Jackson
and nine from Lexington (see Table 2.3). Interviews were conducted by telephone and
lasted anywhere between 30 - 100 minutes in length, as determined by breadth, depth,
interest and willingness of the interview subject. Almost all interviews ranged between
55 – 65 minutes. They occurred between April 28, 2006 and June 30, 2006 using a semistructured interview process where pre-selected questions, approved by The University of
Tennessee Office of Research, were asked of board members with separate questions for
executives (see Tables 2.4 and 2.5). Some questions were the same for both executives
and board members and most touched on the same general topics but were crafted to
board or executive responsibility and perspective.
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Follow-up questions were based on subject responses and in some instances
individual questions or question lines were abandoned during the interview because
participant answers to certain questions answered later questions or rendered them
unnecessary. The participant’s level of interest and expertise in certain question lines or
subject matters, and the general direction in which the participant guided the interview,
also impacted question flow. In these instances, efforts were made to touch on the main
themes of questions to provide sufficient data to compare responses and gain sufficient
data to properly evaluate the propositions and answer the research questions.

CONCLUSION
It is the data, collected through the interview process described above, which is
summarized extensively in Chapters Three and Four. Chapter Three’s emphasis is on the
perspectives of executives and Chapter Four is dedicated to board member responses.
Data was approached at the overall level and the individual level where appropriate to
allow for analysis of group and personal perspectives in consideration of the expectations
and the research questions. The chapters offer descriptions of transit system executives
and board members followed by in-depth summaries of the interviews and data related to
executive and board member perspectives. Attention is on the roles, formal and informal
responsibilities and individual agendas as they relate to policy and management authority.
This discussion then examines the various viewpoints on board and executive roles in
consideration of the respondent perspectives on agendas and actual and preferred
responsibilities.
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CHAPTER III
EXECUTIVE PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION
The essence of this study is understanding what factors impact the critical
relationship between an executive and his or her board. The discussion to this point has
provided a substantial argument that the executive-board relationship may be the most
difficult and sensitive partnership in public administration, as it involves clear political
agendas and strong demands for technical expertise and apolitical administrative and
executive leadership in an environment of intense oversight and accountability. Yet in
most public authorities neither the board nor the executive has its own elected
constituency; almost all are appointed by a single political entity and approved by a
separate political body. All the while the board and executive have the body politic as
stakeholders and shareholders with the public authority and organization charged with
greater challenges and expectations for performance.
As a result, the understanding of both the board-executive relationship and what
impacts it is of vital importance to governing the delivery of public service and the quasigovernmental phenomenon within public transportation. This chapter first provides brief
context of the impact of rising fuel costs on public transportation, as alluded to in Chapter
Two, before moving into an overview of the executives’ experience before examining
their perspectives on public authorities and boards. Perspectives are summarized
surrounding five emergent issues: 1) executive focus; 2) formal responsibilities and
effectiveness; 3) informal responsibilities and effectiveness; 4) political effectiveness of
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board members; and 5) the relationships and the factors influencing these relationships.
The chapter concludes with a review of the emergent themes and aspects of the boardexecutive relationship and how executives effectively manage the organization and their
boards.

THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION FUNDING AND FUEL COSTS
The understanding of a single issue is critical to understanding public
transportation over the past two years—the cost of diesel fuel. Historically, diesel fuel
has been relatively inexpensive and cost effective for the public transportation industry
with prices at a generally low, consistent rate with slight variation by region or market
fluctuation. During 2004, unleaded and diesel fuel costs grew considerably, forcing
public transportation systems—including other public services reliant on vehicle use such
as police and fire—into a budget crisis. Most transit systems reallocated budget items,
had costs absorbed by the parent government or had minor revenue increases to manage
the increased cost with minor issue. In September 2005, Hurricane Katrina’s impact on
the U.S. fuel market drove prices to more than $2.00 per gallon when most public
transportation systems in the Southeast budgeted $1.35 - $1.50 per gallon, numbers well
above the anticipated market. An industry reliant on fuel has been in fiscal control mode
since. Initial concerns were directed at the fuel supply with questions of whether the
storm would create a diesel and unleaded fuel supply shortage. Serious discussion was
held at the state and national levels regarding how the industry would handle an outright
fuel shortage similar to the 1970s. As fuel production levels returned, shortage concerns
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were alleviated but there was no meaningful cessation of fuel prices, especially in the
diesel market on which all public transportation systems rely.
When unleaded fuel prices for the average American exceeded $3.00 per gallon in
fall 2005, public transportation received greater awareness and ridership from the nontransit dependent commuter but attention was short-lived as Americans adjusted to high
fuel costs and returned to single occupancy vehicle use. Mass transit saw a ridership and
revenue increase, even retaining some long-term riders from this period. The problem is
the ridership and revenue spike, and small number of regular riders they retained, was
negligible in comparison to the massive budget shortfall the industry faced in fiscal year
2006. The high price of fuel and the resulting budget shortfalls were undoubtedly the
most pressing issues industry-wide.
Fuel budgets of most public transportation systems have doubled in the past three
years from 2005 to the proposed budgets of 2007. Each transit system in the United
States has been directly impacted by the cost of fuel and while each individual system has
its own local projects and concerns, the fuel cost problem presented a budget
management crisis. Boards and executives have been forced to make difficult financial
decisions that have resulted in fare increases, service reductions in terms of routes,
frequency and hours of operation, the cancellation of marketing and development
programs and the elimination of support staff positions in order to meet budget
requirements. This is juxtaposed with a national trend of increasing annual public
transportation use when fuel costs are hitting Americans at home and riders need
transportation most. As a result, each of the transit systems described below have been
embroiled in budget, expenditure and revenue issues, all while trying to balance the needs
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and wants of its users vs. the fiscal solvency of public services. All but one of these
systems had a fare increase or service reduction (some both) and only one of those had a
fare increase in the previous ten years.

EXECUTIVE BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTIONS
Five public transportation authority executives (herein referred to as executives,
general managers, GMs or similar regardless of formal title) were included in this study
and present an extremely diverse set of experiences. Of the five GMs, none has traveled
an even remotely similar path to date. In Memphis, Will Hudson—the single AfricanAmerican executive in this study—has been associated with MATA for forty two years,
beginning as a bus operator in the segregated South during a time when black drivers
where required to have college degrees while white counterparts needed only a high
school diploma. Moving from driver to operations supervisor and director with
experience in route planning and scheduling, then marketing and customer service,
Hudson became GM in 1993 after a nation-wide search to replace the previous executive.
The previous GM had resigned after a political falling-out with the mayor and board
appointments. While on staff at MATA, Hudson witnessed the impact of the boardexecutive relationship, the value it offers and the obstacles it presents.
With forty-two years experience, thirteen as executive, Hudson has the most
experience in the industry and within an individual system; however, he has the second
longest tenure of executive management at their present system. CARTA’s Tom Dugan,
has been executive since 1980. Graduating with a Masters in City Planning from Ohio
State University, Dugan worked briefly for the Ohio Department of Transportation and as
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a consultant to the city of Lima, OH before becoming directly involved in public
transportation management in Ft. Wayne, IN. When there, he decided to move into
executive management as GM or assistant GM (AGM) and within two years was at
CARTA as the AGM. When the GM moved on, Dugan ascended to the GM position and
has served there since, with exception of brief career change in 1985 - 1986 but was
asked by the CARTA board to return due to failing health of the acting GM. Since,
Dugan has retained the seemingly unwavering support of the board, most of whom have
ten or more years of service with CARTA.
Another executive in the study with a long history in management is Paul Ballard
of the Nashville MTA, although his tenure in Nashville began just four-and-a-half years
ago in January 2002. Like Hudson, Ballard worked his way from the front lines as a
brakeman on the Boston & Maine Railroad and then the campus bus system in
Bloomington, IN as a mechanic before becoming a driver, supervisor and then supervisor
in charge of training. When Bloomington’s city service opened, Ballard became general
manager for a brief period before serving in the same capacity in Winston-Salem, NC.
Ballard then spent ten years as a regional vice president for a national management firm,
which held numerous contracts throughout the South and Mid-west, before Ballard
became GM in St. Louis, MO. He returned to management firm corporate offices as
president for four years and after leaving opened his own consulting firm, providing
interim executive leadership for transit systems before accepting the position of CEO in
Nashville. Although Ballard has several years of diverse experience, he has just
established himself in Nashville and has nearly the same level of experience at his system
as the other two executives, both in their first efforts as GMs. Ballard has quickly gained
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board and staff respect with his turnaround of what one board member called an
“embarrassment” due to the disarray of system of the state capital.
Johnny Gullett, general manager of JTA in Jackson, TN, began his transit career
in Nashville, TN as the Director of Maintenance before moving to Charlotte, NC as the
AGM of Maintenance for the Charlotte Transit Authority (CTA). When the management
firms changed, Gullett was out in Charlotte and found himself as a candidate for the
general manager’s job in Jackson, TN. Gullet had grown up in Memphis with ties to
Jackson, making it look like a perfect fit except for problems JTA had recently faced.
The previous GM had left among of a swirl of controversy that included arrest on charges
of misappropriation of public funds (charges were eventually dropped). This coincided
with a very intense board-executive relationship where strong sentiments of several black
board members insisted that JTA management be representative of the ridership and
workforce, demanding black leadership at executive and senior management levels. The
replacement of perceived problem board members and the addition of Gullett at the helm
since August 2003 have quelled concerns. His first foray into a GM position and
reporting to a board has been successful to date.
Like Gullett, Teri Garcia-Crews, the sole female GM and sole executive or board
member of Hispanic descent, is quite new to executive leadership and board
responsibility but had served as an AGM prior to LexTran. LexTran was actually her
second official GM job, serving briefly as interim-GM in Poughkeepsie, NY, but with no
board and the city administration as the client. Garcia-Crews moved to Lexington in
summer 2004, via New York and Tucson, where she had attended the University of
Arizona and obtained a degree in Business Administration before working in the private
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sector banking industry. First becoming involved in transit management as the Director
of Marketing for SunTran in Tucson, Crews has accepted the challenge of overseeing an
entire operational organization. Garcia-Crews took the reins of leadership during an
extremely difficult time and is just starting her third year in Lexington.

EXECUTIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE BOARD-EXECUTIVE RELATIONSHIP
Executive Focus
While these five GMs have extremely divergent backgrounds in education,
experience, career path and tenure, more often than not they speak with the same voice
when discussing their roles and responsibilities. All are focused on a single primary
issue—budget and finance. While the financial crisis caused by fuel prices placed focus
on fuel budgets and shortfalls, the executives have described fiscal management and
solvency as the single most important aspect of their regular duties. Two executives
came about their present positions due to near bankruptcy of their respective systems in
Nashville and Lexington. Even with more stable funding these executives remain budget
focused because as one illustrated, “Funding is the key and you can never relax from it.”
Another executive, when asked if their focus had changed after taking charge and
resolving the initial fiscal problems of the authority, supported this, adding, “Fiscal
responsibility is always there.”
Nashville and Lexington were in financial crisis for similar reasons. A lack of
executive financial management and information sharing had resulted in a lack of staff
initiated service reduction proposals to maintain budget and boards were so uninformed
they did not understand the miserable financial situation. In Lexington, services funded
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years before under specialized grants had eligibility expire with no provisions to cut
service without replacement funding. The same issue evolved in Nashville as either zerogrowth or decreased general fund contributions had MTA trying to deliver equal service
levels with less money and growing costs. Getting both systems back on budget through
difficult service reduction, wise spending, steady funding and budget management was
critical to system turnaround.
It is arguable the new GMs in Nashville and Lexington entered their positions due
to prior financial crisis where no executive could succeed; however, financial struggles
have been part of transit history from the 1950s forward. The movement from private to
public ownership of mass transit was due to lack of sustainability due to markets and has
shaped the industry since. Environments faced by past executives in Nashville and
Lexington emerged in the 1980s when federal operating assistance for transit was
reduced and systems made constant service cuts to stay on budget. CARTA is a key
example of this problem and Tom Dugan, just after becoming GM in 1980, entered an era
when the surplus of financial assistance ended. After years of contributing little or
nothing to transit, cities had to allocate money to keep buses moving.
When federal funding changed and required cities to fund massive local budget
increases, Chattanooga’s political leaders did not offer requisite political or financial
support and a third of CARTA services were pulled off the streets between 1980 and
1985. Meanwhile the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) reduced programs around the
Southeast hurting systems like CARTA with when regular TVA riders (TVA had actively
supported transit use for employees) dwindled to virtually nothing. In this environment,
focus was constantly on budgets, shortfalls and deciding what to eliminate next. More
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recently, MATA has experienced similar problems when the City of Memphis offered
three consecutive years of zero-increase budgets forcing route frequency reductions,
shortened and restructured routes and a series of fare increases to piece together budgets
against growing costs.
In all five executive interviews, budget management was identified as the most
essential function of the job. In times of fiscal crisis, cost containment was identified as
the most critical factor, as is budget management and staffing expertise. The challenge
for executives is containing spending within the confines of revenue streams—user fares,
state and federal grants funds, private partnerships and local allocations. Executives must
budget and maintain awareness of the financial picture of the organization at every level
while relying on staff to manage the more than $120 million in combined operating and
capital budgets of the systems in this study. Budget formulation is a management
function and represents an allocation of attention and resources. Support staff and senior
managers must carefully follow financial directives and maintain spending discretion
because unexpected, unexplained or unmanaged budgets are career killers within public
transportation.
Executive Perspective on Formal Board Responsibility
In decision-making and influence regarding budgeting, finance and capital
projects executives described a situation of high-level board involvement with surfacelevel board influence—at least nowhere near the level of financial power and influence
expected from high-level policy boards. As each executive outlined the budget
development process and factors contributing to budget outcomes, several salient issues
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were evident. First, the budget is formulated to match general organizational directions
and boards make decisions to expend these amounts after the budget is formally funded.
Second, public transportation is heavily reliant on local general fund contributions
for operating assistance with those amounts coming from parent governments. Boards
typically approve staff-created budgets for presentation to the mayor and council who
decide what to fund or reject. Early board input comes when executives lay out the
“large baskets of money” for use (operating vs. capital vs. limited grants) and how much
is allocated for service expansion or system improvement. The board is approving the
concept of change but it is parent government approval of funds that moves money up or
down. Board involvement is after the fact; basically it tends to rubberstamp the parent
government’s decision. Once funding is established the GM presents the line item budget
and the full financial picture.
Third, fares are definitely seen by executives as a powerful tool, especially in the
wake of nationwide fare increases spurred by fuel costs. In Memphis it can be volatile as
evidenced by Memphis city council’s decision to strip fare policy from the MATA board
a decade ago out of distrust for the former general manager and board. Since restored at
MATA for political and trust reasons, a study-wide desire exists to keep costs low for
users. Memphis was the only system to actually raise its fares in the last ten years until
the increased in fuel costs of 2005 forced the change across Tennessee. In Jackson, the
fare increase passed in March 2006 was the first in seventeen years. Similar time frames
existed for both Nashville and Chattanooga. Boards are very limited in their ability to
influence budgets in meaningful ways and their ultimate weapon to raise revenue through
user fees is financially and politically unpalatable.
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What is described above is a very board-involved process of meetings,
explanations, pre-process approvals, line item adjustments and final budget approval;
however, it is clear this is a staff and parent government process where the board has
limited influence. Where boards yield the most potential influence is in financial
management and capital planning. Financial management influence comes through
regular oversight of, and working closely with, the executive and staff to monitor revenue
and expenditures as forecasted in the final budget document.
All five executives spoke of high levels of involvement from board members in
several areas. First, each authority has a financial report from the executive or staff to
reviews revenues and expenses in a variety of sub-accounts by service type both monthly
and year-to-date. This allows boards to review issues and ask questions. Second, board
members take advantage of this opportunity to question financial performance and in
most cases effective executive management of the budget limits concerns, although issues
such as rising fuel prices and fringe benefit costs are difficult to forecast and make
staying on-budget difficult. Executives have become extremely proactive in
reforecasting revenues and expenditures and in explaining unbalanced accounts, such as
insurance premiums due at the start of the year and place the budget out of balance until
year end. Reforecast fuel budgets prompted a mix of service reductions and fare
increases throughout the sample.
Third, boards are creative, proactive and responsive in keeping the system on
budget. Memphis was poised for a board-recommended fare increase to offset fuel
expenses; however, the matter was tabled in hopes that markets would shift or that
opportunities would allow savings in other areas. In Jackson, the board approved an
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unbalanced budget allowing the board and executive to review financial performance
month-to-month rather than make service cuts to night services right away. Jackson’s
small size makes it difficult to forecast fuel and fringe benefits and the carefully
monitored wait-and-see approach has been successful for MATA and JTA.
Fourth, board responsibility and policy for approving contracts and purchases
creates constant awareness and involvement in finance. All systems require board
approval of purchases exceeding a range of $10,000 in Jackson to $100,000 in
Nashville—scaled to match the financial needs of the system. At CARTA, the board
treasurer reviews all purchases over $2,000 including fuel, parts and equipment; at JTA
two-signer checks require staff and board member signatures for authorization. In both
cases there is a high level of board member involvement in routine purchasing for the
authority. A similar process occurs at MTA and MATA with authorities relying on
committee structures to closely review financial processes, discretionary purchases and
budget performance. The committees usually involve the board chair or vice chair and
board members with strong financial backgrounds for more hands-on involvement and a
greater level of comfort among board colleagues.
Surprisingly, all GMs saw the spending limits of executives as appropriate for the
respective systems’ size and scope. Two executives explained that a good balance allows
the board voice, input and control on large purchases but permits executives to be
reactive to system needs and quickly solve problems. Detailed staff reports, explanation
and issue framing are saved for the larger and more important (usually expensive)
items—although due diligence is still applied. The benefit of executive spending
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discretion is more a function of effective use of staff and board resources and the need for
expedited action on key issues.
The final area of opportunity for strong formal board involvement and control is
the capital planning and funding process. Each transit authority receives a formula grant
from the federal government combined with allocations from earmarked statewide
discretionary capital grants. These funds, combined with congressional earmarks and
federal programs provide the bulk of capital planning and purchases. The boards approve
grant applications, the receipt of funds and approve the annual program of projects—a
clear opportunity to shape organizational approach to on street service through equipment
purchases and the desired level of investment in capital resources.
The collective executive perspective is that outside of these areas boards have
limited opportunity to provide formal high-level policy and organizational direction.
When posed with the question of whether the board should have increased formal fiscal
authority over routine budget and spending issues, the GM answers were split. Three
answered “no” because they felt the present balance of power and authority between the
board and executive was established, functional and beneficial for boards and executives.
These GMs feel strong, effective, executive financial management eliminates need for
increased board involvement in budgetary and spending issues and as one executive
succinctly put it, “If the GM was blowing the budget, that’s one thing: but I haven’t had
that problem.” The key is whether the board has the information to make effective
decisions and a comfort level with executive management.
The GMs suggesting greater board power in budget and spending offered two
distinctly different reasons for increased involvement. One argued the board should have
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more involvement because if impropriety were to occur they wouldn’t be in position to
identify it. Board members have become less detailed in the financial questions they
raise, with exception of a few who require more information on certain issues. The
emphasis is that all board members should have this attention to detail instead of relying
almost exclusively on after-the-fact audits and staff driven financial reports. The second
executive perspective on increased board power is the GM’s job would become easier
because GMs have two masters that can be significant obstacles: the mayor/council and
then the board. The GM “can’t talk about the issues the way they need to be addressed
and ends up tiptoeing around the issues . . . instead of taking them head-on.” A board
with strong financial authority would have the capability to get more involved in funding
issues and relieve the pressure of finding funding. The GM would be able to focus more
on running the system instead of chasing money. At the same time this executive
concedes that more power for the board could become problematic because the city and
the board think differently on high-level and low-level issues. It is hard enough for the
GM; an increased level of involvement and power could create and even greater problem,
as he or she would be required to tiptoe through two very different and very powerful
groups while trying to appease both.
Where executives are most interested in seeing growth in financial power among
boards comes in developing funding and revenue for public transportation. In Tennessee,
legal issues prevent authorities from placing referendums on the ballot, which is a
hindrance when local political forces have no desire to move a referendum forward.
Powers of eminent domain and revenue bonds are available in some authorities but are
rarely used because they raise political and financial concerns. Most authorities are
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structured such that the system has no ability to develop funding and the ultimate power
lies in the hands of funding entities.
Executive Perspective on Informal Board Responsibility
While formal board power is essential to understanding board functioning, this
research is focused on relationships between boards and executives and the most
important element is the informal responsibility boards have as a policy and missionoriented force. These unwritten responsibilities help to support the authority and
executive in a number of key areas and augment the formal powers described in the
previous section regarding budgeting, financial management, capital planning and service
development. First, all five executives discussed the value of board support during key
points and processes. High-level policy boards may be responsible for making decisions
but influencing decisions is equally critical. When the executive presents the budget to
the council and mayor—with the mayor’s appointees sitting behind the executive—the
solidarity of the board is very visible and valuable to the executive and system. This
informal but clear measure of support bolsters the organization in the eyes of political
decision makers. As budgets and needs increase, the board’s role of going before council
and talking about organizational direction becomes more significant. CARTA’s
Executive Director, Tom Dugan explains, “When the board speaks, people listen . . . on
any issue they can touch part of the community because somebody on that board has
connections.” Paul Ballard, MTA’s CEO echoed, “When each board member is a leader
and well respected in the community, the respect they are given is extended to the MTA.”
Second, boards provide moral, technical and leadership support to the
organization through pre-board meeting work sessions and committee meetings. These
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are functions established outside of organizational charters and bylaws yet most
authorities using some form of this process argue this is where real work gets done.
Committee members can develop heightened levels of expertise and knowledge in morenarrowed subject areas that allow for better discussion of issues and eventually better
decisions. Committees allow potentially problematic issues to be worked out through
discussion, explanation and possible modification of recommendations. This process can
increase confidence and comfort levels among other board members who lack
understanding of complex committee issues while helping prepare and focus members for
the formal meeting—specifics without the rhetoric. This is particularly necessary in
more high-profile areas such as approval of unique contracts, major facility construction
or issues regarding labor contracts with collective bargaining units.
CARTA’s downtown committee met weekly for four years during the
development of the garages and was involved in virtually every aspect of the project.
They were engaged in the project and the finished product was owned by the board as
much as the organization. In Nashville, the committee meetings are scheduled back-toback at MTA offices and board members often show for the first, stay for the last and
participate throughout. The committee meetings become mini-board meetings. This
successful format has been adjusted in Lexington where committees were abandoned in
favor of work sessions. Work sessions are designed for full board attendance and
participation so the full membership can consider recommendations and discuss concerns
or questions beyond a few committee members. LexTran board meetings are televised,
which has a more chilling effect on the formal meetings and work sessions have become
the center of more candid, direct and productive discussion.
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Committee meetings also allow board members interact with department heads
and staff. This professional senior staff/board interaction focused on policy and oversight
allows board understanding of administrative and managerial decision-making processes
while approaching questions at a more precise and technical level outside the normal
precepts of formal meetings. It helps to build trust and perspective at both board and
staff levels while improving report and information quality with a mix of positive
feedback and valuable questions.
Finally, authority boards are sounding boards in a number of ways. First, outside
inquiries and questions aimed at the executive from high-level local leaders and officials
during public hearings, meetings or surprise telephone calls may have a political tilt or
hint toward a separate agenda. Executives contact their boards for insight into motives,
as board members may have stronger understanding of actions and perspective within
their respective circles. This is also helpful in terms of institutional history and political
decisions. New executives lack the experience to understand the color or texture of
certain events while long-tenured executives might be aware of undercurrents within
outside organizations or communities. Board input and insights provide food for thought
and can result in change. Sometimes the board is a safety check to ensure FTA, state
DOT or local regulations are followed. Other times they offer perspectives on new
programs because not everything is about routes and riders. Involvement with marketing,
Chambers of Commerce and relationships with central business districts are important to
modern transportation executives.
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Individual Members vs. Collective Boards
An interesting aspect of board power and influence, both within and outside the
authority, was the substantial value executives place on board members as individuals as
opposed to collective bodies. An experienced transit executive observed, “Boards are
made up of people. Some are egotistical, strong, weak, whatever.” What is significant
about this statement is recognition that not all boards and board members are the same
and not all boards and members can be high functioning. This provides insight that
individuals have particular strengths and abilities of which an executive can take
advantage.
First, board members are typically appointed because they bring specialized
information or knowledge to the table. In terms of professions, board members that are
attorneys, architects and real estate developers are extremely helpful in the web of legal
issues and constructions projects. They advise and inform on key high-level issues
through professional expertise but through the lens of the authority’s interest. Day-to-day
business owners, corporate managers, and financial experts have a keen appreciation for
the challenge of delivering services on a daily basis and with an awareness of the
complexity of managing large scale operations. Labor leaders provide insights and
perspectives on labor-management issues while board members working in civil rights
and equal opportunity areas engender a higher awareness and sensitivity to the balance
between equality and efficiency in practice and policy. Others offer unique perspectives
and are in tune with critical elements of the community, such as the disability or social
services community. Board members with disabilities or those working with persons
with disabilities can provide operational and policy perspectives and feedback on issues
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limited to distinct populations. Typically these are lower-level policy areas but these
board members offer insights into what a user might experience; however, it is tempered
with the understanding of board and system goals and allows a more informed and global
understanding of issues.
Second, board members offer individual strengths that emerge over time. A board
member’s willingness to commit large amounts of time or constantly open doors to
political leaders is difficult to predict, expect or maintain. Yet, effort and time
commitment is a very tangible, rare and valuable quality that executives have gushed
over when available. New initiatives such as board benchmarking and peer-review
studies are very involved processes that require a willingness to become involved in the
internal and external board functions. New campaigns for services, funding and projects
require direct communication with local leaders, neighborhoods, riders and non-riders
through large numbers of meetings, public hearings, community and town hall sessions.
All of this helps connect the system with the community and members can bring the
executive and system before unique groups to bridge seemingly impassable gaps.
Finally, board members have a certain level of clout and strength within their
individual communities and among local leadership. Many have close ties to their
appointer—the mayor. For example, in Memphis the mayor is the former Superintendent
of Schools and four of the seven board members are retired school district employees
with close connections to Mayor Harrington. This is common with many of the
authorities in this study. Board members usually are friends of mayors and council
members. They typically are high-level business officials or long-standing members of
the community that are known for a willingness to serve their city on boards. These
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relationships create continuity, especially among long-term board members who develop
long-term relationships with less controversy and change. A good board member gets to
stay—although what constitutes good varies from place to place.
Board members with established high-level networks create access and soften the
blow of financial issues by getting out front of the organization and talking with the right
people. Particularly strong and politically connected board members can get answers in
minutes with a telephone call that a GM could not get in a week. Projects and initiatives
that can die on their feet can be kept alive or nursed along in politically dangerous
scenarios by saying things that would send an executive looking for his or her next job.
Vital to understanding the member-as-power aspect of the board is recognizing
that individual board members are effective in their own way. A board member with a
strong labor union background is most effective when talking with council members
sympathetic to union issues or with other local labor leaders that may try and apply
pressure. This same person may not be very effective among power brokers within the
business, governmental or educational institutions. It is often the effective management
and utilization of these individual resources and assets that define the level of influence
the board can have as individuals or as a collective body.
Relativity of Political Power
While executives identified the value and importance of strong individual
influence and power among their board members, this was lessened when executives
were asked directly about the influence of the board on the political landscape. In one
instance, a GM indicated the board was politically weak. In most instances the board
members have the ability but so does a well-placed executive, which limits the tangible
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levels of influence. Opportunity for influence in the political landscape is limited by the
nature of the board itself. The earlier discussion of board power limitations, due to
authority’s financial restrictions, creates an environment where the occasion for direct,
high-level political influence is rare if it exists at all.
Two other executives noted that mayoral appointees had the ear of the mayor but
lack influence or acknowledgement in the city’s legislative body. More often than not,
council-related issues from the budget, political undercurrents or community concerns
sprout from these sources—not the mayor’s office. Executives displayed a clear
understanding of influence from members and close relationships among power-players;
however, there was a sense this handful becomes diluted when the players are the same.
Another issue is that influence is often limited to a narrow-scope of low-level players.
Members conscious of low-income or social service needs may not exercise influence
outside their respective profession or community and generally are speaking to and for a
disenfranchised base. They lack upward influence, extremely important in a policy
board.
An executive with significant experience warned that the desire for a strong board
is potentially dangerous. An excessive number of politically influential board members
quickly become problematic. Differing board members with strong support can divide
political decision makers or force directions the executive and board majority simply do
not wish to take but the political landscape may dictate.
An important aspect identified by GMs was the boards’ lack of influence and
political prowess within the local landscape as not entirely a creature of the board
members’ personal or political characteristics but rather board structure. Two executives
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identified the biggest obstacle to power and influence, and eventually board performance
at its highest level, as the mayoral appointment aspect of the membership. One suggested
the board should be elected, as elected officials carry far more weight and would elevate
authority issues while the other suggested appointments should come from elected
officials by jurisdiction, placing greater influence throughout the city landscape instead of
within a single person. Another simply identified the best opportunity for more board
influence is moving up a few layers on the socio-economic scale with real estate
developers or business owners and executives, adding, “Money is a big influence and I
don’t have it and no one on the board has it either. In my experience, money people have
the ability to get people to listen.”
The complexity of transit operations and related issues is another significant
obstacle. The concern for board member ability to independently articulate issues and
problems was identified by two GMs as extremely difficult because it requires a great
deal of education by the executive on the relevant issues. This is very time consuming
for members and executives. Along the same lines, board members are limited in their
awareness of city activity, which has a very similar effect when the board is not in tune
with trends and opportunities available for the authority. Once again, responsibility for
educating the board and time involvement comes back to the executive.
This leads to the other most common obstacle identified by executives in
establishing the highest performing board possible—time commitment. In the case of
volunteer boards, members must balance personal and professional obligations and
cannot dedicate necessary time to attend mayoral, council, public and committee
meetings, additional workshops and time with the executive and management team, all
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necessary to be fully informed of issues and expected roles. When considering the
combination of limited political prowess caused by individual, collective and structural
limitations, most executives acquiesce their boards are doing the best they can and that it
would be difficult to ask much more. The most successful and influential members were
generally the most involved but there is an expiration date on that energy and
commitment and it is very difficult to maintain both consistency and continuity of the
message.
Representation & Individual Agenda
While the public authority structure is designed to insulate the execution of public
service delivery from political influence, boards are inevitably political in appointment.
This is most evident in discussion of board representation. Executives were asked
whether they thought the board represented a good cross-section of their city and almost
all answered with some version of “somewhat.” Executives noted: the city and outlying
areas were represented when possible; boards generally included a solid mix of
professional, business, racial and gender diversity—a few lacked strong female or
minority presence; and there is a lack of low-income representation although low-income
riders comprise a strong rider population. The overall theme from executives was their
respective boards represented the community in the best way a public authority board can
by representing issues but with the mayor’s appointment and council approval. The
diversity, cross-sectional representation or lack thereof is not accidental but reflects the
political values and preferences of the mayor. Ultimately it is a political decision of
whether the goal is representation of policy issues or people.
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This led to a discussion of whether boards should be representative of the
population and executives unanimously agreed they should and for generally similar
reasons. First, members are access points for riders—more access than what is available
at a board meeting or at the transit offices and if the board member is representative a
population then there an increased level of comfort for the customer. Second, the board
is there to protect and represent the needs of the people they serve and provide feedback
to management on what the authority is doing for its customers. Third, a representative
board lends more credence to the organization and its decisions. If there is not
representation, there can be a perception of disconnect between the authority, its
decisions and the community. A representative board indicates all aspects of the
organization and its riders are considered at decision time through board representation.
This was mentioned by several executives through existing or desired inclusion of
persons with disabilities and strong minority representation.
Generally mayors just call and ask if there are issues with a new member or make
the appointment without input, already aware of whether to keep the same kinds of
people and ideas or make change. There is actually little board turnover with most
members leaving due to term limits or personal reasons such as health or business
commitments. Most executives had experienced turnover of only one or two board
members in the last three years, creating a very stable environment. Executives saw no
real difference between board members inherited, recruited or appointed without input
but with one difference—one executive noted that recruited board members have a
tendency to be a bit more active for the organization.
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As interviews unfolded, executives made constant references to a mix of issues
and how they are influenced and shaped by the preferences and agendas of individual
members, connecting almost every board member to an issue or idea they represent. The
executives agreed these individual preferences were brought to the table on a generally
consistent basis in issues related directly to personal experiences or circumstances, ideas
or concern germinating from professions or for political attention or gain. Executives
identified board member interest in a number of areas: services for transit-dependent
populations, especially, low-income, disability and the elderly; professional experience
and expertise in areas such as planning, management or transportation; and treatment and
of employees from a hiring or labor/collective bargaining perspective.
Decision-making & Conflict
Executives discussed board member interests and sensitivity to certain issues and
connected this directly to members’ decision-making. Instances where the board member
represents a community or issue area, preferences transform into agendas and
significantly impact board-related discussion and decisions. Decisions on service
changes and reductions are examined through impact on certain populations in which
nearly every board member is interested, such as: those with disabilities or low-incomes;
which neighborhoods or types of riders should be protected; and impact on the workforce
due to layoffs. There was no significant emphasis on the long-term solvency of the
system or what opportunities existing to create revenue to offset impending service cuts.
Even with the obvious opportunity to raise revenue through a fare increase, board
members were extremely reluctant to make this choice. Even though most transit
systems had not raised fares in more than ten years there was a feeling that a fare increase
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would impose an undue burden on certain protected groups such as persons with
disabilities, the elderly and low-income riders, especially the working poor. The board in
Chattanooga was so reluctant to make this decision that at a CARTA board meeting
passengers actually showed up to press the board for a fare increase instead of reducing
service. They would rather pay more money than compromise the system—it actually
took the riders to force a change in policy perspective die to the strong feeling a one-way
bus ride of more than $1.00 was detrimental to certain populations.
Every board in this study included board members with this type of interest and
nearly every board member has an interest pertaining to the purpose of the authority they
serve. In almost every instance, the individual agendas that shape decisions create
conflict with general manager goals, whether from past or present board members. First,
executives described board member pressure to change hiring practices because of
personal agendas and not the expected example of a member asking a GM to specially
look at a particular job application. In most cases the pressure is strong but not forceful
because ethics and formal hiring processes are strong deterrents from becoming more
than part of casual conversation.
A second instance where low-level agendas emerge is in service-related decisions.
Board members apply regular pressure to add or change services, spurring suggestions
and even require change because of a new mall or development. Pressure from
developers, or the belief that service adjustments will produce new jobs and added riders,
has forced actual route or service changes. Sometimes this is to the detriment of the
system and its riders. In one instance, a developer wanted “those people” away from his
new building and was trying to move a bus stop that was very important and popular with
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riders—with the full support of a board member. Other instances are less specific and are
more related to how changes will affect certain groups. Board members have voted down
changes that would open services to larger populations, such as new apartment
complexes or larger sections of existing neighborhoods because the route would no
longer serve a particular neighborhood or because a handful of people opposing the
change showed up for the meeting.
The third type of low-level agenda conflict, also tied to on street services but far
more innocuous is nit-picking details of recommendations brought before the board.
Most often this occurs when the board member has specific knowledge or expertise in the
subject matter such as a procurement recommendation. New technology, such as on-bus
cameras may be picked apart by a board member with an engineering background and
force an unnecessary delay of the vote until staff investigation of issues and changes to
specifications occur. Other times questions are obviously related to the person’s interest
such as, “Will the new bus have a wheelchair lift?” or “Will it still serve the job center?”
Most often this does not actually impact the vote because the staff has made the
recommendation in consideration of board preferences. Other times the board member’s
level of expertise and knowledge is limited and lacks the full context of issues involved;
however, it detracts from discussion and implies a level of incompetence of the executive
and staff.
Strengths, Weakness and Obstacles to Board Effectiveness
All five executives were asked whether their board has helped or hurt the
accomplishment of goals and objectives. Without fail the executives said the board had
helped them, particularly in instances when the board understands and adheres to the
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policy roles and responsibilities of performance monitoring and oversight and recognizes
the distinct role of the executive in handling management-related functions. During the
research, executives discussed and described the most and least effective board members
and what caused them fall into those areas. Political prowess and savvy was rated as
extremely important. The ability to reach into certain parts of the community and
establish support for the authority among local leaders and on key initiatives also was
very important. Least effective members were those lacking the high-level connections
and the ability to deliver political influence when really needed.
Effective members provide expertise with sensible advice and prudent questions
at appropriate times. Board members who go along with others are ineffective because
they do not contribute effectively to the process or provide guidance. They do not detract
or cause problems but become non-factors in system direction. While high-level policy
connections and influence are important, well-connected board members who do not
attend board functions or prepare for meetings are ineffective. Committee and board
meetings lack quorums and action can be delayed. When members show, executives
must rehash issues and the member is constantly behind, unaware of what was asked and
answered or lacks complete understanding of what is happening or where the
organization is headed.
The most effective members meet their board obligations and maintain strong
awareness of local and national trends. Some members are not well connected but their
awareness and willingness to get involved in community projects and understand issues
make them as effective as the most powerful, but constantly absent, board member due to
an ability to make well informed decisions. The level of knowledge and expertise
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required in public transportation is surprising to most outsiders and board members
willing to invest time to learn the complex issues and expand knowledge over time are
very helpful to the authority.
Success of the Board-Executive Relationship
Although all the executives identified various strengths, weaknesses, obstacles,
agendas, conflicts, opportunities for failure and outright problems with board members,
nevertheless, all five GMs offered very positive comments about their boards and board
members. Each felt they had an effective board and had developed strong, positive
relationships with their members. All five board members were asked, “How would you
describe your relationship with the board?” Of the answers, all were described as good or
excellent. When asked if the board was supportive of the job they were doing, all five
answered “yes”. All five answered “yes” when asked their opinion on whether the board
thought they were an effective general manager of the transit system. On three critical
questions of the board-executive relationships, the level of board support for the
executive and the board’s assessment of executive performance, all executives felt
strongly the board was behind them.
Central to the discussion of positive relationships and strong support were two
key issues—trust and information. Trust was the most important theme for the
executives. For one, the board-executive relationship was, “Very good, tight and trusting
because I work hard and I respect them . . . . I make sure they are involved and I don’t
take them for granted. . . . There’s a certain amount of friendliness, openness, safety and
trust.” Trust is not easily developed but once established it allows the executive and
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board to expand their interaction and learn to disagree without harming the relationship.
A seasoned executive explained:
We have developed some knowledge and understanding of the business
and I have always been able to talk and explain issues because I have
established a trust. They can trust what I tell them. . . . We can agree or
disagree but they trust what I tell them I believe and it is backed by my
experience. . . . There are no secret or hidden agendas so I allow them in a
sense to participate and because of this I don’t feel the pressure to do this
or do that. . . . I’m a good politician. I’ve been in the business a long time
so I keep everyone involved and included so there is no backlash. There
are no secrets—I do things the right way and I stand on that.
Another GM, whose board had been starved of trust by a predecessor, echoed
trust as an essential element for positive relationships. While trust is the most important
aspect of the board-executive relationship, trust is built on the quality of information and
how it is shared. The previous executive made no effort to include the board in decisions
and involved them only when required. When the board was involved, especially in
financial matters, they were surprised by what they heard and learned as a result of poor
planning and communication. Now, “there are no surprises. I tell them the truth and lay
out the facts and issues.” He explained further that when he was interviewing for the job
that he had explained to the board that he would work with them to frame issues and
implications. The board needs facts to make decisions and it works well because, “if I
say ‘these are the numbers because I’ve done all of the above’, it equals trust.”
At the same time, trust is built on more than facts; it is built on an individual
effort to get to know the preferences and expectations of each board member. The key is
building a personal relationship with each member to learn what he or she expects and to
operate accordingly. It is the opportunity to create or rebuild a relationship caused by
misunderstanding or disagreement. It is the opportunity to talk informally, outside the oft
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rigid confines of formal meetings and work sessions to communicate what is actually
going on, learn board member concerns and figure out what direction they are headed.
One executive describes a particularly difficult relationship with a board member that
seemed to disagree with and distrust the executive. The executive started meeting oneon-one, once a month and allowed the member opportunity to ask questions in an
informal way—probe the issues, hear the other side of the story and try to poke holes in
the issues.
The more time spent with the board member, the more open and trusting the
relationship. Board projects such as transit centers, frequent involvement in key
committees with the executive or actions that require regular visits from a board member
such as signing checks and approving invoices creates one-on-one time where business is
handled but with a personal touch. It is this type of activity that most easily crafts and
shapes the neutral and even negative relationship. “I spend time with them on a regular
basis and I know what they are thinking,” explained an executive, which helps when
developing recommendations for board review and possible approval. One says, “If I
think I won’t have all the votes, I won’t bring it to them. This isn’t to say I’ve pulled
anything back either. I start early on by making them comfortable and by making sure
what I put together is something they’ll be willing to support.” Trust and relationships
are also built over time. In the case of Memphis and Chattanooga, there has been a very
high level of board and executive continuity over the past thirteen and twenty-five years,
respectively. As board members grow in knowledge, see the expertise of the executive
translate from advice into fact and see the effective management of personnel and
resources, GMs feel trust relationships will be built.
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EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT OF THE BOARD-EXECUTIVE RELATIONSHIP
Executives in public transportation authorities do more than just manage
organizations that deliver transportation; they manage a public authority board in a highly
complex political environment. Like all public managers, finances are the forefront of
each and every decision on a daily basis. Limited funding streams dictate a cost
containment approach to transportation while balancing the need to maintain services
against the growing expenses of delivery. The past year’s high and unbudgeted fuel costs
forced executives to alter their budget management focus of managing expenses and
revenues to a revenue development agenda that required greater levels of board
awareness and action to keep the organization afloat.
Still, that was not the entire focus of public transportation authority boards
because there is a limit to member ability for active involvement in financial management
and high-level policy. Instead, board ability to be a support network for the organization,
especially the executive, through public support, community outreach, technical
guidance, and leadership was the most valuable element of board involvement for the
authority. Within this construct were boards of extremely diverse backgrounds,
composition, influence interests, values and opinions. For executives the success of
balancing fiduciary and service needs of the authority was the ability to effectively
manage relationships with individual and collective members and balance varying
motivations against pressures existent within these environments.
Trust along with facts and information is not enough to develop strong, positive
board relationships, either one-on-one or with the communal board. A key element is
also the executive’s approach to management through an inclusive, yet controlled level of
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board and member involvement. As mentioned earlier, boards are sounding boards with
expert advice; however, there is a limit. The board is looked at by the executive as an oncall sounding board, either for direct or indirect advice and counsel on pertinent issues.
However, one GM asserts, “They are a sounding board but I run it. I want to be able to
do it right, wrong or indifferent. When I’m wrong, they tell me how and I learn from it
and it goes from there. But they can’t tell me how to do it.” Meanwhile, the manager
and staff must remain approachable to the board. It is it through this openness that an
executive can encourage participation and get their staff and board to push forward.
Board and staff interaction was less common than expected, as executives are wont to
wall the organization off from board incursion while controlling information. Highly
effective managers allow and encourage interaction because a level of trust and
understanding emerges between the board and the staff—assuming the executive had
trust in his or her staff to properly work with the board members—cultivating bilateral
cooperation.
Information is extremely important because a surprised board is an unhappy
board, even when it is a management issue. Several executives agreed that it was critical
to involve them in management responsibilities, one using whether they would be
distressed to read about it in the paper as the informational litmus test. Avoiding
surprising or embarrassing them is one issue but based upon the descriptions of boardexecutive relationships provided by executives, all board members want to be involved in
executive management issues to some level or degree. It is the matter of degree and how
the executive manages the level of involvement preferred by the member. The selection
and communication of these issues is the key. First, on some issues the board must be
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kept informed, such as with major accidents, significant labor disputes and controversies
that could arise in the media and catch them off guard. In these instances it is working to
make sure the board member is never surprised or embarrassed.
Second, there are certain things that must be conveyed to certain board members
because each board member has an issue preference or expertise. An effective executive
exploits this expertise for two reasons: 1) it is beneficial to have the technical advice; and
2) no matter what a board member says, it is to the executive’s benefit to include board
members in management issues that fall under the specialized interest areas of the
member. “If I know the member has a particular interest I call them out of courtesy and
for their expertise. . . . If they are active or an expert, I keep them in the loop so they
know what is going on.” It is critical to do this because failure to ask a board member for
their advice in an area of expertise is an insult or sign of disrespect to the member.
Sometimes issues arise and the executive does not think about the board but later realizes
they need to reach out to a member or the chair. One explains, “I’ll call them and say, ‘I
need your advice’. Sometimes I need it but I don’t want it.” The key to effectively
managing this interest is containing the potential micromanagement by drawing the line
at decisions for managing the system. Information and advice is one thing but actual
involvement in decision-making is dangerous for the executive.
Third, GMs foster increased levels of involvement with board chairs. The board
chair seems to be the exception and as one GM deftly put it, “they run the show.” The
chair will field questions from different sources and is the point person for the executive,
fellow board members, media outlets and elected officials—including the mayor.
Accordingly, the board chair must have increased knowledge and awareness with a feel
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for the executive direction of the organization. This is to executive advantage since
chairs have increased levels of influence and control among fellow members, making the
chair’s leadership and guidance of the board extremely valuable. If a board member
devolves into day-to-day issues, the chair can shut them down and explain it as a
management issue, saving the executive from unwanted and unnecessary incursions that
may hurt the relationship. They can diffuse irate customers at public forum, instill
confidence in the process and maintain a quick, efficient meeting that addresses board
business and not much else. An informed chair can expeditiously execute the agenda and
avoid devolution and micromanagement rampant in excessive and wandering discussion.
At the same time, some board members want to be involved in day-to-day
management issues and do not understand the role of a board member. They have an
opinion on anything and everything but lack the consistency and continuity from meeting
to meeting to turn the concern into a legitimate issue for discussion. This type of
discussion tends to devolve into micromanagement or the more harmless aspect of
sharing an idea. Usually these board members are not talking for the sake of ego or
posturing but displaying a level of skill or interest—they just happen to be board
members. Once again, this is where chairs and executives must display skill and tact to
shut down the discussion before it gets off track and detracts from process and business.
Others want to be part of the interviews, pick the fabric color for new bus seats, attend
the employee cookout or weigh in on the new lefts and rights when the new bus routing is
developed. These board members are often personally attached to the system and want to
make low-level decisions they can understand and apply their fingerprints to services.
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But as explained through GMs, the advantage still lies with executives.
Executives have tremendous resources at their disposal to keep this relationship strong
and professional. Executives with management firms such as Professional Transit
Management or First Transit have strong support organizations bringing support through
board workshops, strategic planning and business sessions that set the course and tone of
the board-executive interaction. Executives without firms can utilize management
consultants, board retreats and workshops to achieve similar results. Issues involved in
public transportation are difficult and complex—decisions need to be instant and learning
curves are tall and wide. Board members understand and appreciate this and recognize
the professionalism and experience of executives and staff to make good decisions for
system benefit. Even when wishing for involvement most board members cannot get
caught up in day-to-day issues because they have their own lives and careers and cannot
invest the time and energy to effectively learn issues. That is why boards hire
executives—to manage and implement board-developed policy.
If the executive does not understand the duality of roles of management and
policy then tremendous opportunity for board incursion on managerial preferences and
authority exists. If the organization is poorly managed, the occasional telephone call
about a dirty shelter or a reckless driver becomes a call with expected follow through and
specific results from the executive. Before long, the manager is answering to public
board meeting inquiries of how the service department is organized, the amount of
training provided to employees and the disciplinary structure for violations. It is a
slippery slope and once the slide begins it is near impossible to hold on. But still, the
advantage is with the GM. Successful executives learn to manage the board as they
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would the organization—openly, honestly, with trust, respect, information and a focus on
quality.

CONCLUSION
Executives of public transportation authorities are in a precarious position of
managing a diverse set of board member interest and values while navigating complex
waters of funding, political decision-making and hundreds of weekly issues such as class
action union grievances to a failed bus engine fuel injector—and everything in between.
A board comprised of high-level and low-level political players with a mix of high-level
and low-level issues creates an environment where the board-executive relationship is
difficult to maintain, yet these executives have been successful. Each system in the study
has grown or maintained their status in an era of financial instability and pushed forward
with new initiatives and services, meanwhile collecting support from their board in bits,
pieces, and whole chunks at a time.
Authority boards are structurally and personally limited in ability to garner
political and financial organizational support and wield a generally low-level of policy
power within the organization, as measured by ability to influence financial and longterm planning. The primary value of boards for executives is individual member impact
through expertise, political connections to elected officials, involvement with
communities and community organizations and ability to bring a mix of these items to the
table. Individual and collective investment of board time and energy is as much a
political and board-executive strategy as an outright resource for furthering system
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success and a mechanism for building bilateral trust and support between the governance
and administrative arms of the authority.
Of critical concern at this juncture is whether board members hold the same
perspectives on the board-executive relationship as the general managers. How boards
perceive their roles can vary greatly and the following chapter explores board insight on
formal responsibilities, power and influence and the perceived, actual and preferred
levels of involvement in governance and organizational management. Chapter Three laid
the groundwork for executives’ organizational understanding. Chapter Four builds on
this foundation toward a complete framework of the board-executive relationship within
the context of the modern public transportation authority.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS AND FINDINGS: BOARD PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION
As Chapter Three reveals, public transportation authority executives are deeply
concerned with managing the organization with an eye toward developing and
maintaining trust relationships with the board. The trust relationship comes through a
process of transparent operations, promotion of informed decision-making and inclusion
of board expertise and experience in the formal and informal elements of responsibility.
This chapter continues the investigation and exploration of the board-executive
relationship through the eyes of public transportation authority board members and offers
their perspectives on the roles, responsibilities and effectiveness of both the board and
executive. The chapter follows the general themes established by executives, offing more
unique and divergent perspectives in consideration of: 1) board member backgrounds and
preparation; 2) board member responsibility and effectiveness, with a focus on formal
and informal responsibility; 3) issues of political power and influence along with
representation as a value; and 4) relationships with the executive and the factors
impacting those relationships.

BOARD MEMBER PERSPECTIVES ON THE BOARD-EXECUTIVE
RELATIONSHIP
Board Member Background and Experience
As expected, there was considerable variation in backgrounds of the thirty-one
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board members participating in the research. Diversity, one of the central themes that
emerged from this study in terms of age, race, professional background and experience,
played out in several key areas. Despite the many paths members traveled before
arriving on the public transportation authority board there was considerable consistency
among backgrounds. First, almost all board members had prior experience on governing
boards. Very few had previous experience on public authorities, elected positions or
special commissions but a larger number had served on civic boards with public policy
implications such as economic development, planning, councils on alcoholism or teenage
pregnancy, voter involvement, and disability and elderly awareness. A large very
number had significant board experience related to community-wide activism and
organizations ranging from hospitals or to arts councils. Other experience involved
special interest organizations such as professional associations, churches, schools, and
neighborhood associations.
The board members have an extremely diverse set of employment backgrounds,
including architecture, law, medical, finance, ministers, full-time volunteers, and private
business owners. There was a large number with previous government or public
employment with teachers, university professors and administrators, a firefighter, a police
dispatcher and a social service executive director joining the ranks of public authority
board members. A significant number had political experience as elected officials, staff
for government agencies or organizations, partisan activity and political activism or
instigation. A considerable number of board members were retired from their professions
but continued to serve the community through board activity.
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The vast majority had no prior experience in private or public transportation
management or governance; however, the impetus to serve was tied to one of three main
areas. First, board members served out of concern for community issues that arose from
their backgrounds in areas such as collective bargaining or social services. Second, many
had direct experience with transportation services or experience in large-scale servicedelivery organizations. Third, they had direct connection with public transportation due
to their profession or personal experiences. Despite the limited prior connection to
transportation, most of the board members have since become well acquainted with the
authority and its services. Only eight of the board members had three years experience or
less of authority board service, with fourteen members having served a range of four to
eight years on the board while another ten have served more than eight years. There has
also been generally widespread involvement in board leadership among the members
with fifteen members serving as the chair, vice chair or other board office.
Appointment, Focus and Agenda on the Public Transportation Authority Board
One of the strongest connections developing from the interviews was the
emphasis board members placed on appointment to the board and the agenda they bring
with them to their seat at the board table—despite little knowledge of public
transportation or prior public authority experience. Past professional experience and
involvement with local politics and leaders were linked with individual motivations for
service, which included personal desire to improve transit service, general willingness to
serve the community or the personal pride of being appointed by the mayor. Through
these connections was how these board members represented parts of the city—aspects
relevant to the transit systems or the community as a whole.
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Diversity and consistency of board member backgrounds created a surprising
level of consistency among members’ willingness as well as their interest in serving on a
transportation authority. There were a handful of members that responded to a
community-wide call for volunteers or recruited themselves for the position. That
interest was strongly related to community concerns and members were selected because
of their community roles, for example involvement with neighborhoods and communities
or those with specialized professional expertise.
The early focus for most of these self-recruited members was learning about
public transportation and service delivery while trying to develop new programs and
ideas. In terms of agenda these members felt there was a gap in transportation services or
ineffective transit management and hoped to bring attention to more broad-based
community transportation services or system failures. These members also identified
themselves as present or past users of public transportation, at either that system or
another, creating a stronger connection between the member and on street service. Some
were focused on helping make better decisions for on street services, such as which
routes to improve or protect during service cuts.
There were occasional variations, such as a board member from Nashville MTA,
once employed by at the MTA and previously the executive director of the Nashville
Regional Transportation Authority. Self-recruitment was geared toward keeping a level
of community and political involvement and when joining the board the focus and agenda
was purely budgetary—establishing an understanding of the fiscal aspects of the system.
Another board member described their appointment as a serendipitous. A mayor’s staff
member was recruiting another person when the preferred choice declined. The mayor’s
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staffer—perhaps in jest—asked the recruit’s companion to serve instead. They
accepted—also perhaps in jest—and was on the board of a public transportation authority
six months later. This new member had no knowledge or experience of the system and
until asked to serve had no idea the system had a board. She just brought a willingness to
learn processes and try to look at things a different way and has since established national
prominence for her contributions for public transportation authority board governance.
A significant number of board members were appointments sought by the mayor
because of leadership in a specific community activity. These board members felt their
connection to certain segments of the community, such as low-income neighborhoods,
social services networks and civil rights issues, is why they were selected and obligated
to bring those concerns and issues to the forefront. One such member wryly said, “I see
myself as a constant, if not irritating presence to keep these concerns at the forefront.”
They explained the importance of maintaining their community connection because they
are conduits between the authority and their community. Others have more specialized
communities, such as active involvement in disability issues or past involvement in labor
unions and living-wage campaigns and have perspectives and opinions with an
expectation to guide the executive and impact policy. A member from Chattanooga
understands her appointment was likely based on being a strong, outspoken, AfricanAmerican female with extensive board experience and a willingness to serve.
Like those who recruited themselves, these members had a perception of past
failures or great opportunities to fill transportation gaps to meet the needs of certain
communities and became—and remain—involved to ensure these communities are
served. For one person, the focus when joining the board was to enhance transportation
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for persons with disabilities by improving on street service. For others it was to find
ways to provide more service to minimum wage workers and the economically
disadvantaged.
Other board members were representative of an important segment of the city in
the areas of government, industry, education or business expertise. In Memphis, one
board member was recruited through his management position at FedEx; in Chattanooga,
it was the Dupont Chemical Plant; in Nashville a past CBID transportation committee
chair was appointed, as was an attorney from Vanderbilt University. Often these board
members are recruited for their experience in broad-based industry or management and
have more global perspectives on transportation, governance and management. Expertise
has been identified as important, especially in finance when systems had extreme
financial problems such as Lexington and Nashville. In Chattanooga, emphasis has been
on construction projects and now the board includes an architect and attorney and at one
time a real estate developer. There was also a strong contingent of board members who
have direct connection to political officials, especially in Memphis where the mayor is
the past school superintendent. Four of seven board members have ties to the Memphis
education system and three held administrative posts under the mayor when he was
superintendent. In other cities, friendship with a council member has prompted
nomination.
Typically there is no specific agenda held by appointees at the time of
appointment. Rather, then tend to be interested in the totality of the organizational
machine—not the service or organization itself. Board members of this ilk saw
themselves as manager/leaders that have an edge because of their ability to plan and
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execute needs. Despite their “get things done” acumen, these members also have a
genuine respect for their responsibility to give back to the community. They identified
no agenda or population to serve but rather are helping the community through a
willingness to participate in the community and the process.
Board Member Perspective on Formal Board Responsibility
Board members, much like executives, identified a high value and level of
awareness on board fiscal responsibility and involvement. They were also cognizant of
the low-level service issues on which boards must decide, such as route and time
changes. What was interesting was how board members answered the short, to the point
question, “What are the duties and responsibilities of the board?” Most board members
responded with a very nuts-and-bolts answer of making decisions on routes and services,
specialized events, attending meetings and events such as banquets and roadeos (bus
driving obstacle courses), voting on fares, approving purchases, reviewing reports and
listening to customers. This generally reflected a recollection of board action items from
recent meetings. The understanding was they were there to oversee operations.
A number of board members spoke in vague and board-based terms about the
same general functions with hiring and direct oversight of the GM, setting policy for
operation, balancing the budget and overseeing services. This description was slightly
higher-level, understanding the reason for the decision not really speaking to
organizational purpose or mission. Generally discussion was focused on board oversight
of system operations in terms of budget, revenues and expenditures, ridership levels and
minor changes to system operation.
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A series of more advanced perspectives emerged from a smaller vanguard of
board members heavily focused on the governance aspect of board responsibility. A
large number of board members would say “policy-making” but the policy described was
routine approval of low-level recommendations described above—absent of governance.
When governance was discussed, “policy-making” took on an entirely different tone.
The more governance-oriented answers included: abstaining from micromanaging
executive authority; establishing operational and managerial accountability;
communicating the value of public transportation; balancing the organization’s financial
needs vs. needs of riders; funding scenarios; recognition of appointee needs to serve
mayoral interests; and setting fiduciary and strategic policy for the organization. As one
such respondent explained, “Policies for use, such as fares, are the easy things. The hard
part is the strategy. Is it about how much money you bring in or how many riders? Staff
needs to guide the decisions but it’s our ethical duty to make the decision.” For one
member, emphasis was on providing advice on and approval of where the GM is taking
the organization with an obligation to know what the director is doing and offer input
accordingly.
When pressed about specifics—the actual items presented to the board for vote—
the answers followed a similar trend. Most members shifted into routine items and
became more specific about the types of route changes, the limits of purchases and what
the financial report included—more overall detail regarding low-level policy items. A
wider array of items cropped up with the approval of union contracts, approval of policies
such as drug and alcohol policies, contracts for auditors, vehicle insurance and the
employee benefits package.
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What was very different was the handful of board members who spoke globally
about the limitations of funding streams, the impact on service and the need for political
efficacy as played out through budgetary decisions. These are items disconnected
entirely from the “yea” or “nay” approval process but coupled with the long-range
stability of the system and services. Votes to approve capital funding may have included
the flexing of political muscles with a congressman’s office while route changes might
include calming a negatively impacted community. Actions like this are tied to the actual
vote but occur outside the board bylaws or formal meeting agenda. This discussion also
occurred when members spoke of initiating policy instead of reacting to
recommendations: ethics reviews and formal policy; route performance standards that
require meeting performance measures or risk reduction or elimination; and
standardization of procurement policy and multi-system purchasing to lower costs
through multi-agency, bulk procurement.
When asked if there were any responsibilities where the board wished it had more
power and influence the answer was almost always “no”. Board members commonly felt
either well informed by the executive with a comfortable level of power within their
authority structure or they understood that needed change was not really possible, for
example increasing funding streams. Follow-up questioning focused on whether areas
existed that members felt the board should be included in system service but is presently
excluded. A few answers quickly turned to “yes” and the reasons were of extreme
variety. Concern was expressed about the hiring and retention of employees and that the
starting wage was too low to attract new drivers. Another expressed the desire to be
directly involved in the hiring of executive staff positions with review of resumes and
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participation in interviews—even expressing the ability and desire to offer suggestions to
staff members as they develop recommendations. There was also a desire to negotiate
union and vendor contracts and interact between the union and management—although
none specifically interested had any experience with contract negotiations. Also, the
complaint emerged that the executive too often marches to the beat of the mayor’s drum,
not the board’s, and that they should have greater influence over the actions of the
executive.
In terms of fiscal involvement and influence, board members have a distinctly
different view from executive regarding the board’s actual level of influence. On the
surface, board members spoke intelligently and effectively about limitations of board and
executive power in financial and service realms. First, in terms of the budget process,
board members perceive a very strong amount of budgetary control, as evidenced through
their discussion of the GM’s monthly financial report, the explanation of expenditures
and revenues and the routine board approval of purchases. They perceive themselves as
approving, setting and balancing the budget, raising revenue in times of financial shortfall
and taking the executive to task during financial crisis. However, board members exhibit
the opposite actual knowledge and authority, mirroring the executive analysis of board
fiscal power and influence in the budget process—involvement but not influence.
First, a number of board members acknowledged a poor understanding of the
budgetary process, how it is formulated, how grant funds and user fee revenues are
calculated or how they are applied. A few board members identified strong board
budgetary influence but more in-depth discussion revealed that board approval was postmayor and council approval and usually included no change and a limited understanding
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of line-item justifications and breakdowns. Their influence played out through
suggestions such as reallocating funds for marketing or advertising—a few thousand
from here to there. Nothing of real consequence in consideration of the systems’
combined $120 million budget.
In terms of the monthly financial report review—the greatest opportunity for
oversight—few board members admitted to understanding the detailed interpretation of
financial reports and instead review them and vote instinctively with the expectation that
presented information is correct. A number of board members explained their lack of
budgetary and financial understanding as due to the complexity of the numbers and the
political processes, instead following the lead of a few (hopefully) well-informed board
members, the executive and staff. A short-tenured board member elucidated, “I really
don’t know where the money comes from because of grants and things like that.”
Another echoed the numbers are simply too huge and there is a lack of understanding of
the funding mechanisms. One area where most board members developed a strong
understanding is the effect of rising fuel costs on operating budgets. This is because
almost all boards have had to decide whether to increase fares juxtaposed with decisions
to keep or cut services and the impact on customers and employees.
Fuel prices have been on the authorities’ formal and informal agendas for months
as boards and executives waited out the end of the fiscal year. Once again, the board
understood the impact but not the process. In the end, many of them took the shortfalls,
the forecasts, recommendations and the revenue on faith—and all seem equally proud
and satisfied with making the “hard decisions” whether or not they really understood the
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data and implications. The fuel increase created a situation where the “conversations go
on but is hasn’t increased [real financial] discussion in any real measurable way.”
Another item of financial responsibility board members took as a financial source
of power was the approval contracts and purchases. However, a surprising number did
not actually know the bylaws of the board and had no idea what contract spending or
change order limits are for the board or executive. Some had no idea the spending limits
increased. Some had no idea which kinds of contracts are authorized to come before
them. Some did not know why they were or were not involved in union issues. Grant
applications, for example, are a very common process but very few properly explained
the capital planning and procurement process as opposed to the actual vote on the final
contract—long after the bids have been specified, released, returned and scored with
pricing and delivery negotiated. Only a few drew any connection between the capital
process and how it shapes the future of the city’s transportation network. A capital
project was perceived as just that—a project that needs money, votes and completion.
Once complete, it is checked off the list with no long-term understanding of operating
costs, impact on organizational function or the possible drain on resources.
Overall board members have seen no real change in their financial power,
especially at the formal level. Most boards have kept the same level of authority over the
years with occasional minor adjustments. There was some attention to the financial
power that comes from new funding, such as LexTran’s referendum, as it provides more
teeth to policy changes. At MTA the change in power has shifted away from “lots of
little purchases” to big-picture items of where is the money coming from, where is it
going and is it being spent wisely? A few board members felt their own power has
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increased because over time they have learned what to ask and are less reliant on the
board member who happens to be a certified public accountant.
Amusingly, neither the executive nor board thinks the board should have more
influence over the budget and spending issues but for opposite reasons. The general
manager does not want the board to have more power because it would impact executive
ability to make decisions and run the organization. They feel the present balance is good.
For a lot of board members, they already think they have total control and perceive that
executives do not have the financial power they actually hold. Board members equate
their late-stage budget approval and review of monthly financial reports with budget
control. Yet, they often admittedly lack the expertise and no real ability to understand
whether the work rules or the allocation of human resources (the most expensive line
item is driver’s wages) is fiscally prudent. Meanwhile they assert they are not a
“rubberstamp” board. The board simply perceives far more power than they actually
have in budgeting and do not acknowledge their power and influence in key areas of
financial management and capital planning. Where boards wish they could exercise
influence in budget and spending is the union contracts for wages, overall employee
benefits and budgetary accountability.
The key to this willingness to assume all is well on budgetary matters is that
members believe all is well. When asked, “Do you think resources are being obtained
and spent the best way possible?” even board members that had limited support for the
executive, questioned the financial process, along with concerns for executive leadership
said, “yes.” Most members simply believe the board is a good steward of public funds
and pointed out year after year, budget cut after budget cut, the system runs only on what
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it takes to place quality service on the street. They rely on the board member that is a
CPA, trust the annual audit and believe good discussion and debate among follow board
members drives a well-run system.
The majority of board member attention, before and after discussion of board
financial powers and responsibilities, was focused on the low-level policy of routes,
schedules, customer complaints and an attempt to address the individual concerns they
brought to the board. For example, a number of members were concerned with the
convenience of shelter and bus stops locations, continuation of specific routes in
neighborhoods or at malls and job centers, especially in late evenings and on Sundays,
and the executive’s response to customer complaints. Some board members had real
difficulty maintaining in-depth discussion of financial issues such as grant processes,
budget cycles, budget size, spending limits and revenue intake. A number completely
avoided in-depth discussion of financial procedures but could easily discuss recent route
changes, entrances and exits to shopping centers and specific customers input from the
public forum of a recent meeting.
A number of board members described initiatives and recommendations, often
low-level approaches to high-level policy implications. For example, after the 9/11
attacks a member suggested a board and staff committee on facility security. A board
initiative to have the executive oversee a revised plan and develop funding strategies to
secure potentially higher-risk targets is high-level policy. Recommending a committee,
which the board member was really excited about serving on, is low-level and exceeds
the board’s legitimate purview. Another similar recommendation came from a board
member who attended a professional workshop with a new technology on display that
139

might work on buses. The board member returned and was soon pushing the idea of this
new technology that was helpful, easy to implement and generally inexpensive; however,
clearly a low-level initiative.
Board Member Perspective on Informal Board Responsibility
One of the important themes surfacing from the executive interviews was the
value of the formal board as an informal board. Oddly, only a smaller number of board
members really identified a clear expectation of informal board responsibility, especially
in the important areas of moral, technical and leadership support or the members as a
sounding board. The aspect of strong informal responsibility emerged primarily within
two specific areas. Past and present board chairs acknowledged a much greater level of
informal responsibility and involvement due to the leadership nature of the position.
Also, board members described a much greater level of informal involvement and
responsibility during high-profile events or issues.
Board chairs simply have more responsibility due to their position. Formally,
they must have the greatest level of understanding of by-laws and processes to properly
hold meetings and guide discussion while ensuring the business of the authority is
conducted effectively and efficiently. To do this, they must have an exceptionally high
level of awareness of organizational trends and issues. A past chair described their role
as more than just a chair, describing times where they spoke with the GM three or four
times a week and acted as a one-on-one sounding board for the day-to-day operational
issues, especially when the executive was new to the system. Staffing and financial
problems created tremendous obstacles for some systems; this chair felt the executive
needed someone to talk to about organizational obstacles and the chair’s support was
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critical. Even though the chair of this system has turned over, the new chair recognized
the same importance of being a sounding board and provides the executive an occasional
sanity check. Another past chair agreed that the relationship is different because of their
past chair experience, creating more context and history of issues. This same board
member has since recognized that since leaving the post their involvement has declined,
partially due to their personal efforts to curb curiosity on issues citing, “certain things
aren’t in the board purview.”
Even board members never serving as authority chair or vice-chair understood
this implicit responsibility. When discussing issues such as relationships with the
executive and the rest of the board, a LexTran board member explained, “She [Garcia
Crews] tries to give some priority to the chair because the chair has to deal with the dayto-day issues and requires more prepping.” A Nashville board member agreed, “I think
it’s a different relationship with the board chair because of the position and ‘different’
means a more intensified relationship with the chair and this tends to be true on all
boards.”
The second area of executive support played out when board members described
their role in more unique and high profile events such as LexTran’s referendum.
Numerous board members from Lexington spoke at length about their experience and
other members who worked side-by-side with Garcia-Crews. Attending countless public
meetings with elected officials and events with business and community groups the active
board members remained in constant contact to steer the public campaign and develop
strategy to best educate the population for the greatest voter impact. In Lexington, labor
union officials have gone to the mayor and council to complain about mistreatment of
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union employees. Increased attention from the council and mayor have created a
potentially explosive environment with local politicians making negative, pointed
comments about the organization and questioning board and executive decisions, which
should be based on organizational efficiency and effectiveness and free of political
influence. This increased political meddling has also drawn negative media coverage
with reporters making stories from vague comments and accusations but with little actual
information.
The goal of the union and their political supporters, including a few council
members, has been to apply pressure on the executive (directly and/or through the board)
to get her to back down on her managerial approach. Executives trying to manage the
day-to-day functions of the organization with political forces constantly looking over
their shoulders makes for an extremely difficult situation. Executives and board
members cannot manage and govern effectively with this type of political involvement,
especially when it impacts not only decisions are made but also the outcomes. A board
member who pointed to his labor experience as the sole reason for his board appointment,
feels he has played some role in keeping this situation from exploding into a political
battleground. With pressure on the mayor to get involved, this member has been able to
talk with the mayor and provide understanding and context to the comments and claims
offered by the union camp. In addition, he has placed himself as a political wedge
between the mayor and the authority, “If she stays out I’ll continue to serve. Otherwise
I’ll resign.” This is a strong power move that could only be performed through a board
member appointed to advise and improve existing poor labor relations but who strongly
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believes that the involvement of outside forces undermines the collective bargaining
spirit and process in this circumstance and at this juncture.
Poor labor relations recently emerged in Nashville, at the political level, as the
authority continues to negotiate with the union for a new labor contract—negotiations
that have dragged on since October 2005. Nashville MTA’s CEO, Paul Ballard, was
called before the Nashville Metro Council’s Transportation committee to answer
questions about the negotiations and some of the claims advanced by the union. The
board membership attended the session with the executive to present an informed and
prepared front. The board chair (and former Chief of Staff for Tennessee Governor
Lamar Alexander), opened the proceedings with a “state of the MTA,” discussion on
recent ridership increases and program success, funding challenges, the new commuter
rail project and the transit center before attention was turned to Ballard. From the board
and executive’s perspective this was a very effective mechanism to help control what
could have become a political inquisition. Instead of using the entire session to grill the
CEO over a series of complaints the Metro Council committee first heard a statement
from established and respected chair that emphasized organizational success.
This type of informal participation is critical for an executive, and not just for
solidarity purposes. Many boards would see this as an executive’s responsibility and
would maintain distance; however, this type of situation—an authority executive called
before a legislative body to account for his or her actions—is extremely toxic for
executives. Usually, these types of settings are not fact-finding hearings but political
power plays where there is no reasonable opportunity for the executive to exit the session
unscathed, as minds are often already made up and no one is truly willing to listen. The
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board softens this harsh setting by presenting a unified group of respected individuals
who lay out major accomplishments in areas of revenue, ridership, efficiency and
effectiveness—items that offer texture to a politically charged environment. The board
also has the ability to provide context to the executive after the fact because, “When
you’re in the chair [answering questions] you don’t have the luxury of assessing what’s
really being asked.” When an executive is fielding questions, developing answers that
reveal enough but not too much and still limits opportunity for prying it becomes difficult
to absorb exactly who is asking the questions, the individual agendas or how the council
reacts to answers. A board member who is aware of the players and agendas and can
observe the action allows them to more effectively understand the overall political
setting. They can now make decisions as board and advise the executive more effectively
because they understand the totality of what was an intense circumstance where executive
attention was on the substance of the questions and answers, not the context.
In other instances, flexing political muscles on key issues was described as
extremely important. In Nashville, the financial crisis was more than just poor funding.
When mayoral administrations changed, the new finance director exhibited a lack of
commitment to fund the 10% local match required for a recent bus purchase. The transit
system had actually taken a business loan to meet their purchase contract obligations
while waiting for the local match. The board went to the finance director and explained
that if the funds were not released the buses would be parked and returned to the supplier.
Only a board could leverage this type of pressure—an executive threat of this nature
would lead directly to dismissal. Shortly after this meeting with the finance director
funds were released and the loan paid off.
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Board members made frequent reference to the value of diverse board member
perspectives and its contribution to discussion on issues and agenda items but discussion
was usually framed within the context of the formal role of membership. Debate and
suggestion for change on agenda items during formal meetings and questions on
recommendations during committee and work sessions comprised the main areas where
members felt they provided strong direction and guidance for the executive and
organization. Board members felt they provided the most informal value to executives
when they could offer expertise on selective issues. A LexTran member described how
he assists the General Manager, Terri Garcia Crews. “She’s quick to call me on a labor
issue and I’ll give advice. . . . [I have ] a lot of experience with the [National Labor
Relations Act] so with that background I’m very comfortable and she’s good at coming to
me.” A different board member described similar circumstances but from a frustration
standpoint. The frustration developed because she felt her expertise was not tapped
during a personnel issue where an arbitrator overturned an employee’s termination. “It
was extremely frustrating because [the GM] never asked me what [he or she] should do.”
She described similar conversations with other board members who have said, “a lot of
times if [the GM] had just asked me I’d have told [him or her].”
Political Power and Board Member Effectiveness
An important facet of public authorities, as described by executives, was the
board’s political efficacy manifested in the power and influence on the city’s political
landscape. Executives noted limited power and influence due to financial shackles
imposed by the parent government and a narrow opportunity for influence outside the
mayor. Also contributing, according to executives, was a lack of upward influence due to
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their strongest ties with disenfranchised populations, lack of involvement with circles of
power due to limited personal incomes, and the time involved to effectively communicate
the technical mantra of the system outward. Board members generally agreed with
executives’ assessments that the overall board was relatively weak, identifying their
power and influence as moderately strong or moderately weak. They noted a limit to the
powers the board has in terms of formal powers granted by the parent government and
controlled in the bylaws. Some felt their power was near non-existent because they
lacked the ability influence the decisions of the city’s political elites for the benefit of the
authority. One board member said, “we’re a blip,” as he laughed in resigned frustration
about the board’s lack of political influence outside the authority.
On the first topic of limited power due to the authority structure, the reliance on
federal, state and local funds places the authority on the receiving end of the political
process. Even though elected officials tell board members and the executive that public
transportation is important, it is generally lip service because they give what is needed
and not much more. There was a strong sense that if the mayor and council are in favor
of the organization then the basics will be there. Any system that has no dedicated
funding through property or sales tax must annually beg for money and if the city
declines, the system is in serious trouble. A CARTA board member observed, “The
perception among political players is that we need them more than they need us. That’s
the way they see us so it limits our influence, if we have any.”
This reality is a very limited board in terms of power but the greatest opportunity
for influence within this circumstance is credibility. In Nashville, a sense of more
political power is attributed to the improved credibility the system has established with
146

the mayor and the community, which has translated into more money compared to when
MTA was “a non-entity.” Credibility only goes so far. For one MTA board member, it
would require different people to gain more influence. This limited political prowess and
influence was has been a concern in Lexington. Following the referendum and the
increased prominence of LexTran that came with it the decision was made to approach
the mayor with a desire for the next appointee to have strong business-community ties.
The addition of a highly influential, well-respected board member with a skill-set
beneficial to a growing authority is beginning to pay dividends for LexTran through
knowledge, expertise and stature. It was argued that more high-stature members are the
greatest source of influence for the authority because it provides the perception the
authority is more successful but a member warns big names could mean less effort. Big
names have more obligations—their companies, other boards—and could detract from
board functions as opposed to lesser names willing to invest the time and commitment to
make the authority operationally successful. A balance of these two concerns is critical.
The sentiment of board composition, power-players or non-power players, making the
single largest difference was a consistent theme. On power and influence vs.
performance, a well-tenured board member lamented, “I’m not aware the board has any
power. It really is about the people on the board—I don’t think they think about the
system from one meeting to the next and if [the GM] decided to depend more on the
committees he’d fail because of the people.”
Most members acknowledged board political limitations but identified individuals
carrying particular weight within respective communities. A JTA board member
explained several members are very influential by acting as a go between for the
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community. “The community might have issues with the authority and board members
help calm them down and explain things . . . the expense of fuel, the grant money, etc.”
Even when there were particularly strong and influential board members, such as at
CARTA where the board includes a county commissioner, a fellow member said simply,
“One person can’t change things alone.” There was significant recognition that boards
wielded their power and influence at a grass-roots level. A CARTA board member
enlightened further that leverage really comes into play in the communities where the
board member is widely known and influential.
Even when influence can be exercised, it sometimes is not. A JTA board member
identifying himself as one of a handful of more influential people within the city was
asked, “How do you exercise your influence?” He said it has not come to that because
the entire board is involved in other aspects of the community, therefore making better
decisions to reflect the bigger picture. He added it has not been a transit vs. political
circumstance but identified greater participation in other city functions and meetings as a
key opportunity to enhance their overall influence. “We all have some level of influence
because everybody has someone to talk to.” A different JTA board member actually
questioned the need for political influence. “I don’t see where it needs to be influential.
My personal belief is to stay away from politics if I can help it except for making sure
people’s needs are being met. Personally I’m in favor of that not being what we’re about.
I’m not a politician and I don’t gravitate to that way of doing things.”
In Memphis, the board has a large number of political ties but does not maximize
the opportunity. This problem recently gained board awareness during the political battle
over the planned light rail system. “We have seven big mouths that don’t cost a dime and
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we are a resource. We’re in the process now or organizing to be present at key places,”
but the problem is the time commitment. It is very hard to push a volunteer board for
high levels of involvement, especially on highly political issues. The willingness only
goes so far. Time commitments came into play constantly from board members across
the sample.
Most board members arguing a higher level of political influence focused on the
opportunity for mayoral influence, echoing the executive’s general criticism of limited
board power beyond the mayor. “We have influence with the mayor primarily with some
outreach to the council. But we have to be more aggressive to make sure they understand
the importance and significant value of the service for the community.” Establishing
relationships and outreach beyond the confines of the public authority is extremely
important because business and politics is about networking. Networking by
participating in key events and processes gets past what a Memphis board member
described as the “Who the hell are you?” factor. Knowing the mayor, and others by
extension, breaks down the political barriers but term-limits and subsequent council and
commission turnover make influence exceptionally difficult. Once again, the dedication
and time commitment become real and meaningful obstacles to political influence—the
appointment from the mayor becomes the one political constant.
Despite all of the negative assessments of board power, the recognition of the
limitations of individual members and the inherent weaknesses of the boards’ ability to
deliver influence when really necessary, there was an overwhelming feeling that the
respective boards were effective. A unanimous “yes” to the question, “Overall, do you
think the board is effective?” is the clear and resounding indication. A few pointed to the
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fact that the system was running generally smoothly and that the board was
accomplishing goals and objectives set by comprehensive operations assessments or
strategic plans. In these responses, attention was on task-orientation and effective board
operation with a level of seriousness due to the public nature of both funding and service.
These board members felt their strongest contribution as board was in meeting financial
obligations while balancing the needs of the system against the needs of riders. A strong
sense of “doing more with less” permeated these responses.
For other board members effectiveness came from the membership’s diversity of
and the varying perspectives that allowed for good debate, questions and thorough
delving of issues, resulting in solid and balanced decisions to balance the needs of the
organization with those of the community. The diversity was not always focused on
outcomes for the diversity of riders—talents such as legal skills, labor relations, executive
management experience and strong business acumen bring together a variety of talents to
create meaningful discussion and spur creative solutions.
A common criticism of boards by members was the board’s easy willingness to
follow executive recommendations. Whether it was a lack of initiative, limited
inquisitiveness or a paucity of information, these individuals felt their board did not
challenge the GM’s recommendations or staff reports. One board member felt the same
way but explained it is not a factor of disagreement but that challenging proposals forces
better evaluation of possible options prior to recommending board action. He felt that
there was just too often a will of the majority—a desire not to stir things up or cause
trouble because a single board member constantly challenging issues becomes a political
oddball. Everyone goes along to get along. This sentiment was harshly endorsed by
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another board member from a different system, “It’s this whole Southern attitude. Avoid
confrontation at any cost, especially on a public board. We’re a good will board and
that’s the biggest obstacle to implementing change.” A “go along”-type board member
deftly (and possibly accidentally) identified the quagmire and need for the challengeoriented oddball:
Some might want more authority and more clout and I sense that there are
one or two that are suspicious of things. I wonder why they’re suspicious.
They’re very questioning and speak out on things but I don’t know if
that’s good or bad. They might be some of our best board members. They
ask the most questions with both praising and probing.
Overall, the single greatest obstacle to board effectiveness, at the group and
individual level is involvement and education. For some it is asking more questions,
learning the business of public transportation and becoming aware with national and
statewide trends. There was a need to better understand how changes in funding
regulations impact operations and capital budgets as well as procurement processes.
Boards wanted to better understand how systems deliver services, especially in
consideration of homeland security, advancing technology and judicial decisions on civil
rights through the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Representation
Representation emerged as one of the most important elements in understanding
board member opinions and perspectives. Unlike executives, who were asked whether
they thought the board represented a good cross-section of their city, the approach with
board members was to ask, “In your role as a board member, on whose behalf are you
acting?” and “Is there are particular group you feel you are speaking and voting for?”
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General discussion led to questions of whether the board represented a good cross-section
of the city and which population segments were not represented.
When discussing whether the system represented a good cross-section of the
population, board members were extremely varied. Many said “yes” and answers drifted
from either excellent representation or complete under-representation in very diverse
areas of: professional backgrounds, board member prominence, inclusion of social
services, business, industry, universities, race, gender, political parties, disability
perspectives, retirees and geography. The fact that such diversity is not accidental was a
common understanding. “[The board] is a good mix and not accidental. You have to
work to get that” level of diversity. Diversity was identified as a concerted effort,
explained one of CARTA’s board members, and is good because it is more experiential
and reflects community diversity, adding, “It’s a quasi-political make-up and reflects a
stronger understanding of needs.” Ironically, one board member noted a clear
representational gap despite the board having a person appointed almost solely because of
their specific background—a sly criticism of that member’s ability to truly represent the
needs of a very important population.
On a consistent basis there were two groups identified as lacking representation
on the various boards—Hispanics and transit riders, especially low-income, transit
dependent riders. While some board members saw the benefit there was considerable
question as to the efficacy of such representation, mirroring the concerns of executives.
Reflecting on LexTran’s referendum process, a board member who once believed riders
needed stronger voice on the board really questions the value now. “I don’t think they’d
feel comfortable other than in terms of prestige. In terms of a contribution I don’t think
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there’s much for them to add.” Another reiterated, “How good is it to have an immigrant
representative without English skills or who lacks the understanding of American
government?”
At the same time, there was a unique discussion of whether boards are actually
the best place for the specific communities needing voice such as persons with
disabilities, immigrants and the working poor because you have to see more than one side
of an issue. “When you’re on the board you have a fiduciary responsibility, which makes
advocacy much harder.” The most unique voice on representation was from a Jackson
member who singularly noted that upper income residents are not represented—they do
not ride the service and do not understand the issues.
Board responses to the question—on whose behalf was the board member
acting?—the board members generally fell into two groups, the citizens at large and the
riders of the system. First, when discussing the community at large, board members were
personally divided in their own role as needing to serve the business needs of the transit
system and the population using the service. The issues was well-identified by a JTA
board member who stated, “You have to serve the ridership or you will fail as a business
but if you don’t serve the business you will fail your ridership. A failure in one is a
failure in the other and it’s a hard line to walk, as in the fare increase. You don’t want to
charge riders more money but you have to take care of the business.” Some board
members with the broader community-wide focus on representation did not subdivide
loyalties when pressed on whether they were voting or speaking for a particular group.
There was a very strong recognition that system ridership is diverse and there needs to be
a certain protection of the integrity of the system as a whole as opposed to any small
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group. As a LexTran member explained, “I’m a taxpayer too. Public transportation is
critical to the community and that motivates me.”
Just as some board members with community-wide concerns did not subdivide
loyalties to riders, there were a very large number who did. A long-time board member
justified, “I was appointed by the mayor and the populous. I do pay special attention to
the ridership though.” Even those few members identifying themselves as obligated to
represent the mayor or parent government (the “purpose” of their appointment) were
drawn to the voice of the rider when political obligations were set aside.
Loyalty to the rider is well validated and these individuals joined the vast majority
of board members who were focused on the riders. The ridership is the customer base of
the system and the single greatest source of non-tax funding. Users rely on public
transportation services and fund a significant, although limited, portion of services. They
are the direct recipients of services and are the sole justification for the organization’s
existence, regardless of who rides or does not. Non-riders have family, friends, coworkers and employees that ride public transportation. They receive goods and services
delivered by users and reap the benefits of decreased pollution and traffic congestion.
While there is general interest to emphasize public transportation as a service for all,
these respondents almost always directed their particular attention to the transit
dependent riders of the system, specifically the economically disadvantaged, elderly and
disabled.
Individual Agendas & Decision-making
Transit executives are reliant on their boards for major decisions and function in
an environment where they must balance system needs against board member
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preferences. Executives must develop an acute and precise awareness of how various
board members approach their roles and must place these members in representational
boxes to understand individual agendas, as described in the previous chapter. How board
members perceive their role in representation played out directly in terms of individual
preferences and agendas.
Where this concern solidifies is individual agendas, many of which develop over
the concern for transit dependent rides. A long-time transit rider who serves on an
authority board describes their personal connection to dependent populations and
explains: a choice rider “can choose other options. He’s important too but the most
important group is those with no other choice. These are the people who need the most
representation.” Another passionately avowed, “I believe I’m voting for advocacy of the
working poor. It’s my passion in life to make sure they are served and have
transportation for a meaningful life. It’s a moral obligation of the community to provide
[transit] service.” Another board member saw transportation purely as a social service
and economic equity issue; an obligation to prevent already marginalized communities
from further neglect.
Beyond the economically disadvantaged dependent rider are also elderly and
disabled populations that rely heavily on public transportation. Transportation is such a
critical element to personal independence that the Americans with Disabilities Act
devotes entire sections to public transportation, including requirement of an entirely
separate paratransit service to provide equal access. Several board members were proud
of the disability representation and noted the focus and tenacity of those members on
disability issues. Disabled board members peppered their interview responses with
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transportation accessibility issues in nearly every part of the interview. For example, a
board member with active involvement in disability issues cited their appointment,
overall focus, support for expanded services, acquisition of more vehicles and the
protection of disability services from service cuts as their primary interest. Nearly every
topic discussed surrounded disability issues, as this population often has no other options
and because transportation is essential to the quality of life for all. They see their
appointment to the board as a signal to the community that the system is serious about
issues that are germane to that group and with that comes responsibility to see those
needs are met.
Board members spoke extensively about responsiveness to not only servicerelated issues but also their primary areas of expertise and interest, such as in labor
relations, safety and security and social service issues. Attorneys were very concerned
with contract language and legal entanglements; finance-oriented board members were
concerned with how reports were presented and organized; architects and planners had
urban design concerns and approached transit from a service-development and delivery
standpoint; and labor relations leaders were focused on employee treatment and
collective bargaining. A member with extensive collective bargaining experience
explained that on certain issues he will ask the executive to conduct more research and
has seen changes in how the GM has corrected past approaches to employee discipline
and more careful on documentation of processes. A board member with a background in
safety and security supplemented this with, “I can always give input. I’m not always
asked but I can give it. Anything with safety and security is my baby because it is an
expertise I already have.”
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Throughout these interviews board members generally wore their interests on
their sleeve and it showed in their preferred and actual involvement in decision-making,
conflicts with fellow board members and the overall board-executive relationship.
Overall, most board members identified a low level of in-depth financial involvement, a
very weak-to-moderate political influence, an obvious feeling of constituency and need to
represent and protect certain groups and a self-admitted concern for low-level, on street
issues. Despite this, board members generally did not see themselves as involved in
decision-making for managing of the transit system in a day-to-day sense. Most properly
explained that that is the role of the executive to manage the system and did not really
feel a need to get involved.
Despite the denial of interest in low-level decision-making, most board members
could not help their interest in day-to-day operations. They expressed a natural interest in
the management of the system and the ability to express concerns for important issues
brought before them by riders, concerned citizens or through their own observations. A
board member from JTA, for example, was very satisfied with his role because he had the
day-to-day influence he wanted, arguing, “It happens every month: requests for
additional stops, dealing with personnel and benefits and how it affects the budget.
Occasionally buses are off schedule and citizens have issues and complaints. All of this
is on a regular basis . . . just general input at board meetings.” This was the actual feeling
of most board members whether they admitted to system operations involvement or not.
Representation and agenda poured over into decision-making on a constant basis.
A board member identifying himself as a conduit to the community explains, “Being
involved on this end operationally has opened my eyes to issues about struggles to
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provide service. People don’t understand the day-to-day but I did once I was on the other
side and became involved,” adding, “I’m here to meet the needs of the community . . . a
liaison to understand the process and how things work.” Others simply felt they had
ability and responsibility to get involved in operational decisions—almost on a side-byside level—thinking they have a better level of understanding and appreciation for the
service than those who live and breathe transit as a career. Most of these responses came
from board members who were riders of the system in the recent past or at present. One
such rider/member described their desire to get involved with an on street operations
issue as the problem unfolded in front of them. The board member reluctantly admitted
the need to keep their distance because that is what board members are supposed to do,
but there was clear desire to act as an enforcer of system operations.
Some members, especially those who are riders, see the impact of decisions firsthand and want to offer suggestions for route changes, not just approve them. They want
to offer their input on new vehicles and even get involved in the inner workings of
operations planning. One board member feels so involved in operational decisionmaking she sees her input as directly affecting services at a street level and on a constant
basis. Another frequently calls and speaks to a department manager to advise him on
how to deploy route schedules to be more effective and efficient to reduce the length of
their own personal transit trips. Regular calls to complain about dirty floors, rude drivers
and hot buses were the top areas of involvement in their duties and responsibilities. A
top concern in virtually every answer was the service they use, with little or no concern
for the remainder of the overall system.
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Several board members with strong university ties felt clear and direct
responsibility to represent the university and its students. One such board member
identified their primary concerns as the “university, then the rider.” For members such as
this, transit services to the university campus, how the campus population moves about
campus, and the agreements with the university for services--clearly influenced their
relationships with executives, their approach to their board duties and how they made
decisions. Business leaders and those with connections to the downtown business
districts were concerned with the impact of services, good or ill, on the business
community and tourism industry. Attention was on supporting the economic interests
through specialized downtown services, possibly as the risk of diverting resources from
the core system city ridership. Riders were important but the redevelopment of
downtown business districts and support of the tourism-visitor industry takes their
precedence. Several board members acknowledged these types of issues as having
significant impact on their decisions to cut or protect certain routes or how to allocate
new resources.
In reality, most board members understood the need for restraint and there was a
very strong contingent with no interest in day-to-day operational decisions. The focus is
on the what, not the how, and on the long-term organizational ability to meet the
community’s comprehensive transportation needs. When asked how often they were
involved in the day-to-day system management, a board member answered for this
smaller group, “Hardly ever. We set policy and procedure and that provides the
guidelines and boundaries within which the GM runs the organization.”
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But on occasion even those board members with a clear policy emphasis wished
for greater information relating to on street operations issues, how problems are being
handled and a clearer picture of organizational morale. They longed for the ability to get
the transfer center cleaner, take tours of the operations and maintenance facility and see
how operational decisions are made. Board members agreed it was natural to notice on
street problems but understood it is unhealthy to be involved with what bus goes on what
route—especially when staff should have greater ability for those decisions than board
members. Laughingly, a board member who has developed a strong understanding of
operations and strongly respects the lines of authority admits she occasionally crosses the
crosses the line and presses the executive over minor issues—but also applies some
reality to the circumstance: “[I know] I’m bossy . . . [and ] don’t know as much as I think
I do and I’m seeing it from a distance.” These board members with the occasional desire
to get involved at an operational level recognize their limits as well as the importance of
the maintaining clear lines of board and executive authority.
Conflict
Conflict, past or present, emerged primarily when board members identified: 1)
poor communication, manifest through a lack of information, responsiveness or process;
or 2) strong board member desire for involvement in system operation. Executives and
board members agreed the effective functioning of the board-executive structure was
reliant on communication. Most board members were pleased with the overall level of
communication with the GM. They generally felt the executive was open, honest and
approached both system and board business with a fitting level of transparency while
properly directing their managerial authority. In the case of board members who had
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experienced poor managerial leadership under past executives, communication was the
ultimate cause of the executive’s downfall. For example, board members recalled past
executives who were secretive regarding the real financial picture of the system—which
could produce trust and credibility issues. In one especially telling case, there was a GM
who claimed the $800,000 deficit would go away once budget adjustments were made.
Then, following the performance audit, the actual deficit swelled to $1.5 million. The
situation worsened when the GM allowed the board member to walk into a subsequent
meeting without sharing this information beforehand, so that this stunning news was first
heard by the board member during the auditor’s presentation. Members also recalled
situations in which GMs failed to notify the board about the loss of grant funds and had
not taken steps to adjust services accordingly.
Communication was coupled with responsiveness and how well executives
effectively and promptly replied to board and individual requests. For board members,
this emerged throughout interviews but gained prominence when discussing executive
responsiveness to board and individual concerns. Communication is not just the bigpicture items of board responsibility and by-laws. Nearly all board members felt the
executive was very responsive to board and individual concerns expressed to the general
manager. Members commonly reported the need to know about street level service and
internal management concerns such as buses running ahead of schedule, the
inconveniences of certain bus stops locations, shelter placement or complaints from
customers.
Board members, although much fewer in number, were also focused on more
high-level issues including the regular status of the budget, review of administrative
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salary scales and were focused less on the subject but rather process. Process also
matters considerably to board members. Even when everyone is not on the same page—
board members and executives alike—process takes center stage because it is the
mechanism that drives board member decision-making. Data and information packages,
explanations from consultants and executive expertise only go so far. The process of
information and summary reports mixed with opportunity for board questioning of staff
assumptions and ideologies for recommendations is how board members develop comfort
levels for decisions. This is very important when all board members are not on the same
page. Sometimes the data and information is not sufficient or is based on certain
assumptions that board members are unfamiliar or uncomfortable with. When the
executive recommends “X” with reasoning and support information but the board
chooses “Y”, the executive must be willing to follow the board’s direction and respect the
process. As a past board chair explained, “If the board says to do it [and it is a bad
decision] it’s our problem.”
Timely communications is important, as seen in the case of a member who
reported being extremely frustrated when an executive suddenly added an important
agenda item for a meeting of the full board, including a published notice for a public
hearing involving major changes in operation of a service, which fell within the
jurisdiction of a committee he/she chaired. The executive added this formal agenda item
at the last possible moment without any advance warning, bothering the member greatly.
While the GM provided very good reasons for adding this item—advance notice and
discussion would have delayed action for another forty five days until the next board
meeting—but the board member did not appreciate the lack of concern for their
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perspective and the opportunity to ask important questions. “I probably would have been
furious but he had a really good reason.” The board member was still able to ask
questions and address issues one-on-one with ample board opportunity to discuss the
issue in committee and at the board meeting—but it was after the process had begun. For
them the frustration was not related to the formal process but the informal understanding
between the executive and the membership.
While responsiveness to board initiated concerns was important so was awareness
of ongoing and surprise events such as bus accidents and potentially explosive employee
terminations. Board members, especially chairs, felt a great need to aware of what is
going on whether low- or high-level. They like no surprises, whether a phone call from a
staff member or driver who was terminated, the rogue union member, the local politician
who heard something at a meeting or the media calling for a statement on the fatal
accident or bus fire. These items are generally few and far between but represent one of
the many areas an executive can run afoul of a board member with heightened interest in
internal operations. Board members just want to know about these things, even when no
one from the outside is asking questions.
Often defensiveness colors an executive’s responsiveness. An executive may be
extremely thorough in the research and prompt in the delivery of information but
defensiveness has created direct conflict in several instances and in more ways than the
obvious example of an executive-board member argument. Sometimes it is secondguessing the board by providing the information the executive thinks the board wants to
see instead of what is asked for. A GM once told a board member, “I told the staff not to
bring it to you because I knew you would not accept it,” after a resolution failed. I asked
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the board member if they felt this was a situation where the executive was keeping things
from the board or just learning from the past and following board leadership? She
explained the conflict was more about an unwillingness to try for change and fail, along
with the executive’s defensiveness and frustration that follows. She added, “You never
know you won’t like it or pass it unless you’ve had a chance to hear it.”
Conflict was not solely directed at executive communication and responsiveness
to concerns. “Our board doesn’t have any concerns,” a board member explained. The
only things discussed were on the agenda and any discussion comes from him. The
frustration is that the GM does not look to the board for guidance and the board does
nothing to bring up concerns they may have. When discussing how that member
approaches his individual concerns he explains that he has essentially acquiesced to the
executive because of past circumstances related to his board appointment, “I walk such a
narrow line that I don’t know how effective I am [as a board member].”
The most detrimental conflict occurs when board members desire to become
involved in the heart of managerial authority—the selection, allocation and management
of human resources. At one of the systems included in this study there was a strong level
of concern from those involved in system governance that board involvement in human
resource decisions is creating a very awkward and fragile board member-board member
and board-executive relationship through the constant questioning and involvement in
personnel management. The product of this involvement is seeping into effective system
governance and detracted from board ability for effective decisions in a number of ways.
First, board members articulated that communication has been severely damaged because
this particular board member has decided to become involved with personnel issues,
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including collective bargaining unit demands and complaints to which the member is
sympathetic. This member uses a board position to transfer information from the labor
union to the mayor. Communication from this board member to the rest of the board and
the executive was described as one-way information seeking along with asking questions
and demanding changes but with no real filtering of issues or absorbing the advice and
counsel of their colleagues.
Second, members of the board felt the actions and statements are detrimental to
the quality and stature of the board, as attention to public airing of concerns takes
precedent over accomplishments and service in the eyes of the media, local politicians
and the community. Third, board members within this system are frustrated because a
board member’s individual preferences have emerged into a publicly aired, single-issue
agenda at the expense of responsibility to the service. The opinion has surfaced that the
board member is no longer as dedicated to the functional responsibility of the board such
as participation in committee meetings, pre-board meeting discussions and regular
interaction in outside events. The board has a strong desire to maintain a policy-based,
service-oriented, non-political environment where decisions are made for the sake of the
system’s riders and long-term viability. The conveyance of concerns outside the confines
of the board weakens solidarity and creates an undercurrent where the presentation of
concerns, not the substance, is creating problems.
Yet, there was no real belief from the board membership this specific member is
wrong for the questions asked or spirit of the discussion. Concern was for the process
through which these issues are addressed. Most involved feel this has been fully
addressed and resolved through a fact-based discussion and review of the issues. In
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essence, the board has decided, either formally or informally, that the issues are resolved
insofar as board responsibility allows. Now there is a sense that a continued undercurrent
of an individual’s desire for involvement in personnel selection and the resulting agenda
may turn from frustration to conflict.
Board involvement in staffing decisions and managerial approaches are also of
concern. A situation described during the interviews was a board member who feels the
executive underuses staff for system outreach with excessive amount of time focused on
operational issues—despite the executive’s focus on operations issues and
communication as a means to deliver quality service. The board member has discussed
this directly with the GM and knows the executive’s decision is to emphasize more on
street service with strong support but the member feels a lack of outreach is like opening
a new store on Main St. and not putting an “open” sign in the window. This has been a
constant struggle between this board member and the executive and has created a
tenuous, sometimes outright distant relationship. A relationship that was once described
as excellent has slowly eroded over time, according to the board member but overall
remains good and in tact. The board member has genuine concern for executive
decisions regarding use of staff for community relations and outreach but that is a smaller
area of the overall scope of the organization and the executive excels in other areas that
overcomes what the board member perceives as a misuse of staffing.
Even board members who know they have no control over personnel, fully
recognize management authority over personnel and respect that distinction exhibit
frustration with the board-employee disconnect. Most members understand the executive
is the sole authority over hired personnel but they struggle with an excellent executive
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that builds a generally strong, competent staff but still disagrees with certain executive
decisions. This was present on a significant number of occasions and the interviews were
littered with references to certain effective or ineffective staff members, questions of
hiring decisions and promotion practices, how they delegate and allocate their staff and
how executives discipline employees. Some question their colleagues’ concern,
wondering whether much of what arose as concerns was gossip being treated as fact.
There was also real frustration over the board’s inability to hold the local union
employees accountable for their actions—citing the separation of the management rights
to manage and negotiate with the union from the ultimate board responsibility for the
authority.
Conflict was often tied to very deep-rooted problems with how the executive
managed the organization and was based on self-identified, individual agendas with
strong levels of personal involvement in the surrounding controversy. In each instance
where serious conflict existed the board member had significant levels of expertise and
investment in a specific community or policy issue and the board member’s concerns
were specific to that issue. Outside board concerns or even agreement with other
organizational functions may have existed but once these concerns were solidified and
articulated, individual perspective on board responsibility completely shifted in terms of
focus and agenda.
Overall, conflict is driven by a lack of communication between the board and
executive, mostly from the executive to the board, and when board members have
increased desire for involvement in executive decisions. Executives must work carefully
and constantly to be responsive to board concerns but also to keep the members well
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informed of issues that may come before them, especially major financial issues and
controversial subjects. Boards do not like to be surprised. Within this, the executives
must pay considerable attention to formal and informal processes, as organizational
norms often drive board expectations and opportunity for input. When processes are
bypassed or changed, frustration is more likely to emerge, especially if it done out of
defensiveness. Boards want to opportunity to discuss and debate items—they do not
have the same personal stake in items as executives—and do not mind tearing
recommendations apart. Executives that become defensive and begin to avoid putting
recommendations before the board may run afoul of the members. Finally, conflict
frequently develops when there is a string desire for involvement in executive decisions.
Most often this involves personnel and treads on the board-executive relationship because
it calls executive authority into question and is often tied to very personal feelings of
equity and accountability.
Board Perspectives on the Board-Executive Relationship
The above descriptions of conflict and frustration allow for in-depth discussion
and consideration of the primary causes of board-executive conflict from a board
perspective—communication and personnel management—along with discussion of
where and how these issues play out. It must first be clarified that throughout the sample
there were few board members that identified serious conflict among board members or
with the executive. There was significant conflict but it generally involved a single issue
that had either been resolved and the parties had come to an amicable agreement or
agreed to disagree and let it not interfere with board operations. This was evident when
almost every board member identified the relationship with the executive as good or
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excellent and felt the same existed between the executive and the other members of the
board. Most board members described a professional, respectful and comfortable
relationship founded on the business of the transportation system and the responsibilities
of the board and the authority as a whole. Even those with serious concerns identified the
relationship as “fair” and generally respected the executive’s position and the need to run
the organization as they see fit but those members did not agree with how the executive
went about those decisions or the results.
Nearly all board members considered their relationship with the General Manager
as at least “good.” Many thought them excellent. All of the board members interviewed
rated their GM as an effective manager of the transit system. All were supportive of the
job the GM was doing. Overall most felt the executive was caring for the riders,
employees and communities, was invested in the system and was straightforward and
honest. Board-executive conflict emerged when a there was lack of trust in executive
decisions that played out within the specialized agendas of the board members. Of those
board members indicating a particularly close relationship, none identified a relationship
that exists from events outside the authority’s business. The leading response to why
members had particularly strong, positive relationships surrounded service as board chair
or vice chair, service on particularly involved committees or side-by-side efforts such as
facility projects or Lexington’s referendum process. Positive and negative relationships
were typically a product of internal authority business, not outside political divisions.
Also impacting relationships and support level was board member and executive
tenure. The longer the board member and executive serves, the greater the appreciation
and trust that develops as they experience how the GM manages resources, solves
169

problems, interacts with the board, handles political involvement and manages
employees. Even new board members come to appreciate the long years of service and
the expertise and experience GMs accrue. As long as nothing occurs to significantly
harm the relationship, board members remain loyal and supportive because executive
success is seen as equal to board success. Time solidifies these feelings and helps to heal
fresh wounds.
Supportive board members acknowledging a good or better relationship felt the
executive was effective because the GM listened to what the board said, whether as a
group or one-on-one. Guidance on labor issues, economic strategies, service planning,
facility planning and political direction was important to individuals, if not the entire
board, and the executive’s open ear to concerns was highly valued. Often it was the little
things that board members latched on to: after-hours e-mails to make sure the board
member understood the discussion from the board meeting; post-board meeting
conversations to gather expertise; or getting an “am I crazy but . . .” opinion. The same
was true for low-level service issues such as vandalized shelters, a bus without working
air conditioning or inclusion in selecting new marketing materials and promotional items.
The effectiveness of the executives was measured by as much by the employees
surrounding them as their management style and responsiveness. GM and organizational
weaknesses in budgeting, finance, marketing or planning were noted but were often past
issues due to the executive’s ability to recruit, develop and retain a high caliber staff to
lead the organization. To board members organizational success is defined as being on
budget, increasing ridership and managing effectively. Support is also driven by the
quality of the information board members have at their disposal. Most felt they had
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enough information to make effective decisions, are supplied a variety of options and are
provided more information as requested.
Connected to excellent staff and organizational ability was the ability to garner
further expertise from management firms such as First Transit and Professional Transit
Management. In the case of executives employed by management firms, board members
had glowing praise for both Professional Transit Management and First Transit and felt
that the resources offered to the board members and executives made them more effective
in their responsibilities. Board members from systems with management firm general
managers identified the corporate staff by name and touted them for individual handling
of the board, professional board development services and the technical expertise
available.

CONCLUSION
Chapters Three and Four provided a complete picture of the ways executives and
board members perceive the role boards play in policy-making, formal and informal
direction of organizational goals, influence on the political landscape and the
effectiveness of individual and collective members. First, executives and board members
are in general agreement regarding the political influence of the respective boards and the
preferred levels of involvement in service-oriented, low-level policy. Second, board
members and executives are also in general agreement on the representational boxes in
which board members are placed, as board members self-identify their individual agendas
and described how those agendas shape decision-making and manifest through conflict.
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Third, board and executives perceive very similar levels of support from the board
for the executive and have similar rationales for this support. Finally, board and
executives describe two distinctly different understandings of what constitutes financial
power and authority, depending on the executive and board member. It is from the fusion
of executive and board observations and realities that we may now seek to understand
what impacts the board executive relationship.
Chapter Five juxtaposes the findings from executives with those of board
members to evaluate the expectations presented in Chapter One regarding authority
financial power’s impact on board member agendas and whether increased conflict is a
product of this scenario. More importantly, the research questions posited in Chapter
One are considered in depth with an emphasis on examining the role perceptions of board
members and how these perceptions impact both when board members seek involvement
in executive decision-making and the impact of that involvement on the board-executive
relationship.
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CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS OF EXPECTATIONS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

INTRODUCTION
Important to public authorities is the power and scope of the agency, as measured
through their financial power. Chapter One described a shift of political and financial
power from public transportation authorities to parent governments creating an
environment of increased conflict based upon the premise that an absence of high-level
policy opportunity results in low-level players on public authority boards. The argument
was presented that low-level players bring service-level rather than policy agendas to
their positions, which would differ from the executive’s service-level agenda. As a result
there was an expectation of significant organizational conflict as a product of this
situation. In this chapter the basic arguments and expectations are considered in light of
the personal interviews conducted for the study. Specific attention is paid to formulating
answers to the research questions presented in Chapter One. Ultimately this chapter
considers the board-executive relationship in terms of conflict and encroachment on
executive territory. Executive and board member interviews are analyzed to establish a
fundamental understanding of how the individual transportation authorities function.
Close attention is paid to high- and low-level policy, individual agendas, board
preferences for decision-making and the support levels yielded from these closely
connected elements.
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EVALUATING THE EXPECTATIONS
Arguments and Expectations
Public transportation authorities are a popular creation of parent governments to
govern the complex and business-like issues surrounding urban mass transit service
delivery. The unique political structure, narrow scope of responsibility and need to
manage the day-to-day services produces a circumstance where the ability to control the
organization’s destiny is reliant on board and executive ability to develop and execute
policy toward the achievement of organizational goals. Most critical to this function is
the ability to make financial decisions and direct resources toward these organizational
goals. Problematic is the shift of financial authority away from authorities to parent
governments, creating considerable control on how these quasi-governments function.
The removal of financial power from the authority creates strain on the board-executive
relationship based upon the following expectations:
1. The shift of fiscal power from the public authority to the parent government
yields a significant loss of the authority’s political power, reducing the
willingness of influential and politically astute individuals to serve on the
authority board.
2. In the absence of high-level political actors, lower-level community activists and
players with service-related agendas fill public transportation board positions.
The lower-level agendas of board members will be focused heavily on servicerelated issues that fall primarily under the scope and authority of the transit
executive.
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3. This will lead to greater conflict between the executive and board members as
agendas conflict or as the executive resists involvement by the board in those
areas. The result is decreased support for the executive by individual board
members.
The argument is limited fiscal power reduces willingness of influential individuals
to serve on these authorities and creates a board comprised of members with limited
political efficacy unable to develop and maintain political capital. The executive must
move from administering programs and managing resources to mission building and
policy-making and when political capital is needed the board has relatively little to offer.
Low-level players form boards with a lower-level policy focus, of which most concerns
fall under the authority of the executive.
Financial Power and Board Political Power
In the evaluation of this expectation there are several significant criteria for
consideration. First, attention is paid to significant limitations of financial power and
whether this yields a significant loss of board political power as described and expected
above. To examine this criterion the transit systems are individually considered
regarding financial authority and board ability to influence internal and external policy
decisions to guide and direct funding—the key source of power to the organization.
Second, the criterion of whether this level of power is relative to the boards by examining
the overall political influence of the boards at the individual transit systems at the
individual and collective levels.
Most of the transit systems—executives and boards alike—described a board with
limited ability of to impact budget processes. In public transportation the vast majority of
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financial requirements are non-policy decisions required for operation such as fuel,
wages, utilities, and insurance. The board has no influence in most of these areas because
of market and national trends. Wages and insurance cuts would draw ire from unions and
politicians and risk employee unrest while procurement and cost containment alternatives
are often nominal in savings. This leaves little budget flexibility while opportunity for
influence is usually post-budget. Boards are also limited because budgets are staff driven
due to expertise and experience required for development and staffs are comprised of
well-educated transit professionals with increased financial expertise. Additionally,
boards lack solid understanding of highly complex funding of formula and statewide
discretionary grants, capital vs. operating limitations and specialized non-changeable
grants.
Dedicated funding through fuel or property taxes is more critical because it
provides considerable amounts of funding for the system, reduces reliance on federal,
state and local governments and most importantly allow systems to plan long-range with
consistent funding streams—a constant problem when a board and executive are on pins
and needles waiting for final budget numbers. This is where board effectiveness could
reach its zenith—a board that can recommend and implement new revenue would
instantly become more important and would place the authority in position to make giant
steps. Once again, reliance on other political forces to permit referendums, invoke
eminent domain, increase taxes or allow pre-grant receipt spending authority is a
significant obstacle to managing system growth.
Post-parent government approval is the stage that boards have the most budget
formulation influence. They have power to force staff reductions to create new on street
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service, initiate service restructuring to reduce one route to augment another (or create a
new one), cancel programs or shift amounts from one line item to another because of
individual or board preferences. Boards rarely force these decisions because staffs are
already lean and would reduce authority professionalism and service quality, something
boards and executives highly value. Additionally boards are generally reluctant to take
resources away from existing services to bolster another. The major resource most
boards have at their disposal to fund non-budgeted expenses comes in the way of fare
increases; however, fare increases can be counterproductive because small fare increases
do not yield significant revenue for the system and can actually decrease ridership as the
cost outweighs the benefits of transit use (especially among low-income users). This is
especially the case with large fare increases (generally more than 10%) (TCRP 2003).
Described in the interviews was a board-involved process of meetings,
explanations, pre-process approvals, line item adjustments and final budget approval;
however, it is clear this is staff and parent government driven and the board has limited
levels of influence. Boards actually yield the most potential influence in financial
management and capital planning. Financial management comes through oversight of
budgeted revenue and expenditures and is established with monthly reports, reviews and
questions from the board or committee along with procedural requirements for contracts
and purchases. These avenues provide constant awareness and involvement in financial
issues.
As described by the GMs, the key to formal, high-level fiscal power does not
manifest in budget planning but rather purchases and contracts that originate out of
capital planning and long-term focus. An executive focused on technological “bells and
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whistles” can be rebuffed by a board that redirects funding to new vehicles but often
these initiatives are driven by needs of outdated equipment, elevating service quality or
spending capital money because is it there. This is a dangerous area for boards not fully
informed about operating costs for new staff or maintaining the capital purchases because
additional operating costs can absorb or delay on street funding. A board is more
powerful when cognizant of these implications, raises concerns and asks important
questions. Still, it is difficult for boards to become closely involved in actual
procurements. The request for proposal and bidding processes are internally managed,
extremely complex, and technically involved so the board member’s routine and obvious
procurement questions are usually an exercise of checks and balances, not power or
influence. Ultimate responsibility rests with the board but they are realistically
uninformed at the technical level and incapable of close involvement due to complexity
and time commitment.
Of the systems in this study, several exhibited considerable levels of influence in
financial management and oversight plus capital planning and spending. For MTA in
Nashville, financial management came as a function of board reassertion of financial
oversight powers. Citing a dearth of financial oversight and management by the past
general manager and considerable lack of funding from the city, the board obtained
mayoral commitment to possible increased funding contingent on solving managerial
problems. A comprehensive operations assessment, performed at board direction, and
subsequent management changes have since yielded significant city funding increases, as
has overall management of budget processes. Due to board diligence the budget is no
longer the exclusive domain of executives.
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Board approach to revenue increases came in 2004 with new fare structures—not
a true fare increase but budget-friendly revenue through increased ticket sales. MTA’s
board places considerable value in approving contracts to control spending but recently
increased executive purchase limits from $50,000 to $100,000. There is less focus on
spending processes but much more attention to funding use in terms of mission and
policy goals. Increased funding allowed the MTA board to develop higher-level financial
policy power due to parent government restoration of operating funds. Even though
MTA competes with city departments and agencies for funds the board and executive
have established a high-level policy focus.
Now attention is the on the $40 million Central Station in the core of downtown.
Securing local funding and the required match funds is a challenge that has allowed the
board to flex its muscles at the state and local levels. But, it has brought with it a
political environment with daunting challenges at every turn—from land use conflicts
among stakeholders to shifting project timelines. What severely limits board ability to
achieve consistent high-level policy is the inability to pass resolutions to directly fund the
system. All local funding comes from the parent government—the single greatest
obstacle to service expansion and growth. The absence of funding power puts the
executive at the budgetary forefront and forces reliance on non-authority powers for
sustenance.
Evaluation of the MTA board’s political power and influence in funding issues
shows they are considerably limited; they are creative in approach but lack the political
capital to ensure dedicated funding. Also, major corporate executives from Bell South,
Gaylord Entertainment or even policy makers such as former mayors and Metro Council
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are noticeably absent. While this may seem lofty, a high-level policy board with taxing
power might draw such individuals to provide stepping stones to higher office, especially
considering Nashville’s growing national attention and economic growth.
Despite the absence of dedicated funding and extremely high-level players the
level of attention to finance has drawn a considerably strong board. The chair and past
chair both hold prominence in political circles for past service in the governors’ office
and as executive directors of public and non-profit organizations. Well connected is a
board member from Vanderbilt University and the school’s prominence and impact has
extended influence on behalf of MTA. Two other board members carry considerable
weight in their communities and are politically active: a well-known social leader with
connections to grass roots organizations and a long-time labor leader. The board felt
their power and influence fell somewhere between moderate and powerful or as one
member best described, “not strong, but in the mix.” Both the members and executive
identified the board as having influence with the mayor and exercising influence in
specific policy areas but closeness to council and more political activity was cited as
important for gaining more influence. The key is that these board members are as
powerful and influential as they can be, given their make up and circumstance: “We are
who we are.”
Like Nashville, Memphis has no dedicated funding for MATA and also absent are
major players in downtown redevelopment or corporate ownership. Mayor Harrington’s
appointees are former education colleagues and friends—individuals he trusts—but that
is limiting in regards to influence outside the mayor’s office. Connections exist outside
the mayor but are considerably lessened and members carry relatively little policy180

making experience or expertise. There is some corporate representation from FedEx but
neither member was identified as holding any strong influence and one’s activity is
lessened by retirement. The seventh member of the board was appointed to represent
persons with disabilities and has no real political or business ties. Yet, MATA exhibits
some relatively high-level policy power, as seen in past and planned large-scale rail
capital expenditures. Memphis leads all systems in capital funding due to more than $30
million spent on the streetcar system and light rail planning initiative to date. Renovation
of downtown’s Central Station, expansion of the downtown streetcar system and the
proposed $400 million rail light project create tremendous opportunity to direct and shape
transportation development on a massive, regional scale. MATA board decisions on
which corridors to serve, which major rail stops to fund and how to ensure the system is
expandable for future rail planning and bus transportation networks requires considerable
levels of information and involvement in issues. This is decision-making at a high level
and board action is predominantly directed at funding strategies, capital allocations and
global service levels.
Where MATA’s board members are having the largest amount of difficulty is in
the local funding process. Chapter Four described board members with significant
concern regarding the ability of the city to first commit and then actually devote the
funding necessary to meet grant match requirements. Board members feel their level of
influence amounts to “not much,” “moderate,” and “some clout.” Only one member felt
any sense of power but in consideration of the power other board members wield, this
member’s actual level of influence is extremely limited. The board simply cannot deliver
the influence to secure the funding because the mayor relies on his city school system
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connections to fill out the majority of the board. What is produced is a collection of
lower-level members performing at high-levels.
Chattanooga follows the trend of no dedicated funding and CARTA submits to
the competitive funding process through the City of Chattanooga. They rely heavily on
city budget allocations to maintain service with exception of the revenue generated from
the Incline and two downtown parking garages. The Incline and garages fund other parts
of the system and success has prompted plans for a third garage, requiring CARTA’s
Downtown Committee to be intimately involved in the design and build phases of the
project. The committee has had considerable control over project parameters in the past,
including usage policies, joint development agreements and construction involvement. In
reality, the committee does the lion’s share of board work for these projects and most of
the board has little awareness of complex project details. For this new garage much of
the work may be turned over to a private firm, which may reduce board involvement
further.
While the Incline and garages offer a significant amount of revenue for CARTA,
the board has very weak budget impact. The budget is staff driven and the board can
force reallocation of funds from one line item to another but rarely does. In the area of
financial management, the board is also generally weak. There is a review and questions
are asked but reliance is on the auditor and processes that look like oversight. The board
secretary approves all purchases over $2,000 but the secretary has no formalized training
in accounting and is essentially rubberstamping checks. At one time the secretary
delivered the financial report but turnover saw new secretaries with lower financial
interest and oversight declined. Now the GM and staff prepare and deliver the report
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with decreased board involvement and responsibility. This also formed as the executive
gained expertise and now the board defers to executive guidance on financial matters.
Most of the board members responded the board has very little influence in the
Chattanooga political landscape. Only one member, a county commissioner, is thought
to have any political clout. Board members simply do not possess any real political
capital and what little they have is within narrow communities of limited political
significance.
On a much smaller scale is JTA. First, in budget and finance direction they have
limited influence because the city of Jackson is not the primary source of service
funding—the state and federal grant shares actually combine to support a tremendous
amount of on street services through specialized grants. Until recently the board was not
actually involved in the budget process but instead just approved route and service issues
with approval of limited contracts and purchases exceeding $10,000. The board is,
however, very involved in financial decision-making for a number of items such as
whether to re-build or surplus equipment or whether to replace a long-term employee
absence with overtime or a part-time employee. The small operating scope has the board
making few high-level, cost or policy decisions with most activity focused on keeping
existing services operating.
Considering JTA’s fleet of only twenty vehicles, with the last sets of buses and
vans bought through bid options from St. Louis and Nashville procurements, the board
has limited opportunity for capital influence for vehicles. The board is working to fund
and build a modern maintenance and operations facility in Jackson. JTA board members
are involved with state and local officials to arrange funding and find an acceptable site
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that is functional for system operations and palatable to local leaders. Also of extreme
interest among the board members was procurement of new bus stop shelters for the route
network. The board views itself as moderate to very weak in terms of political power and
influence. For some board members, there is no desire to exercise influence and for
others there has not been a need. The board has little involvement in issues requiring
high-level decisions or a need to garner or wield power. Processes are routine and mainly
low-level and even the two former county commissioners on the board acknowledge no
real board power beyond JTA. Outside of the two former commissioners, there is an
attorney from a local college, a minister, a director of a convalescence home, an
insurance broker and a telecommunications laborer with Bell South. Each has some
influence within their respective communities but few have any influence upward or
outward of their communities or the board.
The odd exception to the concept of capital planning and financial management as
the primary source of board fiscal power is at LexTran. In Lexington’s case the
referendum has provided considerable opportunity to fund expanded service through the
direct property tax on Lexington-Fayette County. The board governs the only authority
with a dedicated revenue stream that delivers a significant amount of power to the board
membership. The board has control over the allocation of funds for budget line items and
final budget approval, as altered by board preferences (although the mayor and council
must approve the board’s version under state statute). Now that council has lost most
fiscal control of LexTran—they do have some control over limited funding but not
enough to impact the organization significantly—the board and executive are able to plan
system growth and spend accordingly. Having more money to spend has now become
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the easy part of the equation; now decisions are priority-based and vacillate between the
commitment to restoring lost service vs. tapping into more lucrative and higher ridership
markets.
The board funded a comprehensive operational analysis to look at route
performance, revenue opportunities and evaluate service efficiency based on expected
trends for a city and system of Lexington’s size. The analysis provided a road map for
system improvement; however, opportunity to implement a downtown trolley network,
expand park-and-ride services and build a university partnership is now tempered by the
capital planning process. New service must be supported by capital purchases of
vehicles, expanded facilities and customer amenities such as signs and shelters. While
operating assistance is funded by the local tax, capital funding is formula and
discretionary-based and not immediately available to the authority. The slower trickle of
capital funds makes it difficult for the board to maintain long-term focus as new ideas
and initiatives may run counter to established strategies. The board can always choose to
expedite capital acquisition by directly purchasing equipment but that would spend
operating costs unnecessarily and fail to take advantage of “free” money from the federal
government for fleet expansion and facilities growth.
Even with dedicated funding, the LexTran board feels they are considerably weak
on the political scene and exert little influence. There are seven members and only one
has employment in the private sector as the manager of major architecture firm—the
remaining seven have public sector ties. One member is a retired city fire fighter and
labor leader; two have connections to university administration while another is a
neurosurgeon at a university hospital; one works for the federal bureau of prisons; and the
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last works in compliance with equal employment opportunity programs for the state.
Even with this emphasis on government, social service and public consciousness—focus
that is indicative of lower-level service-oriented policy—LexTran’s board is changing.
There is decreasing emphasis on “formula” board representation and the board is focused
on attracting more high-level names with stronger political connections. Despite only
one African American on the board, the mayor’s two most recent appointees have been
white males with strong connections in business and medical fields. The chair position
shifted from an attorney to a CPA so there would be greater attention to the spending
patterns and analysis on a more consistent basis. The appointment of a labor relationsoriented board member has not “quieted” the labor community but rather improved
internal processes and now complaints are usually viewed as baseless. This board
member does not look for every opportunity to throw money at the union to quiet and
appease them—rather attention is on effective spending for efficient services.
The board is struggling with themselves to balance their many service interests
against the limited opportunity they have—new trolley routes vs. restoring service lost
five years ago. They have greater attention to their responsibilities and are enacting an
attendance policy for themselves. Even board activity has changed with work session
meetings more collegial and candid because of televised monthly board meetings. The
committee meeting is where they ask the hard questions, get to the bottom of issues and
make their decisions. Board meetings hint toward the occasional grandstanding but are
otherwise reserved to the basic functions of voting and the occasional question that arises
during the meeting.
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This board is among the vanguard because they have transitioned from having no
power to having ample power of spending, service development and political voice but
remain very attentive to service-oriented concerns and maintained a strong working
relationship with the executive. The concern is whether this group can sustain this
approach long-term. As service unfolds, priorities may change and attempts to force
shifts in implementation schedules can heap impossible or exceptionally difficult
expectations on the executive. Overemphasis on service development and growth
without adequate staffing to develop new service (new programs are more labor intensive
to develop than maintain once operational) may overextend the organization and reduce
quality output. The LexTran board has historically been a low-level policy, low-power
board and since the referendum changed to a high-level policy, low-power board. Money
has changed their perspective and the power to make internal change has translated into
higher levels of decision-making. Of interest is whether the board can grow external
power with the same group of players or if the board must turn over its membership to
gain the power players LexTran needs outside the authority.
Having established the backgrounds, fiscal powers and levels of influence
available to the board members, it becomes clear there are two higher-level, highperforming boards in Nashville and Lexington but neither is a complete high-level policy
board because power is generally internal. Nashville is as close to reaching the preferred
level of power and experience on a policy board without actually bringing in the power
players. The board is active, aware, connected upward and downward, has a eye toward
management and oversight of finances and brings together policy expertise and
experience to guide the organization and make decisions that are effective for the users
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and beneficial to the operation. If they had LexTran’s referendum, MTA might have one
of the premier boards and systems within the Southeast. The revenue stream is their
Achilles heel. Just below MTA is LexTran, a board with strong financial power and
responsibility but still finding its way after years of darkness. The board will have to
develop strong levels of policy expertise and financial planning in order to develop
implementation schedules and analytical frameworks to determine which services are
successful and deserve to extend beyond a demonstration or “idea” period. If the board
does not develop into the policy approach of MTA, LexTran will have too much service
for its city and taxpayers will tire of the referendum and rescind the funding.
Further down is MATA, a lower-level board that has strong experience in
government and logistical services but lacks the political capital to force support the
largest public transportation project in Tennessee’s history and one of the largest in the
Southeast. They cannot deliver the support to obtain the funding but they approach the
light rail project with sincerity and awareness of issues that guide effective decisionmaking. Like Nashville, they have taken advantage of opportunity but with a more
homogenous and operations-oriented group (administrators and business types) than the
policy-oriented group from Nashville and with arguably fewer connections. Continuing
on is CARTA and JTA, two systems that were nearly void of high-level board members
with political power and policy influence. Most board members have little interest in the
raw financial processes but participate on a surface level and keep slight awareness of
financial activities while following the lead of others. These boards collectively
described an absence of planning. Short and long-term and decisions seem to be made by
the executive with routine approval of measures—because the recommended action is
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almost always the best course of direction for the system and the circumstances or
because the board does not know to ask otherwise. In either case there is board
complacency on high-level and even medium-level issues while latching on to low-level
service issues and following the direction of the executive.
Low-level Players and Service-Related Agendas
Do low-level players have service-related agendas and concerns? It appears they
do when one examines the available financial power and budget control, financial
oversight, and capital planning. When strong levels of financial power are available
boards can exercise greater attention to high-level policy and better guide mission. In
the cases of CARTA and JTA, each system has experienced weak fiscal authority due to
limited opportunity for budget control translating into surface-level financial oversight.
CARTA experienced a clear reduction in power as years of service reductions gutted the
authority of service while cities like Soddy Daisy and Redbank withdrew from the
authority, taking with them funding for services and crosscutting policy influence. The
result is a board that is no longer a true regional authority but a city service with some
funding from the county and a county mayor appointed and county commission approved
board member.
The boards for CARTA and JTA are comprised of low-level players from public
service and local organizations interspersed throughout the community and bringing
different ideas to the table. This is not unique to those cities, as high-performing boards
such as MTA or LexTran also have members best described as lower-level players. This
evaluation will be looking at the criteria of whether lower-level board members had a
lower-level, service-oriented policy interest. Additionally, these areas will be reviewed
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as whether they are items under executive or board purview. This examination will
approach the board members as a group because CARTA and JTA are generally
imbalanced toward low-level members compared to the other systems. Additionally,
one-by-one identification of agendas is not allowable due to the type of study and
confidentiality expected from the sample.
All authorities in this study included some low-level board members; however the
expectation was that the absence of financial power would create boards comprised of
community activists and low-level players with service specific agendas. When
considering the employment backgrounds, the personal preferences regarding services,
the individual interests of representation and protection of the ridership, especially lowincome riders the expectation rings true—lower levels of power have a pattern of
attracting lower-level players. Even when there are a considerable number of board
members that are professionals in law, education, finance or architecture they tend to be
lower-level players in terms of the power they wield but lack service specific agendas.
They sit on the board because of professional expertise or mayoral connection and
possess a willingness to serve. During the interviews these board members typically
expressed no internal motivation for joining the board, had no specific interest in the
authority or services and still see their role as helping to be good stewards of public
funds, offering viewpoints for consideration and guidance where possible.
When removing that group, there is a large segment of board members that
represent specific partners or organizations with vested interest in the authority and its
services. Universities have service-related interests with actual funding and service
partnerships and there is a large number of members with social service and advocacy
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concerns for the disabled, elderly and low-income communities. All five authorities had
some board members with a university or social service tie-in and a large number of
those board members identified themselves very strongly with on street concerns.
Several university-employed board members identified student-oriented service concerns,
social service affiliated members had concerns related to job training, employment access
to higher paying jobs and service at varying hours to reach employment centers. These
are low-level service concerns that hint at global service issues (access to education and
employment, for example) but were discussed by these board members in the narrow
view routes serving specific users.
Those with a stated interest in disability services viewed nearly every topic as a
MATA-plus, Care-A-Van or The Lift service issue (paratransit services for MATA,
CARTA and JTA, respectively). On time performance, routing and customer service
were commonly reviewed during interviews and are purely street level concerns.
Occasional discussion covered adequate numbers of paratransit drivers and vehicles to
meet service demands but how service is delivered through drivers and equipment is the
responsibility of the executive, especially in the absence of meaningful policy standards.
Board members failed to address the high-level disability challenges of funding streams
for specialized services (nursing homes and adult day care), establishing strict service
eligibility standards, moving paratransit dependent riders to fixed route services or policy
to balance choices between replacing aged paratransit vans vs. transit buses.
Among these social service-focused board members was the inescapable focus of
protecting transit dependent riders and routes against choice riders such as park-and-ride
or downtown shuttles. The low-income, minority community was of top concern for one
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or more board members at each system study-wide. Concern from these members was
geared to social equality and access to transportation as a right but was almost always
couched in the needs of the working poor and black neighborhoods, the historic ridership
base of urban mass transit. Social advocates spoke of how transit service has to be:
frequent, early and late enough to get to work or home; on time because a missed trip
could mean a very long wait or a lost job; and near retail and industry because they host
the higher-paying jobs for workers. The more a board member knows about transit use,
either through his or her own use (past or present) or their close connection with current
users, the greater interest these board members had in the actual service. The same can
be said of board members with an affinity for involvement in human resources, either the
front line employee or the administrative staff. Some board members indicated a desire
to help select staff members, control the make-up of the staff by emphasizing descriptive
qualities of race and gender and finally control the contract with, and treatment of, the
collective bargaining unit from a monetary and working conditions standpoint.
Often board members are appointed because they represent a particular group or
interest and when board members are selected or recruited for purposes of representing a
segment of the community it creates a situation where these non-elected public
appointees feel they have a constituency. These board members have no such
responsibility and should have no focus other than ensuring the success of the public
authority. When the board member is appointed to represent a group of people the board
member becomes far less inclined to serve mayoral or transit system interests but rather
those of a non-existent constituency. In some instances the board member may be
extremely connected to a segment of the community and is seen as a leader, therefore is
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able to garner significant public support for involvement in issues. In these cases a real
but illegitimate constituency exists. In other cases, the board member has a certain level
of experience and expertise that allows them to contribute to processes relevant to the
organization or its mission. The executive must be constantly aware and careful of board
member agendas, whether crafted by individual perspectives or those of an assumed
constituency.
Boards with limited financial and policy influence frequently become involved in
low-level, service-oriented issues. Although they see these decisions as policy, it is more
closely associated with internal management and operational decision-making. This is
the case at JTA through two recent items discussed by board members and the executive
during the research interviews. First, they described a circumstance where the local retail
mall refused to allow JTA shelters and buses on their property. This is generally an
operational management issue with staff initiated short-term solutions followed by
recommendations of long-term change for board review and approval. Board members
quickly became very interested in this new change and were soon suggesting on which
street to stop and questioned operational issues of lighting and traffic delays. Board
attention to deciding where service should be is clearly a low-level, but important, policy
issue; where and how to stop is a management responsibility.
Similar issues arose in a number of other boards within the study. Committee or
individual member reviews of routes are focused on where the new route operate, where
riders will wait and transfer, what type of bus will be used and who will be impacted
positively or negatively by the change. These are all salient issues; however, this is
where attention is typically drawn—low-level on street issues. Service reductions or
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modification is extremely important to the system and its riders and the Federal Transit
Administration even requires public hearings to ensure public input on significant route
modifications. On its face, this is a high-level policy, especially when considering new
routes and services or worse the reduction or elimination of service. In reality, this is a
low-level issue because the high-level policy issues are: Why do you have to cut service?
What was done to allow for expansion of service?
A second circumstance described at JTA is bus shelters. The allocation of capital
funds for bus shelters could be seen as a high-level issue in the scope of Jackson’s small
capital budget. A few years ago JTA acquired some used shelters from MATA and more
recently money was allocated for new ones. The GM found some similar shelters but due
to the prohibitive cost it was decided to find and buy fifteen alternative shelters that fit
better in both cost and need. Where things became low-level is when board members
became extremely interested in where these shelters would go—what neighborhoods,
what routes—to the point that one of the board members approached the public to
provide input on where shelters belong. Rather than force the issue of establishing policy
such as amenities standards—stops with daily boardings between “X” and “Y” shall
receive shelters and those exceeding “Y” shall receive benches—it became an issue of
personal preference and low-level input.
The above discussion clearly demonstrates how quickly the focus of low-level
board members devolves in low-level policy and service level concerns that are within
the scope of managerial authority. The majority of concerns identified by low-level
board members are “how, when and where” questions—the administrative and
management functions of the organization. Board members should more concerned with
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“what and why” questions, establishing standards, expectations and guidelines for
executive management of organizational resources. The item of concern with the three
expectations and the extent to which these patterns exist is the final item—will this lead
to greater conflict between the executive and board members as agendas misalign and
does that cause decreased support for the executive?
Where agenda creates conflict is when the board member’s focus is on lowerlevel issues that deviate from the policy-orientation of the board, such as the management
of employees, the implementation of services or when requisite change is in stark contrast
to individual preferences. Executives have entirely different perspectives than boards.
Executives spend their careers in public transportation and spend their days living and
breathing service issues. They develop understandings of how to deliver services, the
obstacles to services and how to manage resources—human, mechanical and financial—
for the betterment of the system and the city. Board members are distant, have only
surface understanding of service delivery and have no idea of the true capabilities of the
system or its resources. They gather semi-monthly, sometimes less, to discuss issues and
make decisions with less information and less experience.
The conflict is going to emerge because executives make decisions based on the
overall system and its long-term success. They do not subdivide loyalties because the
system is the sole recipient of the executive and staff’s devotion. A manager with 14
million customers a year, even 500,000 customers, cannot pick and choose between
neighborhoods, customer groups or service types. All must receive equal attention but
when it comes time to make service decisions, the executive allows the facts speak for the
service, not the people. This is an entirely different understanding from board members
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who see concerns at a more emotional, personal level instead of purely on ridership and
revenue projections. An MTA board member who affirmed the challenge of balancing
everybody’s needs against budget limitations was directly asked, “If you had to choose
between the choice rider and transit dependent rider, who wins?” The response was
based on how low the ridership was and how great the need was to try new services. This
is the hard choice that most authority board members struggle to make—balancing the
opportunity to shift low-performing route resources to high-revenue routes and
opportunities. “Usually we give up the choice rider because of density” but park and ride
routes can yield higher fares and total revenue with higher passengers per hour and
represent a very efficient and effective service. “Ultimately it comes down to an equity
issue and a need to protect the underclass, whether perceived or actual.”
Executives saw clear opportunities for these differing agendas and perspectives to
unfold into conflict. In almost every instance where conflict existed, identified by either
boards or executives, the board agenda was focused on low-level items that were either
the prerogative of the executive or detracted from the large-scale goals of the system.
Where this becomes most problematic is when this devolves into micromanaging such as
publicly questioning mechanical problems with buses or directing staff to reassign
vehicles. Executives described situations where board members publicly attacked the
staff and GM over customer complaints or sought involvement in hiring by participating
in interviews. Low-level agendas and board micromanagement eventually consumes the
executive and staff as they spend time preparing meaningless reports, implementing
changes that serve no purpose or spawn greater problems.
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Several executives described where meddling in hiring practices was extremely
explosive for the board and executive and detrimental to the authority. Racial motivation
was expressed as a common theme surrounding intense conflict over minority hiring or a
minority termination, regardless of performance-based decisions and issues. This is an
implied, even explicit charge of racism, which is extremely serious and harmful to both
the board’s functioning and the executive’s ability to execute the managerial and
administrative needs of the organization. The same issue can occur when the issue is tied
to labor practices involving collective bargaining units. Board members overly sensitive
to union-related issues may try and persuade (or force) executives to change policies or
practices and may try and get involved more one-on-one in disciplinary matters despite
the clear managerial authority in personnel matters. Described fallout has been increased
media attention, lawsuits and formal complaints from employees, investigations from
government agencies, lost time and resources spent defending the executive and
organization, infighting among board members, declining morale, fired and resigned
GMs, as well as board member resignations, removals and non-reappointment.
Meanwhile the business of the organization grinds to a halt or is set back months or years
while the organization recovers.

ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Research Questions
The purpose of the research is to better understand the board-executive
relationship in public authorities, specifically those governing public transportation
organizations. The academic literature, conceptual arguments and data from board
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members and executives reveals conflict as a byproduct of the absence of high-level
policy opportunity and creates obstacles for system governance through increased
micromanagement. This research’s exploration of board composition, agenda
preferences and conflict is focused on three research questions to provide understanding
of what factors impact the board-executive relationship. The three questions are:
1. What are the perceived roles of board members serving on public transportation
authority?
2. Under what circumstances are public transportation authority board members
more likely to seek involvement in decision-making that falls under the
executive’s authority?
3. What impact does this encroachment on executive responsibility have on board
membership support for the executive?
The first question helps to explain board member focus and perceptions, as
displayed in actual and preferred roles of authority responsibility. Simultaneously,
attention is paid to issues of representation and the inclination of board member agendas
toward low-level policy. The second question draws the connection between individual
preferences, decision-making preferences and action and the extent to which this exists
and why. Finally, the answer to the third research question explains the impact of board
members’ low-level agendas on governance and the extent these agendas impact boardexecutive relationships and support for the executive. Each question is answered below
in light of the expectations evaluated earlier in this chapter in addition to the data
presented in Chapters Three and Four.

198

The Perceived Roles of Board Members Serving On Public Transportation Authorities
The most important factor impacting the perceived roles of individual board
members and the expectations of fellow board members is the basis for appointment. A
large number of board members pointed to past professional and board experience as the
reason for appointment by the mayor and self-identified a motivation for carrying these
reasons forward. They also expected other board members to have the same viewpoint—
that backgrounds and experience in certain areas of the community should translate into
individual perspectives, preferences and decision-making. Members identifying a higher
level of involvement in these ancillary areas held a stronger belief these values and
perspectives should be forwarded to authority activity, especially during board discussion
and action on executive recommendations. They also felt past experience on boards—
community, professional or otherwise—helped to prepare them and the skills and
perspectives developed elsewhere contributed to their appointment and beliefs on how
boards function.
The second most important factor was why these board members agreed to serve
on the authority board—to represent a certain perspective, manifest through their
appointment, and represent a certain population. Representation emerged is a unique
phenomenon among these public transportation authorities because the need for
representation is played out through the perception of the appointer and his or her
advisors. The decision that: 1) the board will be representative; 2) who will be
represented; and 3) by whom is made with no public input or discussion. It is an odd
situation where an elected mayor decides who can best represent a community and
generally with no attempt to represent the organization’s needs. Representation is
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extremely varied and individuals can be devoted to a population of one or one million by
choosing to represent the mayor or an entire metropolitan area; however, in most cases
the representation of riders was the most important motivating factor for decisions.
Board membership was a way to support and give back to the community—a strong
feeling of public service toward the public good and a need to reflect community values.
Board members did, however, recognize and sometimes assert a logical limit to
representation as a value and the dividends it pays. From the standpoint of public policy
development and organizational efficacy, there is no need for proportional representation,
whether black, white, rider or non-rider. For example an uneducated, low-income
individual disconnected from public policy and processes may statistically represent a
distinct and large population of riders but cannot contribute effectively to the public
process itself. The result of this type of person could constitute a lack of representation,
as this person might not articulate the necessary ideas and issues. It was argued that what
is truly needed for representation of these groups is an understanding of wants and needs,
not individuals with those wants and needs.
The combination of these two items, reason for appointment and the
representation of certain communities, played out in the third perception that boards
should reflect the diversity of the city and the people the system serves. Even if board
members did not feel they personally or collectively represented expected viewpoints
because they were black, disabled or employed in certain fields there was a belief that the
board should reflect the community because it shows the city that as many viewpoints as
possible are included in the discussion and decision process. All board members felt
their board was effective and many felt diverse membership backgrounds and
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perspectives drove board and organizational success, as measured by balanced
discussion, good group decisions and smooth board and service operation. Many felt
their board was particularly good at working together to resolve issues and conflict while
bringing this diversity to bear on problems and challenges facing the authority and how
those challenges will impact the riders and community.
The next major perspective offered by a large number of board members was the
identification of their role as policy maker. They view their role in terms of budget
control through approving, setting and balancing the budget and raising revenue in times
of financial shortfall. They spoke in high-level terms of funding, budget, financial
performance and capital needs but most discussion of formal board powers was drawn
toward more routine items. Routine functions included review of financial reports,
approval of contracts and routine purchases and participation in discussion and debate
over recommendations proffered by executives. Major decisions to fund an operations
analysis, add new senior staff positions or increase fares were few and far between.
Decisions to cut unproductive route segments are typically budget driven and it is usually
and either/or situation. Few articulated any major concerns with the recommendations
presented and felt their discussion guided decisions, although these were generally
routine items that were evaluated on a case-by-case basis. There was no indication of
action items translating into specific steps along a short- or long-term business plan.
Boards that utilize a committee structure rely heavily on the committee to review and
address financial concerns. In general, board members described their actions and
involvement more in terms of review and oversight but perceived a much stronger policy
role than exists.
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The majority of policy-making described was turned toward low-level, on street
service decisions. All of the boards in this study review and approve changes to on street
services and these items comprise the remainder of formal board meeting agenda items.
The majority of items actually brought before the board are service-oriented changes,
such as rerouting of buses, approval of new routes and services in addition to conducting
public hearings and asking for reports and information from service related issues.
Unlike the committees for budget and financial issues, including facility-oriented
committees, most board members felt an obligation to discuss service changes at a board
level instead of relying exclusively on the committee for vetting of issues. Once again,
much of this is discussion and expression of ideas regarding agenda items. Overall it
pertains much more to oversight of services—especially through the review of monthly
ridership, concern for customer comments and input and the overall process of listening
and voting—most often in support of the recommendation. They generally perceive the
discussion and questioning, regardless of the item, as their way to prevent the
rubberstamping of executive action.
The informal role of the board was also an important perspective; however, for
most board members this was a more individual role and was not discussed in the specific
construct of a responsibility. They viewed their professional backgrounds and technical
expertise in areas such as financial, legal, management and labor relations to be not only
valuable to the authority’s formal functioning but also the informal processes and
interaction among the members and executive. Board members cited their ability to
review reports and information, communicate concerns and provide clarification to
fellow members as valuable but placed greater emphasis on their ability to guide
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executive decision-making. The perception that members should provide technical or
general advice on complex issues and procedures was evident, as was the belief that
executives have as much responsibility to seek advice as the members’ have to provide
direction. Members perceived a high level of board chair and executive interaction as
important in addition to increased involvement during high profile or critical processes,
such as budget hearings, transit center meetings or political and controversial issues. In
these instances board members perceived an obligation to apply political pressure upward
or downward, depending on circumstance, for the authority’s benefit.
Involvement in Decision-making That Falls Under The Executive’s Authority
Board members are more likely to seek involvement in decisions that fall under
executive’s managerial authority under three main circumstances. First, when the
majority of decisions the board is involved in are low-level on street service decisions,
and second, when the board member perceives a high level of technical expertise and
interest in a particular issue but lacks formal authority for involvement. The third
circumstance occurs when board members have vested levels of interest due to a
community-based focus (caused by feelings of representation and constituency) but lacks
authority for involvement and perceives a detrimental impact on that particular
community resulting from executive decisions.
The first situation, where boards seek involvement in executive decision-making
due to frequent low-level service issues is spurred by several factors. First, as a general
rule these is little controversy between a board and executive when there are increased
amounts of high-level policy decisions because the board is already involved. High-level
decisions are a shared function of the board and executive with final authority resting
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with the board. Most often these items are short- and long-term planning and funding
strategies that require a team-oriented approach to problem solving. Second, little
controversy exists because the most board members have either little interest in the
subject or an ability to influence these decisions because of limited technical proficiency
and increased time constraints—so long as results do not negatively impact the
communities or interests of that board member.
Board members are most interested, at varying degrees, in service-oriented, streetlevel decisions. The formal duties of the board involve a number of decisions that impact
services such as adding and eliminating routes, eliminating unproductive trips, changing
bus routing and approving purchases for vehicle and on street amenities (shelters,
benches, information racks, etc.). These decisions are conceptually and practically easy
to understand, are often tangible in terms of the “where and when” of bus services,
represent positive or negative changes to services and invoke customer-oriented
perspectives. When mixed with concerns of representation and protection, these issues
elicit high levels of interest. It is these decisions that allow boards to have nuts-and-bolts
involvement in the complex and dynamic functions of transit operations. These actions
allow for important service-related involvement but require only surface-level
understanding for action—so long as the decisions are positive, a popular caveat.
These on street decisions are the formal duty and responsibility of the board and
members are required to act on them; however, when the low-level, on street issues
become the focus of the board rather than high-level policy, devolution sets in and can
turn into board encroachment of executive direction rather than the true function of the
board—policy-making. This occurs when the vast majority of decisions are service-level
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and there is little opportunity for high-level policy related to finances and organizational
guidance. Board members feel their duty is to direct these service-related policies and
grow increasingly familiar with on street operations. When this familiarity develops the
members can feel as though they possess the right and obligation to direct decisions made
at the executive level.
AT JTA the board is increasingly involved in routine operational decisions
because routine decisions impact finances, such as the meeting to decide to replace an
employee on a long-term absence with either part-time help or overtime work. This was
also the case at JTA where board members became intimately involved in the style of
shelters for purchase (instead of price only), and the preferred locations in addition to the
circumstances of a mall’s refusal to allow JTA buses on property. These decisions
should be almost entirely management decisions because a budget is set and resources are
allocated. How an executive manages this is purely his or her discretion under normal
circumstances but the board’s close association and interest in on street service has
created a high-level of familiarity and involvement. This becomes the standard operating
procedure of the board and seems to meet the needs of the board and executive.
The second area where board members want intimate involvement with executive
decisions is when the topic falls within their area of expertise. The diversity of board
members includes a variety of professional backgrounds and experiences and most any
board will have a member with some involvement in a policy or management issue.
From a professional standpoint, attorneys for example, seek to be involved in contracts
issues and potential legal entanglements even when the problems are management-related
such as a termination, accident with injury or a contract within the mandatory spending
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limits under executive discretion. Those with financial backgrounds will seek
involvement with low-level financial issues such as developing route performance
calculations, minor budget adjustments and renegotiating existing (already board
approved) contracts. There is a near endless list of managerial decisions that touch some
part of the board’s expertise in collective bargaining practices, personal management
experiences, large-scale procurement and political involvement. Board diversity, as
described throughout this dissertation, is a common theme and value for appointers,
appointees and executives. There is an inherent expectation that executives will tap this
resource on a regular basis, even when the executive feels it is not necessary.
Another area where this expertise unfolds is not in the individual’s outside
expertise or experience but their internal involvement in authority functions over time. A
number of boards have no term limits or the terms are staggered such that they take a
one- or two-year break from service and are reappointed at the next vacancy. These
board members develop considerable experience through many years of service and
become personally invested and devoted to the system. They have greater desire to help
select new buses after experiencing years of outdated equipment or become excited when
new service is launched and want involvement in the details of how a new innovative
service will work. When they are skeptical of a new initiative, they want to know exactly
who will do what and how. They need to develop their own comfort level in how new
programs will be implemented. Sometimes they see new products or ideas they think
would help the system, hoping to contribute to the system’s safety or quality. A board
member who served on a particular committee during the high water mark of service
expansion or facility growth and was involved in the street-level details at that time may
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always have an affinity for the service or a staff person that worked closely with them.
These circumstances are especially true if the member served as chair at some point
because board members and executives both described an increased level of involvement
in managerial issues and a closer working relationship between chairs and executives.
The final instance where board members seek involvement in executive authority
is when a board member with a strong community-based focus perceives a negative
effect on a specific community, as caused by executive decision-making. Most often this
occurs when a board member sees his or her appointment as an implied responsibility to
represent a specific population they view as a constituency but with no formal right to be
involved. This can also happen when the board member questions decisions and seeks
involvement but the member’s preferences are dismissed or the member is excluded from
processes. These individuals see service changes and internal policies from a street-level
perspective and board members, such as ministers, community volunteers or those
employed in social service-focused organizations that work directly with, or are active
among, low-income or marginalized populations have a strong connection with their
respective communities. Members with connections to disenfranchised communities act
as liaisons between political and bureaucratic processes and those they feel they serve
and represent. Board members with this professional or volunteer background maintain
personal involvement, develop more social-based relationships and become more
supportive of individual needs via this direct contact. As a result, opportunities for
executive decisions with potential to hurt these populations are of extreme interest for
these board members.
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This preference is not exclusive to marginalized populations. Some board
members are riders by choice or circumstance and see a direct connection between
executive decision-making and the service they receive. They think certain drivers need
discipline or retraining, some stops should be relocated to more convenient locations and
think the route should line-up with more buses so that layovers are shorter. They feel
attention to maintenance is lacking because the bus they rode yesterday was hot or
because the passengers complained their bus broke down on the route twice last week.
These are important, service-related issues but are areas of concern for executives and
their staff. A large number of business owners and organizations benefit considerably
from public transportation services. Convention and tourism districts may be hurt by an
executive’s redirection of vehicles to other service areas or a reduced emphasis on service
marketing or street-level supervision. Medical centers and industrial districts often rely
heavily on entry-level workers and become increasingly concerned with executive
approach to service development or attempt to steer resources to those routes. Board
members from those respective communities may become the point of contact for
employers who have problems with route timing or on time performance, offering
suggestions for how service should be organized to meet those unique needs and
preferences. Universities entering into operational service agreements with the authority
may seek greater involvement in managing service quality due to concerns over student
complaints or administrative pressure. They may demand greater involvement in
resource allocation and service development polices, going as far demanding personnel
involvement and vehicle use.
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In many regards, the above areas have some level of board applicability because
the board is ultimately responsible for service. On street administrative and management
decisions are the domain of the executive but it is understandable how some board
members see the connection between on street service and their involvement—even when
it is an executive responsibility. The board should focus more on holding the executive
accountable for on street issues but the service/involvement connection is there, although
sometimes it is a stretch. Where this becomes far more difficult for board members to
justify is in areas of personnel management. Personnel issues can be an area where board
members desire greater involvement in executive decision-making. Most members
know, however, that this is prohibited due to the clear distinction between board and
executive responsibility. Controversial hiring, promotion or termination may capture
board member attention if there is a perception of favoritism, racism or mistreatment.
They may feel a particular employee was overlooked for promotion and deserves the job,
perceive the executive is allowing certain difficult and abrasive personalities to drive
away competent staff or the executive allows too much freedom for a supervisor or staff
member. Sometimes the focus is on employee morale due to new stringent policies to
curtail excessive absenteeism, preventable accidents or a new director who is reportedly
mistreating front-line drivers and supervisors.
The Impact of Encroachment On Board Membership Support for the Executive
This research indicates that board member encroachment on executive
responsibility has two distinct effects on support levels for the executive from board
members: 1) relatively little impact; and 2) severe and devastating impact, although each
occurs for separate reasons. First, instances where there is little impact on executive
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support from encroachment is the result of a very diverse mix of members with varying
individual preferences and agendas that tend to play out one-on-one and in isolated
circumstances. It is rare to have multiple members expressing desire to become involved
in a single area of executive decision-making. The encroachment is more memberexecutive based than board-executive based. Second, these individual and unique
circumstances rarely boil over into member-member interaction or formal board decisionmaking because the situations are usually limited to issues that fall outside board
responsibility, therefore committee and board meeting agendas rarely include issues
surrounding these controversial topics.
Encroachment on executive responsibility is typically expressed by board
members as a desire for involvement in executive decision-making processes, not an
actual involvement in decisions. The trend toward declining board member support for
the executive is mitigated by the third factor influencing the level of encroachment on
executive responsibility—board member restraint. A considerable number of board
members with an inclination toward involvement in management and administrative
decisions were tempered by their own recognition of the proper limits of board and
executive authority. Even when these lines were crossed, executive resistance and
assertion of managerial authority was respected and the board members appropriately
retreated. The fourth factor that helps to control board member incursion is a the watch
of a strong board chair that recognizes the line of demarcation, especially when the chair
is well informed of these issues and has established a comfort level with the executive’s
authority and approach. Strong, well-informed chairs can calm down excited or
concerned board members; however, reliance on the chair is equally dangerous for
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executives if the chair is the one seeking involvement. Executives that allow board chairs
into management circles when it is helpful have a hard time excluding them when it is
harmful.
Fifth, the success of the executive and the system generally speaks for itself. A
successful transit system with growing ridership and revenue, a steady stream of updated
equipment and technology, positive employee relations and support from local political
leaders is extremely difficult to ignore when a board member feels the executive’s
decision-making is ineffective or seeks involvement. Even when concerns exist, the
success of the system is usually attributable to the executive, just as failing system can be
blamed on them. Even when views clash the executive commands higher levels of
respect for their position during times of organizational growth and success. Finally,
executives have a natural tendency to include board members in managerial decisions
either ad hoc or through routine processes. Some executives have established higher
thresholds for board involvement in executive decision-making, utilizing the board as a
“kitchen cabinet” but with considerably more voice and even voting authority on
marketing and procurement committees. This keeps the board informed and engaged
while helping them to understand the rationale behind executive judgment so when
managerial decisions are made there is less controversy and questioning.
Even when the desire for encroachment is controlled by the above factors, it still
occurs and is highly problematic, if not devastating, to the executive and the authority on
several levels. First, attention is directed from organizational policy and guidance even if
the undercurrent never goes beyond one-on-one, member-executive relationships. An
executive must dedicate the time, energy and effort to defend their case and risk annoying
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(at best) or offending and alienating the member. Meanwhile, efforts required for
managing the budget and system are impaired, as is the progressive and innovative
leadership expected from an executive of a public authority.
Second, board encroachment can quickly turn from involvement in an isolated
issue to micromanagement, which becomes conceptually lose-lose for the executive.
Allowing involvement in one area may encourage micromanagement from that member
or others in a multitude of other areas. When this occurs, executive authority becomes
ineffective and all decisions are challenged, both internally and externally and regardless
of circumstance. This has potential to devolve into more widespread concern for
executive effectiveness. A board that directs executive work, rather than guide
organizational mission and policy has spiraled outside the expected norms of the
authority structure and a group approach to management develops rather than an
individual executive accountable to a board of governors—the essence of quasigovernments, especially the public authority structure.
Third, encroachment and support levels are troublesome when the executive must
go beyond balancing the needs of two masters—a parent government and a board. When
board encroachment occurs the executive’s masters quickly multiply, especially if there
are multiple board members with divergent preferences. Board member involvement in
one decision may negatively impact the preferences of another member, requiring the
executive to involve the other members and balance the repercussions across multiple
communities or individual preferences. When executive decisions are fact-based and
delivered by an executive with neutral competence and no alliances, these decisions are
more respected—even if there are negative consequences for members’ communities.
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Ultimately, the content of the encroachment and the board member’s assertion for
involvement can damage the relationship and possibly destroy it. Relatively routine
issues of dirty shelters, a preference for certain types of buses and overall employee
morale are considerably minor when compared to overt demands placed on executives
related to personnel management and organizational operation. Constant questioning and
demands for board involvement in authority management undermines staff respect for the
member and overall board, reduces board member support for individual and collective
staff members, and ultimately creates thinly veiled suspicion, distrust and
misrepresentation of concerns and issues among the board, staff and executive.
Incursions driven by value judgments, even tinged with harmful sentiments such
as sexism, racism or nepotism—either direct or reverse—can call into question the
executive and board member’s character and play out in political arenas. Mayoral and
council intervention in authority business is detrimental to organizational functioning and
can reduce external funding and support for key measures. It creates a more partisan
authority that cannot be divorced from political wills and may force the executive from
the system and the member from the board. This instability and uncertainty permeates
the board, organization and parent government and can leave a scent of controversy and
infighting that reduces the willingness of members to continue serving and further dilutes
the pool of new individuals willing to serve on what is perceived as a misanthropic
organization. Meanwhile, controversy makes it difficult for the authority to recruit future
skilled executives, as they are hesitant to risk their careers and experience potential
professional and personal misery.
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CONCLUSION
When evaluating the areas of developing funding, financial management and
capital planning there is clearly a connection between the ability to participate in and
impact these process and distinctly different board activity among the varying authorities
within the study. Boards with more financial authority had a much higher level of policymaking involvement and an ability to create opportunities to further organizational goals.
The research shows that as financial authority decreases there is a much greater
inclination for lower-level players to fill the seats on public authority boards and a
resulting emphasis on low-level, on street service policy issues. The less financial
influence the board holds, the more attention is paid to on street services and
organizational operations, most of which are implementation and management-oriented,
both the general domain of the authority executive.
What this study did not uncover from interviews was a pattern of higher levels of
conflict and disagreement among executives and lower-level players expected from the
lower-level players and their service-level agendas. Chapters Three and Four presented
executive approach to managing the board-executive relationships and board perspectives
on representation, political prowess and decision-making; however; the primary
determination of conflict is the authority’s overall success. When organizational
direction in policy, management and service delivery meet the needs and preferences of
the vast majority of board members, there is a much greater level of support for the
executive and an affirmation of executive effectiveness. While this study did not reveal a
high level of conflict among these systems, several board members and executives
described very difficult periods in the organizations’ history to display how conflict can
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develop across a variety of financial and non-financial issues falling within and outside of
the normal expectations of board and executive responsibility. While this research did
not provide evidence of an automatically higher level of conflict between executives and
lower level board members, interviews did reflect low-level players’ increased interest in
low-level policy and non-policy issue areas that encroach on executive responsibility.
The answering of the research questions reveal that board members identified
their roles and responsibilities as heavily influenced by the reason for their individual
appointments and the representation of certain perspectives and populations. There was a
clear perception that these factors should translate to authority decision-making and
organizational direction. Additionally, the diversity of boards plays a significant factor in
authority policy, as decisions are a reflection of community values and make-up;
however, policy was typically drawn toward service-related decisions. In addition to
these issues, board members saw themselves as formal and informal advisors for the
executive, brining their experience and expertise to bear for the benefit of the executive
and the authority. Boards, however, have a tendency to encroach on executive decisionmaking when on street policy is the board’s main role, when the member has high level
of technical expertise and when members have vested levels of interest due to a
community-based interest but lacks authority for involvement. Yet, ultimately this
encroachment has two extremes—little impact or devastating impact, depending on the
issues and how they are managed.
The analysis of the expectations and research questions have provided
considerable insight in to how board members perceive their roles and how this impacts
board-executive relationships, as examined through conflict and decision-making.
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However, from this discussion surfaces a typology of public transportation authority
board member preferences based on the actual and preferred roles of members and how
individual preferences and focus manifest through conflict and support. Chapter Six
explicates this typology in the framework of the dichotomy-duality model and
conceptually applies the model and the typology to the public authority structure.
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CHAPTER VI
TOWARD A TYPOLOGY OF BOARD MEMBERS

INTRODUCTION
This exploration of board-executive relationships in public transportation
authorities has focused not on personality and interaction but rather structural elements of
public authorities, the impact of parent governments, political environments, community
norms and organizational decision-making. What has surfaced is the understanding that
executives have similar perspectives and opinions regarding board roles, responsibilities,
preferences and behavior with a strong focus on managing board relationships in addition
authority business. What is also apparent is a diversity of board member perspectives
and opinions toward these same roles and responsibilities, political power and
organizational effectiveness plus personal preferences toward policy and decisionmaking.
Despite the diversity, the research and analysis has shown that there are clear
similarities among board members. This allows board members to be grouped according
to preferences and behavior within a typological framework to better understand the
different kinds of board members comprising public transportation authority boards. The
typology allows board members to be located in conceptual “boxes” differentiating highlevel and low-level board perspectives while outlining policy preferences and
understanding of board and executive interaction along the mission-policyadministration-management framework. This chapter presents the typology by
describing the different board members, identified from the data and analysis, within the

217

frame of James Svara’s dichotomy-duality model. Chapter Six concludes with an
evaluation of this typology in regard to how each main type of board member—policy-,
advisory- and community-oriented—presents a different set of challenges to a positive
and effective board-executive relationship.

TYPOLOGY OF BOARD MEMBER PRFERENCES AND BEHAVIOR
Looking back on executive and board member opinions and attitudes towards
policy, representation and decision-making and the combined impact on the boardexecutive relationship there are several emergent themes that allow for more broad-based
conclusions regarding board member preferences and perspectives. First, boards are
internally varied by design and this variation generally attempts to reflect the values and
norms of the community, the parent government and the needs of the organization.
Second, the experiences and subsequent perspectives brought to the authority board table
are as diverse as the members who bring them. Third, despite this variation and diversity
these public transportation authorities parallel one another in important areas such as
organizational functions, formal board and executive responsibilities and most important
how executives and board members view their roles, responsibilities and power. The
value of these similarities and differences is the ability to work toward greater
understanding of preferred and actual roles of members and to develop more specific
descriptions of board member behavior and preferences. This is an important first step
with the potential to lead to generalization and application of the concepts to the
population of public authority boards.
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Through this research and analysis a typology of three distinct types of board
members developed, further subdivided into six subtypes based on the preferences and
perceptions of board member responsibilities. This typology speaks to the board
members’ understanding of the role of the board and what is expected of them as board
members in addition to how this impacts decision-making. The typology is organized
around the two themes of orientation and focus, with orientation describing board
member outlook and preferences on board roles and responsibilities while focus describes
the scope of interest in the scheme of these roles and responsibilities. Orientation is
defined along three separate areas: policy-orientation, advisory-orientation and
community-orientation. And the additional conceptual layer of board member focus is
examined in terms of broad or narrow focus to describe the breadth and depth of
individual board member interest in policy, advisory and community issues. This draws
greater distinction between board member types to create a typology along the two lines
of orientation and focus to create six distinct categories of board members: policyoriented, broad focus; policy-oriented, narrow focus; advisory-oriented, broad focus;
advisory-oriented, narrow focus; community-oriented, broad focus; and communityoriented, narrow focus.
Policy-Oriented Board Members: Broad and Narrow Focus
The first type of board member identified is the policy-oriented board member,
briefly described a member who recognizes, articulates and maintains the distinction
between executive and board authority and responsibility and preserves a firm and
reasonable line of demarcation between these functions within the context of the boardexecutive relationship. The policy-oriented board member is conceptually divided into
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two sub-types, based on the broad or narrow focus of the member as described below.
The board members are interested in policy development at financial, oversight and
planning levels, indicate a propensity toward information-based decision-making and
place tremendous value on key issues of financial management, structural responsibility
and accountability for the board and executive. These individuals comprise an ideal-type
group of board members within the traditional conceptualization of the public authority
structure.
Policy-oriented board members are unique in that appointments are typically
motivated by efforts to draw greater influence for the authority, both internally and
externally, and are frequently tied to prior experience in high-level public and private
sector organizations with extensive service on other high-level policy and civic boards.
Selection is based on achieving greater stature or expertise for the authority and members
typically view their role on the board as voting and acting on behalf of either the parent
government, the authority, the entire city (or region) or some permutation of the three.
Most of these board members draw no distinctions between the benefit of services for
riders and non-riders, identifying public transportation as a critical element of a
functioning urban area.
These individuals identify their duties and responsibilities as policy-making for
the authority and elucidate this through concentration on financial and strategic policy
direction for the organization with an emphasis on clear lines of board and executive
authority. Policy direction, especially in financial terms, is emphasized on larger picture
issues of funding streams but with specific measures to generate revenue or establish
minimum standards of performance for resource allocation, especially for on street
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services. Attention is on concepts such as performance measures for evaluating on street
services along lines of efficiency, effectiveness and financial viability; establishment of
business and financial plans to balance interests between revenue intake and ridership
growth—both very important to the authority; and policies to meet the needs of users in
terms of service area, service type and cost. This group’s description of policy-making is
less about approving recommendations but initiating short- and long-term planning with
priority on developing strategy for garnering resource support for innovation and
implementation.
Policy-oriented board members view their role as setting direction followed by
review. Their expectation as board members is to remain aware and engaged in the
business elements of the authority with an eye toward oversight of board and executive
decisions. To that end they expect to be informed of high-level policy issues and the
associated internal and external political maneuvering and motivations while assisting in
key areas when necessary. They see themselves as holding policy-making power not
only for the authority but influencing decisions outside the authority when possible.
They exert higher level of influence and power, especially when joined collectively on a
single board and with a strong executive at a burgeoning system.
While many board members identified the importance of maintaining distance
from executives’ managerial authority, policy-oriented board members emphasized the
unhealthy result of this type of involvement. Recognizing the detrimental impact of
micromanaging they make concerted efforts to keep attention on policy development and
issues brought before (and initiated) by the board. Issues pertaining to personnel, internal
organization and policy execution are tempered by this understanding as well as
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cognizance that professional staff possesses expertise and experience to make effective
decisions to operate service and functionally run the organization. Beyond maintaining
distance in managerial authority there is understanding of, and some support for, a strong
executive that not only prepares and presents recommendations but plays a major, if not
lead role in crafting policy and direction for the board as well. The executive is viewed
as the organizational leader with experience and expertise combining to shape direction
in conjunction with the board. Policy-oriented members have a strong reliance and
respect for executive and staff level policy development but assert their power to ensure
the information available is complete and accurate such that members can make effective
decisions and uphold their responsibility and duty to the authority and parent
government.
Focus draws an additional level of distinction between board members, especially
in regards to board members that have either a broad or narrow policy focus. Policyoriented board members rarely identify a specific goal or objective as motivation for
joining or remaining on the board; however, they have areas of interest and expertise
regarding the scope of issues they are responsible for pursuing. Broad focused board
members typically have an interest in overall organizational mission and policy and tie
together the issues of policy development, oversight and accountability. They have no
specific interest in only finance, only planning or only performance measurement. They
see connections between these diverse areas and approach the overall development of the
authority through the understanding of the broad interrelation between funding, system
improvement and accountability. Narrow focused, policy-oriented board members have a
narrower scope of interest, focusing predominantly on budgetary and financial process,
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on street service standards and quality assurance assessments, transportation technology
procurement or political inclinations toward wielding power and influence within given
circles.
Of the three clusters of board members, policy-oriented members often have more
broad-based interests because they have no distinct representational interests or alliances
with certain segments of the community. They possess a much higher level of policy
ability and interest and see interrelation between multiple issues making it difficult to
segment their policy orientation into narrow focus or small spheres of policy. Overall,
policy-oriented board members are close allies of the executive because they have an
understanding of the mission and policy expectations of the board and execute the
responsibilities effectively combined with the executive involvement in the same.
Support for the executive level is generally very high and these members feel the
executive is an effective executive of the transportation system and that the board is a
highly effective functional unit.
Advisory-Oriented Board Members: Broad and Narrow Focus
Advisory-oriented board members represent the third and fourth type of board
members. Just as the policy-oriented board member, articulates the distinction between
executive and board authority and responsibility the advisory board members seeks a
more active role in executive decision-making by providing advice and counsel to the
executive. Unlike the firm line of demarcation established by policy-oriented board
members, advisory members see themselves as less developing policy and setting
organizational direction and more advising the executive as he or she crafts mission and
policy for board approval. Advisory-oriented members are predominantly interested in
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oversight of policy development and implementation with more reactive and surfacelevel involvement in policy-making. Emphasis is on the level of confidence in the
executive’s approach, as determined by the executive’s incorporation of board member
advice and perspective. They view policy recommendation as a reflection of board
values, especially their own personal perspectives, and place a much lower level of
emphasis on involvement in financial and planning process. While valuable for the
advice they proffer, they have a much lower level of influence inside and outside the
authority resulting from their own inclinations for decreased policy formulation.
Advisory-oriented members are appointed for the same general reasons as policyoriented members—stature and expertise—but with a decreased emphasis on power and
influence. Most advisory board members have involvement in civic or community
interest boards and have established themselves as mid-to-low-level players with an
interest in community issues. They are usually selected because they offer a level of
technical expertise in a professional area germane to the authority’s function such as law,
engineering, architecture or executive management. Additionally, these members do not
have specialized interest in any particular segment of the community but place greater
emphasis on the protection of service for riders, as they view themselves as providing
technical guidance and advice for improving existing services and developing new ones.
Members with an advisory orientation see their policy-making role as
involvement through ad hoc response to single initiatives or continuous advice on a more
long-term project launched by executives. Advisory-oriented members have interest in
budgetary, planning and strategic direction but interest is usually limited to their primary
areas of expertise or applying that expertise across a wider range of issues. There is a
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greater emphasis on service delivery in community-wide terms and view
recommendation through the lens of what they think is good for authority and good for
the city—especially the ridership. They have a much greater tendency to ask questions
about service-level recommendations than policy-oriented members, especially when
those recommendations involve more tangible issues of service levels, routing and
vehicle procurement. Involvement in financial issues is typically post-development such
as after budget approval by the parent government or after contracts have been negotiated
and presented. They offer perspective and advice at a surface level and are much more
reliant on staff and executive professionalism, often deferring to their expertise and
experience. New staff initiatives for more innovative services are met with some
resistance primarily due to a lack of understanding of the service and an unwillingness to
take risks. If they have comfort with staff ability to execute changes and see nominal
effect, either positive or negative, they are often neutral to the recommendation and will
offer advice and follow the tendencies of the rest of the board. New measures they view
as very positive but are met with resistance by non-advisory members may also sway
their vote, as they have offered their advice and perspective but have no stake in either
the policy or its impact.
Overall, advisory-oriented members see their role as asking questions, making
sure varying perspectives have been considered and then relying on the will of the
majority to guide decisions. Their expectation as board members is to be kept abreast of
a larger variety of non-policy issues and see information and awareness as oversight.
They often feel their attention to detailed reports is important but not necessary and are
looking more at the bottom line: Are we on budget? Is ridership up? Will the new buses
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be here on time? They have interest in the answers but have little interest in the factors
that have created the situation; they are interested in the short version with no real
proclivity to change processes. They are reactive rather than proactive and emphasis is
on oversight and making sure the executive is aware of issues important to the board and
its individual members. Accountability is important but awareness and limited oversight
is the general interest. Advisory-oriented members expect to be informed of high- and
mid-level policy issues but desire a reduced level of involvement in crafting the policy or
ensuring implementation. They see limited policy-making power and opportunity and
only cursory influence over decisions from outside the authority, recognizing their
limited political influence.
Board members with an advisory orientation describe a greater distinction
between board authority and executive authority and want little, if any, involvement in
managerial decisions but seek greater awareness of these decisions. They feel their
oversight extends beyond ridership and revenue but how the organization is managed.
Insights into operational decision-making increase understanding and comfort levels with
executive recommendations for policy. When executive decisions involve an area of
expertise the board members possesses, such as law or engineering, there is an even
greater expectation of inclusion for purposes of advice and counsel and some basic level
of explanation regarding the final decision. Advisory-oriented members rarely seek or
expect involvement in the process but are outcome oriented, especially in controversial
matters of staffing decisions or high profile events. They respect the decisions, even
when disagreeing, and recognize the inherent right of the executive to manage the
organization and make decisions. They see themselves as a “kitchen cabinet”—a group
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of advisors but with “final authority” on these matters resting with the executive, so long
as he or she listens to what is said. These members do not place great emphasis on a
single subgroup of the city population or riders because their attention is turned to
technical guidance on transportation issues that impact the whole system. These
advisory-oriented board members do not frequently identify a specific goal or objective
for serving on the authority but do see themselves as bringing an area of expertise to the
table. Once again, it is a function of their strong desire to provide guidance and advice,
mostly one-one-one to the executive in these matters. Where advisory-oriented board
members separate is their focus. As explained above, these members have either singleissue interest on some authority activities and policy or apply this expertise on a variety
of topics. This helps to clarify differences between narrow and broad focused advisory
leaning members.
Broad focused members apply expertise ad hoc to single interest areas as well as
overall issues that come across the executive’s desk that might warrant their involvement
or proficiency. They do have detailed levels of involvement on some areas but because
attention is more widespread they have a decreased tendency to drill down into the
minutiae surrounding most issues and view authority business from a global lens of their
own professional technical understandings and experience. They apply their interest to
nearly all issues, not in the sense of micromanagement but as advice. They hold greater
expectations of awareness on not only high-level issues but also mid-level and some
lower-level issues in order to provide perspective on almost any item before the board.
Narrow focused board members, especially in areas of finance, engineering and
architecture, seek much greater involvement in their areas of expertise and less on the
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overall scheme of the authority. For example, budgetary struggles or financial oversight
might be the domain of a member who served as a finance director for a public agency or
is an accountant. They might seek and obtain more active roles in committees and work
sessions. They have a much greater interest in single areas and work far more closely
with the executive to provide increased oversight and advice in these areas on behalf of
the board and for the benefit of the executive. They connect oversight with advice on
these important issues and place considerable attention on the areas of process and result.
Unlike broad focused members, narrow focused board members have a tremendous level
of interest and desire increased detail in a single area without trying to make every
situation fit their interest and expertise. For a narrow focused board member, if it falls
within their narrow area of interest, they are involved. Otherwise they defer to other
board members or the executive.
Advisory-oriented board members share high levels of executive support with
policy-oriented board members and also have strong allegiance to the executive,
especially when they see their fingerprints on policy and management decisions. They
are typically very supportive of the executive and when support is lacking this is usually
tied to disagreement over single policy issues within that board member’s narrow policy
interest. When the board member has more broad-based focus, the conflict reduces
because the areas of disagreement are less intensified instead of within single-interest
area.
Community-Oriented Board Members: Broad and Narrow Focus
The final types of board members identified within this study are communityoriented members, also divided along lines of broad and narrow focus. What best
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differentiates these board members from all others is representation as a core value with a
very strong connection to a distinct and specialized community. This is opposed to the
policy and advisory approaches that slant toward high-level policy-making and political
influence with reliance on technical expertise for and oversight of the overarching system
goals. Community-oriented board members have interests in policy and oversight and
offering expertise but the context of representation and connection to a specialized
community heavily colors their perspectives and preferences. It is this community
orientation that presents itself mostly in narrow focused board members but exists
strongly in broad focused members as well. Community-oriented board members are
interested almost exclusively with on street services and organizational management, as
these are the tangible aspects of authority business. Policy-making, oversight and midcourse correction are means processes whereas the output and impact of these functions
are ends processes, rolled out through on street services planned by staff, delivered by
employees and received by customers. It is within these ends processes that communityoriented board members place their emphasis.
Community-oriented board members feel their appointments are based on
representation of a particular community or group. These board members feel they are
voting and acting on behalf of a segment of the community that may include a large
group of disconnected individuals, a smaller group of individuals connected by common
descriptive or circumstantial factors, special interest organizations and agencies or large
community institutions. Their appointment is based on an ability to connect with an
easily identifiable, particular group and the need (either implied or direct) to represent
certain perspectives and opinions on the authority board. It is a connection to and activity
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among such a group that places a board member within this typological box. These
appointees see a direct connection between decisions of the authority and the impact on
this representational group and in public transportation these board members can be
extremely diverse depending on the community.
The board members identify their appointment and representation of a community
as their primary responsibility with participation in policy-making, oversight and
decision-making. Like other board members, they have political influence and technical
expertise but with a greater variety than among policy-oriented and advisory-oriented
members. Policy and advisory board member influence is predominantly upward with
closer political ties to elected officials, business leaders and local high-level players.
Community level board members have a tendency to downward influence, especially
with the population they are representing. Political ties to the mayor exist for
community-oriented board members but are negated by all appointees having similar
relationships.
Like other types of board members, community-oriented members have
professional backgrounds with technical expertise valuable to the authority board and
executive but this is typically related to backgrounds in fields such as ministry,
volunteerism and advocacy, collective bargaining, and social services. Most often these
professions are with organizations that work directly with or are active among lowincome, marginalized or disadvantaged populations and the members have strong
connections with these respective communities. These professions have a clear
connection to disenfranchised communities and act as liaisons between the political and
bureaucratic process and those they feel they serve and represent. Board members with
230

this professional or volunteer background maintain personal involvement, have increased
social interaction and become more supportive of individual needs via this direct contact.
They have a tendency to view policy and process through the eyes of their community.
Most unique about board members serving these communities is a feeling that they
provide voice and protection to the disenfranchised populations of the city.
Community-oriented members are not exclusive to these professions and
backgrounds. Business owners, university administrators and public organization
executives serving on authority board are frequently appointed to represent groups or
institutions because they offer unique business perspectives or because they are major
forces in the local community. In the case of a university administrator, especially in a
city with a major university, there are considerable needs for service for students, faculty,
staff, support workers and the ability to connect them throughout and off campus. This
diverse collection of members identifies policy-making and oversight as their two most
important responsibilities; however, the policy and oversight lean toward service-level
issues.
Policy direction on big-picture issues of funding streams and route performance
standards are typically of lower priority and funding is viewed as extremely important
primarily because it is the means by which service can be delivered. Increased budget
allocations from parent governments and state or federal agencies are not viewed from
the perspective of grant expiration dates or development of replacement funding—it is
simply a question of is there enough money to keep service on the street? These board
members rarely apply pressure to council members or mayors to increase budget
requests, often citing limited personal influence or an inability to garner strong and vocal
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grass roots support. Policy preferences tend to relate more to how the recommendations
impact the community the member is representing. The majority of policy areas where
they seek involvement through committees and work sessions relate strongly to service
development and marketing committees. Questions regarding revenue and expenditures
are less frequently raised unless it is an area of expertise because community-oriented
members often lack interest or knowledge in the complex financial procedures and focus
predominantly on ridership performance. Oversight is usually couched in terms a basic
review of ridership and questioning is geared why a route’s ridership is considerably up
or down, almost with a suspicion of what is happening on street to grow or curtail
customer use.
Community-oriented board members often view their role as an obligation to act
on policy and provide advice and counsel—just as other board members—but with the
intent and voice of those they represent, whether overtly or covertly. This attention to
service issues is predominantly reactive, reviewing proposals that may add, enhance,
reduce or eliminate services entirely within the lens of how this affects their community.
Special attention is paid to user and community perspectives and concerns are voiced on
behalf of the rider—so long as it is valid—no matter how low-level the concern and
regardless of the overarching mission or agenda of the board or the executive.
Community-oriented board members are clearly different in their interests and
attention—and potentially their decision-making because they identify a direct
connection between policy and users.
Unlike the descriptions of policy-oriented members who are concerned with
information on high-level policy and highly controversial issues or the advisory-oriented
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members who want information on high- and mid-level issues along with controversy,
the community-oriented board members usually want to be informed of high-, mid- and
low-level issues plus the controversial items. This is in spite of limited involvement in
high-level policy due to an inability to influence issues and generally little interest in the
routine mid-level issues; meanwhile the threshold for what is deemed controversial is
much lower for this group than for other types of members. The reason for this
expectation and desire for increased awareness is the board member’s role of a conduit
and the perceived need to have their ear to the ground within the community and their
finger on the pulse of the authority. They simply expect to be more informed on an
increased number of issues.
This increased expectation for awareness and involvement can go beyond issues
of policy and service. Representation as a perspective and core value may yield the
belief, and inherent obligation, to question issues regardless of topic, including decisions
falling under executive authority. There is seemingly less respect for strong executive
management and administrative authority, although community-oriented board members
describe an understanding of both board and executive roles and the powers and rights of
each. This understanding only extends so far as executive decisions do not negatively
impact the board member’s community, which increases desire for both awareness and
involvement. This can become particularly tenuous when executive decisions are in
process (especially internal management of resources and personnel) and the board seeks
involvement and control over outcomes. This micromanagement undermines the boardexecutive lines of authority, although the community-oriented board sees this as an
extension of their roles and responsibilities.
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The community-orientation of board members is also divisible into the subgroups
of broad and narrow focus. Most community-oriented board members identify a specific
goal or objective as a reason for serving on the authority board. These narrow focused
members usually cite their attention to one of three groups: passengers, especially transit
dependent populations; employees, especially front line employees most often in the
collective bargaining unit; and the organization they are closely associated with and were
appointed to represent. Issues are closely tied to the community they represent and serve,
such as a low-income neighborhoods or community associations near the core of the
urban center for which they are a leader, either formally or informally. As described,
these are usually service specific issues that relate to low-level policy approval of route
changes, service reductions or reallocations to more productive and revenue-friendly
routes. They are also oriented to internal organization and management decisions to
allocate personnel or resources.
Votes are not based on revenue projections or growing ridership but rather how
decisions impact their respective communities. When recommendations do not impact
their specific communities, individual members remain sympathetic to other board
concerns or with customers who may be impacted, whether or not the impact is real—
only possible. Broad focused board members typically have the same general perspective
as narrow focused board members but lack a specific community or allegiance to a
policy. Emphasis is on low-level issues, almost always service related, with opinions,
questions and votes forming “on-the-fly” and easily steered by concerns of other
members.

234

With community-oriented board members, representational interests or alliances
among certain segments may impact the support levels for the executive. The disconnect
between community-oriented board members and their ability to develop and influence
high-level policy, which becomes the focus and attention of the executives, prevents the
close working relationships with executives. When services are functioning well, the
organization is successful and decisions have limited or no negative impact on the
community, then the executive is viewed as effective and support for the executive is
usually strong. Board members do realize there are limits to funding for services and
understand hard decisions must be made; however, there is usually considerable concern
and emotional hand wringing over these decisions. Even then support remains strong—at
least until decisions effect only very narrow portions of the community and call into
question the executive’s decisions.
Variations on the Typology
In a number of cases there were board members who were clearly torn between
two different orientations: community/advisory-orientation and advisory/policyorientation. In each of these instances, the primary orientation of the board member is
identified in the first descriptor—community/advisory is community first and
advisory/policy is advisory first. Overall, these board members numbered very few but
clearly articulated two very strong viewpoints that fit within two categories of the
typology. This was caused by one or more of the following factors: 1) board leadership
positions; 2) extended service on the authority board; 3) intensified service on the
authority board; and 4) large numbers of a particular type of member on the authority
board.
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In the first instance, a number of board members described a much higher level of
awareness of mission and policy issues and greater understanding of the lines of
responsibility for the board and executive after serving as chair or vice chair on the
authority. As explained by board members and executives, the chair position has a much
higher level of interaction with the executive and develops greater awareness of issues.
They becomes very protective of the executive and board responsibilities as they referee
board and executive concerns while maintaining the effective business of the board
including meetings, committees, acclimating new appointees and communicating with
elected officials and local leaders on a very wide variety of issues. They are much more
in tune with financial and managerial issues and develop a greater understanding of
operational and financial decisions and cannot help but be educated by the process.
Through their experiences they become better board members and if not already a policyoriented member are naturally transformed toward that role.
The second and third factors that transition board members are very closely
connected and follow the same trend as described above. The longer board members
serve the more experience they gain. For example, an advisory-oriented member that is
on their tenth budget cycle is much more aware of process and may seek involvement in
an areas they couldn’t have participated in years ago. They still have advisory
inclinations but have developed enough financial acumen to get their hands dirty and
guide decisions regarding capital planning and long-term strategy. Community-oriented
board members with long tenure have been presented with the harsh economic realities of
public funding. Board members who joined to try and develop new services soon realize
that services are expensive to deliver from an operating cost, vehicle replacement funds
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sometimes come at a trickle and even when grants are available the parent governments
have limited funds and are often unwilling to provide match money—$200,000 in grant
match funds are difficult to provide even when $800,000 is available from the federal
government and will only net four new buses.
Over time boards see just about every issue brought before them and the longer
they serve the more they understand—budget crises will force service cuts, managers will
implement originally unpopular but very successful services and staff recommendations
will seem to turn out fine. The same can be true for a board member who becomes very
active an a new project, such as helping pass a referendum, chairing a committee for a
new downtown parking garage or a complete renovation of an older facility. The intense
working relationship required to make a project successful allows the board member
tremendous insight into organizational operation, teaches the board members the
complexities of funding mechanisms and exposes them to the obstacles of service
delivery. They gain greater appreciation for the challenges managers face and become
more understanding of the board’s proper roles and responsibilities.
Finally, who surrounds an individual member has a tremendous impact on how
members act and what they learn. An advisory- or community-oriented member on a
board made up of policy-oriented members will be brought along for the ride in board
business. A strong chair with a no nonsense board will have little patience or room for a
board member that is constantly a few steps behind or is not focused on the proper
business of the authority. Over time they conform by the will of the majority but more
often they grown in terms of understanding the responsibilities and expectations. As long
as the executive and fellow members show genuine concern and listen to what the
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member has to say they become satisfied with the process and an active and valuable
participant in the process.

THE TYPOLOGY AND THE DICHOTOMY-DUALITY MODEL
Adapting and Refining the Dichotomy-Duality Model
While this typology is extremely valuable for understanding the different types of
members that make up public transportation authority boards, the value of this typology
is the understanding the types in relation to the mission-policy-administrationmanagement functions presented within Svara’s dichotomy-duality model. Chapter
One’s literature review identified James Svara’s dichotomy-duality model of local
governance (Svara 1985; 1989a; 1990) as the most effective tool for understanding
executive-board relationships. While the research did not study public authorities, the
model possesses some applicability to authorities. As previously mentioned, the concept
of dichotomy permits the differentiation between policy and implementation while
recognizing the players and functions of policy and implementation continuously overlap
(Svara, 1999b; 2001).
This study suggests that Svara’s model is not only applicable to public
transportation authorities but public authorities in general. More importantly when the
dichotomy-duality model is considered in conjunction with the typology of board
member preferences and behaviors, a new layer of understanding is applied to expand the
model beyond lines of power and responsibility. Board-executive relationships can
actually be studied in relation to power and responsibility to analyze public authority
governance and management.
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Svara’s model divides the classic policy-administration model discussed in
Chapter One into mission, policy, administration and management. Mission is described
as the guidance of the organization while policy includes mid-range policy decisions
decided by council with advice of staff. In his model elected officials are the primary
mission builders with administrators offering advice and counsel while officials and staff
share equal influence in policy formulation with technical expertise playing a significant
role, although councils establish policy guidelines as a framework for policy development
(Svara 1985; 1990). Staff roles grow larger in administration of decisions and low-level
implementation policy with some council oversight through citizen input or active
interest in decision-making. Management is the domain of executives and includes
human, material, and informational resources (Svara 1985; 1989a; 1990). Mission,
policy, administration, and management are the primary functions of government
structure but what the model emphasizes is duality, that dichotomy exists but that
functions of government are shared but at varying degrees. Executives provide the
technical guidance on mission and policy while officials have a responsibility for
oversight of program outcomes and accountability.
Applicability of a Typology
The introductory chapter posited that Svara’s research is applicable to the
transportation authority structure. Generally in this exploratory study, it has been found
to be the case, although relationships did not always follow the expected patterns. This
study, however, suggests that the model is incomplete, as it focuses exclusively on the
functions of governance but does not account for individual preferences and the
manager’s ability to navigate these preferences toward effective relationships that are
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absolutely crucial to the effectiveness of the organization and the services the public
receives. Unlike Svara’s research, which examined the deviations from the typical
division of power and responsibility (Figure 6.1, all figures are located in the Appendix),
this variation on his model locates the board member types in consideration of the
conceptual dichotomy and duality articulated in his research. This research did not focus
on the lines of responsibility and power, which was the crux of his study. Rather this
research uncovers board member preferences that may or may not fall where the formal
lines of power and responsibility are drawn. In this expanded model, boards substitute
for city councils and the city manager’s functions are those of authority executives.
What this typology demonstrates is that there are six types of board members with
either an orientation toward policy, advisory or community issues and that these
orientations can be subdivided into either a broad or narrow scope of interest. What
Svara’s model very broadly describes is how responsibilities are shared between boards
and executives across varying organizational functions. This expansion of the model
instead focuses on how board member preferences fall within this construct. First,
policy-oriented board members are concerned primarily with mission and policy
activities, typically mirroring the council member roles within the dichotomy-duality
model. What the dichotomy-duality model shows is how the responsibilities fall at
different points within the structure. The board members may have larger scopes of
responsibility but the policy-oriented members are centralized within a smaller subset of
preferred responsibility, some of which falls within executive responsibility and power.
When placed on the dichotomy-duality model (Figures 6.2 and 6.3), their interests fall
predominantly within the normal scope of power and responsibility expected of boards.
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This is outlined in the mission and policy functions but within the responsibilities of
public authority board members, as described in the scholarly literature and this research.
The placement of the “box” on the model is located to reflect several specific
tendencies among these board members. First, the location illustrates how the majority
of interest is in high-level mission and policy issues identified by board members as
policy and planning, nearly all of which falls under board responsibility. Second, the box
drops only slightly into administrative issues, reflecting the general preference of most
policy-oriented members to keep distance from managerial functions but maintain
oversight and accountability in executive implementation of policy decisions and overall
direction of the organization. Third, the preferences show some involvement in executive
responsibility, but these are mostly within the shared responsibilities of mission and
policy and there is relatively little encroachment on executive functions, which is
important as these members maintain a strong distinction between board and executive
responsibility.
Broad focus, policy-oriented board members place considerable attention on the
mission and policy functions of the organization but prefer a generally wider scope of
responsibility for mission and policy (Figure 6.2). Different from this conceptualization
is the policy-oriented, but narrow focused, board members who have the same general
interest but are less focused on the multitude of policy and mission requirements of a
governing board and prefer a more narrow set of influence (Figure 6.3). They do not
shirk or shed their duties in other areas of board responsibility—they just prefer to be
more heavily involved in specific areas.
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Next is the location of advisory-oriented board members, both broad and narrow
focus, within the dimensions of the governmental process. Advisory-oriented board
members’ focus, like policy-oriented members, are impacted by the scope of interest
articulated by the individual members and may fall across different areas of
responsibility, including executive authority. The difference lies primarily in the location
of advisory preferences of these types of board members, as shown in Figures 6.4 and
6.5. As described in the typology, these board members recognize the demarcation
between executive and board responsibility but seek an active role in executive decisionmaking through advice and counsel.
These advisory members are more interested in advising the executive as he or
she crafts mission and policy for board approval, as shown though location of preferences
in the lower potion of the policy box and in the upper portion of the administrative box.
Oversight and advice plays a much greater role for these members, as demonstrated by
the preferences that fall under executive responsibility. This helps visualize the areas
where advisory-oriented board members seek to ensure policy recommendations reflect
board values, especially individual preferences, which encompass a wider variety of
issues, especially service delivery. The more information they have on executive
decisions the more comfortable they are approving executive-driven recommendations,
especially when decisions incorporate their preferences.
Community-oriented board members are much harder to place, as their
preferences for involvement in authority issues is considerably wider. Those board
members’ focus is far less involved in high-level mission and policy but rather streetlevel policy, street-level oversight and individual expertise with a connection to a
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specialized community. The preference for involvement is mostly within decisions
related to on street services and organizational management. Believing appointments are
based on representation, they act as liaisons between the authority and the community
with low-level policy and oversight as their two most important responsibilities but with
a desire for awareness on an increased number of issues. Frequently awareness and
involvement goes beyond policy and service by questioning decisions falling under
executive authority with a decreased appreciation for executive and board lines of
authority.
It is within this understanding that community-oriented board member
preferences were placed (Figures 6.6 and 6.7). First, these members are interested are in
the lower portion of the policy dimension and in a smaller area, reflecting the lower level,
on street policy preferences. Second, the oversight aspect of community-oriented board
members is of a much wider range, as exhibited through the larger sized box placed on
the model. Third, these board members have a much stronger preference for low-level
issues and executive functions as shown in the larger areas falling under administration
and management and reflecting a much higher level of board member encroachment on
executive authority. The ideas described above in policy- and advisory-oriented
members that differentiate narrow and broad focus members applies to this type as well;
however, the narrow focused members’ boxes are also larger, suggesting members’
desire for increased awareness of issues, even when interest areas are narrow focused.
Consideration of the Typology on Board-Executive Relationships
The typology presented here achieves several important things. First, it
consolidates a wide variety of board member preferences and behaviors within a limited
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number of board member types while accounting for the different perspectives and values
these board members hold. Second, the typology can be understood within Svara’s wellestablished and supported studies of local government structures and therefore provides
greater understanding of how board members relate to functions of governance,
especially in the ambiguous environment of public authorities. Third, this typology
allows scholars, elected officials, public managers and board members to understand how
these individual preferences and member types impact governance. Ultimately, this
dissertation is about expanding our understanding of authorities through exploration of
the factors impacting relationships between public authority board members and
executives. It is through this typology that we can understand how board members
preferences and perspective play out in the board-executive relationship.
What this typology means for public transportation authority executives is that
their ability to identify board member preferences and place them in “boxes” will go a
long way toward understanding why they interact with board members in the way they do
and also how they manage their organizations. Executives are fully aware of the
preferences of individual board members but they tend to look at them as a collection of
individual preferences as opposed to a collection of types. Boards are comprised of very
different members—policy, advisory and community types with a varying level of focus
that reflects different breadths and depths of interest. The different types of members
have very different ideas of what is important to the organization with very different
ideas of what is important to the public with some members “stretching” the boundaries
of their respective boxes on a continual or ad hoc basis.
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For executives, each different board member type presents its own set of
opportunities and challenges while forcing the careful balance the many interests, wants
and needs of their boards. Policy-oriented board members are the ideal-type members for
public transportation authorities for a number of reasons. The modern public
transportation authority is extremely reliant on outside organizations and agencies for
resources and support, especially funding, especially parent governments at the local
level and state and federal agencies for grants to fund operating assistance and capital
equipment. Without this public funding the systems would cease to exist as we now
know them, as user fees are insufficient to cover the cost of operation or equipment.
Policy-oriented board members have a very strong preference and motivation toward
high-level financial policy and direct the organization along core values of efficiency and
effectiveness to ensure the long-term capacity of the system to grow and provide
transportation services critical to the life of a city.
The emphasis on developing financial support for the organization is not the sole
benefit of policy-oriented members to the executive and the organization. These board
members have a strong emphasis on ensuring the business of authority is properly
executed through developing and approving (with thorough consideration) high-level
policy; however, they apply proper levels of oversight and accountability to ensure midand low-level policy is executed within the confines of the board and toward the
organization’s goals. Additionally they bring strong connections to higher-level players
within the political landscape and can open doors for the board and executive and
increase access at critical junctures. Most important, these board members have a much
greater awareness of the proper roles and responsibilities, both formal and informal, of
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both the board and executive and allow each set of actors to fulfill their duties effectively
for public benefit.
In many ways relationships with these board members are much easier for the
executive to manage because the areas of interest are predominately mission and policy,
areas in which these members already hold tremendous responsibility. Because these
areas are already within the board’s purview there is a decreased opportunity for conflict
over board and executive responsibility, especially issues that may lead to
micromanagement. They have greater understanding of how a board is expected to
function and hold a higher standard for themselves and work effectively and according to
these standards, making it much easier to the executive to manage and administer
services with board support. Additionally, these areas of mission and policy are
functions shared among the board and executive creating a stronger connection, with
each professionally and personally vested in organizational success.
Still these board members present their own set of challenges. First, policyoriented board members have little interest in non-policy issues, making it extremely
difficult for executives when they are struggling and need advice and support for internal
problems and challenges. A policy board may have limited understanding of the
contextual issues within the organization and may turn a blind eye toward these issues,
evaluating the executive solely on performance measures, budget management and
similar policy-related signposts. Second, these board members have higher expectations
for board authority and can present very strong, if not willful, perspectives and impose
very difficult standards and expectations for the executive and organization. This is
multiplied when a board comprised of multiple power players imposes different
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expectations, placing the executive between divergent viewpoints and both expecting
results.
Third, if the board and executive hold very different opinions on the direction of
the transportation authority and its services, it may be very difficult for the executive to
guide and direct services he or she feels will best serve the transportation needs of the
city. In a battle of wills between the executive and board the executive almost always
loses—right or wrong—because the board members carry considerable weight within the
community and with the parent government. Power players can hold tremendous
influence and not always to the benefit of executives. Finally, depending on a broad of
narrow focus, these board members can require an exceptional amount of involvement
and interaction for the executive. Members who seek to drill down into very complex
issues may place tremendous strain on the staff and executive then they must constantly
develop new recommendations, prepare proposals for presentation and research and
distill according to board member questions and preferences. The non-stop policy
attention can detract from the organization’s ability to refine present policies and
programs to improve its core mission—transportation operations and services.
Advisory-oriented board members offer a different aspect of governance and
relationships for the executive because although they bring stature and expertise to the
table there is much less power and influence. This creates a vacancy in board
responsibility for mission and policy and places the executive in a more prominent role in
crafting organizational direction. The greatest value of the advisory-oriented board
member is the technical expertise brought to the board and executive, producing a
constant well of resources to draw from on a variety of issues. The advice often comes in
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very important areas such a finance, law or management and can be applied across a wide
swath of issues. Questions help guide the development of policy and programs to create
a higher level of attention to issues. While preferences lean to mid- and low-level policy
they offer a tremendous amount of perspective and advice at critical junctures and an
executive willing to take advantage of this opportunity can benefit not only in terms of
technical information but also in building confidence and strengthening the boardexecutive relationship.
Overall, the relationship between executive and advisory-oriented board members
is very good and quite easy to maintain. The decreased interest in mission and policy
creates a greater level of freedom for executives, allowing them to be more involved at
higher levels that challenge the organization and allow for more innovative approaches to
services. While innovation can be met with resistance, as the ideas fall outside of the
board member’s expectations, the advice offered can be heeded and reflected in
decisions. Even if disagreement arises, there is usually little long-term effect because
interest is mostly surface level and program success breeds support. The mid-and lowlevel policy preferences are usually already within the board’s responsibility and even
when the executive holds the power for some of those decisions, it is easy to keep the
board informed with updates telephone calls, e-mails, and reports at committee and
formal meetings. By assuring the board their advice has been considered and by
providing detailed and complete reports for review, the oversight and accountability
interests are met with little controversy. In reality, the executive is in the power position
with advisory-oriented members because the executive has established the political
contacts, has a much stronger grip on organizational policy and mission as well as the
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system itself. Executives hold the majority of influence on budget, policy, service
development and implementation and rely on the board primarily to approve measures,
which the executive shapes to reflect board member advice and preferences.
The board members do require considerable more attention than policy-oriented
members, primarily because they have a greater interest in executive decision-making
and organizational operation. Curiosity requires more information, education and
handholding due to interest in a wider variety of issues and increased expectations for
oversight. The board members often lack political prowess, which makes it much easier
for the executive to control organizational direction but at the same time the executive
must tread lightly to avoid offending members. This is a very difficult part of the
relationship to manage because the executive is pitted between board members who often
lack the ability to impose their own political will on others but have concerns about an
overly strong executive that bypasses board members and fails to include them in
political maneuvering.
As a result, communication becomes far more critical and difficult because it
must be provided more frequently and on more subjects. The executive must open the
organization’s doors beyond the boardroom far more regularly than with policy-oriented
members. This creates considerable opportunity for micromanagement but is usually
tempered by the understanding of the executive’s need to manage and administer services
as her or she sees fit. Where this grows tenuous is when the board member’s advice,
especially in more controversial subjects, is either outright dismissed or not applied.
With a variety of members, this becomes very difficult to balance, as different members
offer different advice and expect different results. The ability of a strong executive to
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gather the advice and apply it properly to the satisfaction of a board is extremely
challenging and easily creates discord among the membership. Advice can be constant,
unwanted but required and narrow focus board members may demand a much higher
level of attention and involvement in critical issues, possibly leading to the detriment of
the relationship when executive and member agendas are entrenched and opposed.
By far the most difficult relationship to maintain is with community-oriented
board members—the most intriguing type identified in this study. The motivation for
decision-making is very different for these members than for others in the typology.
Each decision is viewed almost exclusively through the lens of their respective
communities. They have a very strong interest in low-level policy and management
issues because these are factors that most often impact the services that communities
receive. Boards comprised of community-oriented members are extremely valuable if the
political goal is to connect users and affected communities with the authority. Boards
tend to be comprised of elites with limited interaction or connection to those directly
touched by services. While opportunity for input exists through board meeting public
forums or required public hearings for policy or service changes, marginalized groups are
unwilling or unable to participate and are intimidated by the public process. Therefore
citizens within these communities seek out ministers, social workers or politically active
volunteers before traditional resources when problems or concerns arise. As a result of
this connection, community-oriented board members can be a very calming influence
within certain communities by speaking for the authority to quell community concerns or
explain issues to citizens.
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These members emphasize low-level issues because they are legitimate conduits
and voices for the community they represent. Community-oriented board members have
strong connections to these groups, which becomes most critical to the board-executive
relationship when proposed service changes may have a direct, negative impact. Change
with negative effect on a person the board member must face becomes much harder to
support. This is particularly important for community-oriented board members working
within these communities because they identify closely with the transit dependent,
working poor.
Community-oriented board members face internal contradictions that make
relationships exceptionally difficult to manage. First, as board members they are
appointed to represent a population but as a governing board must represent the parent
government as well. Difficult choices must be made when governing the use of public
money but community-oriented members are personally torn between the dual values of
serving the parent government through budgets, oversight and efficiency when they must
make decisions that will negatively affect their communities. Many of the decisions
boards must make are decisions for cost containment, especially in times of a budget
crisis. When a board member has emotional ties to a population that will be negatively
impacted by decisions—even when they must be made—the member feels a sense of
frustration or failure because the only available options will hurt their community. An
executive placed in the constant position of making necessary recommendations that
evoke these feelings will have a very difficult time engendering trust and support from
the member.
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Second, these board members are most interested in services that will benefit the
community, especially their own, but are unwilling to take risks to achieve innovation
and improvement of services for users. They see the value of changes but fear that even a
small subset of riders will be hurt by service changes and therefore will not support
measures, regardless of the opportunity for long-term change and direction of the
organization. The status quo becomes politically and organizationally easier to maintain.
An executive seeking to make change for the betterment of the authority and the city—
greater ridership, revenue and performance translates directly into greater value for the
taxpayer—finds themselves developing and submitting recommendations to board
members that see direct, negative consequences between their vote and people’s lives. In
the case of public transportation it is more painful to take service from those who
presently have it than to deny it to those who have never had it. A board member focused
on the policy impact for a small population of affected riders and citizens, as opposed to
citywide needs or long-term system growth, can be seen as either a voice of the people or
a problem for the executive.
Finally, for many community-oriented board members distance provides an
advantage because it provides a more balanced view, as closer relationships with the
executive might bias decisions and professional distance keeps that balance. At the same
time, this same group of members seeks and expects much greater involvement in key
decisions that impact their communities but lack the close connections necessary for
monitoring the organizational pulse at arm’s length. Many of the issues that members are
concerned with fall outside the normal responsibilities of the authority board as shown
through the typology. Personnel management commonly falls under this scenario
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because management decisions to hire, fire or promote often capture the interest of the
member because someone in the organization likely has some community ties with a
board member. This is especially problematic when board members seek involvement
with collective bargaining unit issues such as policy changes and terminations. They
have only surface-level knowledge or misinformation but executives cannot reveal
certain information because it may violate protections entitled to employees or
compromise the grievance and arbitration process. This often occurs over claims of
racial discrimination, especially among African-American board members who perceive
a predominantly minority ridership base and transit operators include a large African
American workforce. When Caucasian executives and managers make controversial
personnel decisions a natural tendency to protect a historically disadvantaged class
emerges and creates a charged emotional and very dangerous situation for the board and
executive.
Micromanagement is a consistent problem for executives with communityoriented board members. These board members hear and see on street issues and because
of their position have unfettered access to the executive, frequently calling the
executive’s oversight into question. Customer complaints about late buses, rude drivers
and vehicle breakdowns are valid but become informal agenda items for the board
member. How quickly the executive repairs a vandalized shelter, installs a bench near a
senior center or deals with a speeding driver colors the relationship with the board
member. When it comes to board-level decisions of routes and schedules, concern is
expressed over why it serves one apartment complex but not another—regardless of the
operational issues of sidewalks, turning radius or population density—and executives
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must justify every decision. A particularly bad accident or bus fire calls into question
passenger safety, forcing executives to defend training programs and vehicle quality
while conversations devolve into voltage regulators, tire pressures and braking
mechanisms.
Balancing these diverse perspectives may be one of the most difficult challenges
executives face, especially among community-oriented, narrow focused board members.
Two different members will have very different concerns on a single issue. One may be
bothered by a new route’s path of travel because the president of a neighborhood
association called them to complain. Another board members is extremely excited
because this new route will serve several new low-income housing developments yet the
only way to reach the apartments is to travel through the complaining neighborhood. A
board member will become concerned with whether the new shelters will be located in
the downtown business district and whether they will match the façade along the historic
square while another member with a disability is concerned with whether the new
shelters have waiting space for wheelchairs and are near curb cuts while third wonders
why these new shelters are not in an economically disadvantaged neighborhood. When
board members are solely advancing a low-level, user-based agenda and envision their
board service solely as connection to, and protection of, the transit user then an increased
opportunity for executive-board member conflict arises.

CONCLUSION
This typology of board member preferences has very important and far-reaching
implications for governance and the board-executive relationship. Boards are comprised
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of an eclectic group of members, all bringing their own expertise and concerns to the
board table. The key for executives is their ability to understand the implications of the
different types of members and the opportunities and challenges presented by these
various types. How well an executive manages these relationships, takes advantage of
board member tendencies and engages them in processes is going to determine his or
professional and organizational success.
An important consideration is how well this typology applies to the board
members within this study since the development of the typology emerged through the
research, which was based on data collected from executives and board members from
five different public transportation authorities. When assigning board members from this
study within the various board member types one critical theme emerged—the more
financial power and authority vested in the board in areas of finance and planning the
more often the board members were drawn to policy and advisory orientation. In
Nashville and Memphis, most members fell into the policy or advisory/policy mold with
only one member holding a community orientation. Lexington was extremely interesting
as many of the members fit the policy or advisory mold but those with an advisoryorientation expressed much greater awareness of policy, indicating a shift in perspective
and a declining level of interest in purely community-oriented perspectives. Chattanooga
was comprised of only one policy- and one policy/advisory-oriented member with the
rest falling under the advisory, advisory/community and community types. Jackson had
no policy types with a much greater tendency toward advisory- and community-oriented
members. When examining the level of financial power available to the authority and the
types of members serving on the board the connection was clear: when there was a lower
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level of financial and high-level policy opportunity available then there was a much
greater prevalence of community-oriented members on the public transportation authority
board.
This chapter extends the findings of this research into the development of a
typology which supports the adaptation of Svara’s seminar model of local governance in
two ways. First, it applies the dichotomy-duality model of governance to public
authorities, an approach absent in the quasi-governmental research or in studies of local
government structure. Second, this research overlays a new dimension of individual
preferences and motivations to the model with considerable implications to how these
preferences impact lines of board and executive responsibility. This has potential
applicability to other local government structures that continue to attract scholarly
attention. Chapter Seven presents the implications of this research and poses the
unanswered questions deserving further systematic study.
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CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION
This chapter concludes the dissertation. After presenting a summary of the study
it draws the implications of the findings. Recommendations for future research are
offered and an assessment of what this study means for the future of public transportation
is made.

STUDY SUMMARY
Public authorities play a highly active role in public service delivery as an
alternative to traditional governmental structures in the U.S. While public authorities
have existed for more than 100 years, little scholarly attention has been paid to them and
there remains a considerable gap in the understanding of authority structure, operation
and especially governance. This study sought to expand the understanding of authorities
from the perspective of key actors within them—the governing board members and
executives. Most research is focused on organizational purpose of the public authorities
with an emphasis on the flexibility, accountability and productivity of authorities. While
this is useful to understanding authority roles and structure, it neglects the internal and
external functional relationships and how these relationships affect decision making
processes and shape policy decisions. Once an understanding of the board-executive
relationship is developed a much greater connection can be drawn between structure and
organizational performance; until now no scholarly research has been devoted to this
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critical relationship. This dissertation provides an understanding of how board member
role perceptions and individual preferences impact the board-executive relationship and
establishes an empirical baseline of knowledge that helps to overcome the significant
challenges in researching public authority governance.
Quasi-governments, or hybrid organizations, are appealing to politicians because
they are modeled after private organizations and offer public service with business-like
processes and can be shaped to virtually any organizational shape. Among the various
types of quasi-governmental institutions available, public authorities are quite unique.
Formed to build and operate large infrastructure projects they have transformed into
strong planning and development arms of public service but with an emphasis on revenue
from user fees and beholden to a strong parent government (Smith 1969). Authorities
offer an atypical approach to public service delivery but research has generally ignored
how the board-executive structure and relationships impacts governance.
Public authorities are important to students and practitioners of public affairs
because they are a growing form of government. Yet, relatively little attention is paid to
their operation and structure. Employed almost exclusively at state and local levels,
authorities provide service across a variety of policy areas of critical importance to the
study of governance, management, policy analysis, and organizational theory with
important issues of neutral administration, accountability and reform at the heart of the
structure. An effective balance of responsibility between boards and executives is
essential for achieving organizational policy objectives and performance. No prior
research on authorities has studied this balance or what affects the board-executive
relationship and how it impacts the executive’s ability to manage the organization. The
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literature on boards in governmental, non-profit and for-profit organizations focuses
almost exclusively on formal responsibility, composition and effectiveness but neglects
the executive-board relationship.
This study fills this void, emphasizing how executives and board members view
internal and external roles in addition to perceptions of formal and informal
responsibilities. Most importantly this research provides insight into the preferences,
motivations and behaviors of individual board members. This insight now informs on
issues of political power, effectiveness, representation, agendas and decision making
while uncovering the factors that impact support for authority executives. In addition to
establishing an empirical foothold on the critical board-executive relationship, this
research applied and expanded the dichotomy-duality model of governance and has
allowed for nuances in respect to how organizational structure influences the relationship
aspect of public policy.

FINDINGS REVIEW
The purpose of this study was to explore the nature of public authority boards and
the impact of board-executive relationships on public service governance. The study first
considered levels of fiscal power available and existent within these five public
transportation authorities and examined whether this affects the willingness of influential
policy makers serve on the authority board. The study identified an important link
between the limits on board financial power and board member ability to influence
internal and external policy decisions or the guide and direct funding. Most participants
in this study described their board as possessing a limited ability to impact budget
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processes. They also indicated that budgetary influence is typically after the post-parent
government process and after staffs have revised and adjusted numbers based on funding
allocations.
Boards that can direct new revenue streams play a more prominent role in the
political landscape and exercise more power in directing authority progress toward a
comprehensive transportation network for their city. The most significant factor
impacting board power and influence and the ability to achieve high-level policy
(internally and externally) is financial reliance on parent governments. When compared
to LexTran, the one transit system within the study with dedicated funding, the remaining
systems are much more reliant on federal, state and local governments for funding and
struggle with long-range capital and planning initiatives. Overall, budget development
remains a staff and parent government driven process where the board lacks influence but
retains some post-budget involvement and approval. However, this later phase of
involvement does not hold the same level of power and influence as near-total budget
control. In the absence of increased funding streams from parent governments, boards
are reluctant to make unpopular decisions to cut positions, redirect services or increase
fares.
Yet, boards have considerable opportunity to influence financial direction of the
authority through increased oversight of revenue and expenditures and through controls
over contracts, purchases and capital planning for vehicles and facilities. This facet of
fiscal power remains quite challenging for most boards due to the complexity of
government procurement, the advanced technical equipment needs and the vast
implications involved in facility and vehicle planning. Boards that exhibited considerable
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levels of influence in financial management and capital planning took advantage of their
powers and conducted comprehensive operating analyses, focused attention on capital
projects and applied increased emphasis on funding use as it related to organizational
mission and policy goals. With this emphasis on organizational performance and
opportunistic decision making boards are able to develop and maintain a high-level
policy concentration despite the lack of dedicated funding. While some of these authority
boards established higher-levels of policy-making influence, there was an absence of very
high-level political players commonly seen on boards holding strong financial power. In
this study, policy-centric boards came about due to the collection of individual members
with penchants for financial management and capital planning. While boards were not
particularly powerful on the respective political landscapes, they had some level of
influence and sought to exercise power when available.
As authority boards exhibited a reduction of high-level political actors and policy
players there was also a reduction in the availability of significant capital projects. The
same was true when executives played a stronger role in financial direction and
management, limiting opportunity for board member influence over financial
management and oversight. When this occurred board composition shifted from a group
of experienced political and policy players to technical experts and mid-level local
participants and included a greater presence of street-level interests toward social services
and individual riders. These lower-level community players with service-level agendas
had individual interests and agendas that fell primarily under executive authority. Weak
fiscal authority from limited budget influence translates into limited financial oversight,
creating boards of low-level players with service specific agendas. Attention to
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representation and protecting ridership emerged in the absence of high-level policy and
social service advocacy for marginalized communities became more prevalent. Board
members with lower-level agendas had distinct connections to on street service and
personnel decisions, either front line employee or administrative employees. Active
interest in personnel surfaced through a sire for involvement in employee selection,
affirmative action practices and control of the collective bargaining unit contract, wages
and working conditions.
Boards comprised of members with lower level agendas indicated that
representation was a significant factor. Board members selected to represent certain
communities or expertise had decreased interest in overarching authority business. They
were instead more interested in how decisions would impact their perceived constituency
or their own individual preferences. Limited financial and policy influence breeds an
interest in low-level, service-oriented issues that, while viewed as policy, in reality are
more closely associated with operational management. Board attention should be on
mission and policy issues but in the absence of high-level policy opportunity emphasis
falls on more operational. Lower-level board members take on increased ownership of
these types of decisions, which on its face seem high-level. In reality these decisions are
relatively low-level because high-level issues deal with causes of decisions, not the
decisions themselves. Low-level board members can become caught in a trap of lowlevel policy concerns, many of which fall under managerial authority and can lead to
excessive incursions on executive responsibility and create increased micromanagement
and conflict.
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This attention and micromanagement can create conflict because board member
emphasis on lower-level issues deviates from the board policy-orientation. How
executives manage employees or implement services may be stark contrast to individual
member preferences and may create considerable conflict when agendas and preferences
collide. Executives are careerists and understand how to deliver services and sidestep
obstacles that inhibit effective management of human, mechanical and financial resources
while boards have only surface understanding of these processes and view executives
decisions through a lens colored by less information, experience and expertise.
Conflict is more likely with lower-level members because executives are
interested in the overall system and its long-term success as opposed to a narrow
subgroup of riders or community interests. Executives have an emphasis on global
aspects of service delivery and transportation networks and lack the personal ties to
communities that lower-level board members possess. Conflict rooted in personal
agendas is easily identifiable for executives, as it is usually based on low-level issues that
stand out from the normal business of the authority. It is usually manageable for
executives but becomes problematic when it turns to the constant micromanaging of
executive decisions and consumes organizational resources as staff responds to a barrage
of questions and demands. It can also become destructive for the organization and
damage careers when battles over unsubstantiated claims of racism arise or when
demands for nepotism in contracts and hiring permeate the relationship.
This study first sought to explore the perceived roles of board members serving
on public transportation authorities. There was a strong feeling among participants that
the basis of the mayoral appointment created an expectation that individual perspectives
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and preferences should become part of the debate and decision making processes.
Closely associated was whether members felt appointments were based on a need to
represent certain perspectives or populations. The connection between appointment
purpose and representational goals translated into a strong belief among members that a
diversity of viewpoints is an important contribution to policy and decision making.
Board members saw themselves as policy-makers with budget control but
descriptions of control included routine questions and issues, not policy or budget
control. There was, however, a very strong belief that asking these routine questions was
of critical importance to the public process. Board members typically perceived a higher
level of policy power and stronger role than they actually possessed. Most often policy
descriptions were service-related and not couched in the financial terms of the authority
and displayed limited understanding of financial; and high-level policy implications.
Policy power was usually described in terms of debate and consideration of on-street
services decisions. This focused on how boards should avoid the rubberstamping of
executive recommendations. Of importance is the strong connection between board
powers to develop and manage funding, their ability to participate in organizational
planning and the type of members that serve on the board. Boards with more financial
authority had a much higher level of policy-making interest. As financial power and
opportunity decreased, however, lower-level players began to comprise board
membership—often with an emphasis on low-level policy issues under executive domain.
The research next sought to understand when encroachment on executive
authority occurs. It was found that when board responsibility consists almost exclusively
of service-level decisions it creates an emphasis on service-level issues. When these
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decisions involve issues related to members’ technical expertise or affect community ties,
a desire for increased involvement and encroachment is more likely. These types of
service-related decisions do require a certain level of board involvement because
authority boards have formal powers requiring approval of certain service
recommendations, and because they are ultimately responsible for the executive’s
management of the authority. The issue is that board attention should be directed toward
a more comprehensive understanding of decisions and implications while exercising
powers of executive accountability. By emphasizing policy implications of executive
recommendations and maintaining accountability of executive decisions without direct
involvement, boards fulfill the authority’s mission-policy needs and allow executives to
perform the administration-management functions of the organization. The challenge for
executives is how to handle members that supplant their attention on implications and
accountability with involvement in formulating recommendations and making managerial
decisions.
Finally, attention was paid to how board encroachment on executive
responsibility impacted executive support. The research, however, found there was little
conflict. When conflict occurred, it had either nominal or crippling effect on the boardexecutive relationship. Nominal impact occurred because the encroachment was usually
a circumstance of member-executive conflict vs. board-executive conflict, meaning the
conflict rarely included more than one member of the board. Additionally, when conflict
was nominal board members applied stronger levels of restraint (as did a strong board
chair) when the system is very successful or when the executive has involved the
members in certain decision from the start. The board member may accept the decision
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because he or she recognizes executive authority, defers to overall effective leadership or
at least understands the basis for the decisions—even though they may strongly disagree.
When the conflict is severe, it shifts executive attention from innovative policy
recommendations and effective management to defending against micromanagement and
accusations. This situation can quickly spiral into a circumstance of an executive
entrenched in a battle among the executive and individual board members, the board as a
whole and the parent government.
The impact of the conflict is generally a function of the board-executive
relationship and the executive’s ability to manage this relationship. An effective
executive can easily manage a desire for involvement in low-level issues of dirty shelters
or malfunctioning air conditioning units. By recognizing the interests and needs of the
members and balancing this against their own responsibilities and authority, executives
are more able to maintain an effective relationship. This understanding prepares
executives to manage conflict without significant impact on the level of board support for
the executive. Where this becomes unmanageable for executives is when the interests
and involvement undermines executive ability to effectively manage the internal
operations of the organization. Excessive board involvement in executive decision
making weakens board and staff respect, oversteps boundaries and promotes
organizational distrust. These incursions can destroy the critical member-executive
relationship and can invoke political power plays that weaken external support for the
authority and impair its ability to grow.
Conflict is not necessarily detrimental to the organization. As shown through the
board member interviews, even when conflict was present the support levels for the
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executive remained moderately strong. It is important to distinguish between conflict
that does not impact services and that which becomes detrimental to service delivery.
Even when conflict is devastating to individual players, which is to be regretted, the
overarching concern is ultimately for the impact on the governance and management of
the authority as to program outputs. Conflict, is oft times present but is usually
manageable. What matters for public management study and praxis is a greater
understanding of why conflict occurs as well as when conflict becomes unmanageable
and imposes costs on the authority and the public it serves.
Emerging from the study of board-executives relationships is a typology of board
members classified by their individual preferences and interests and the focus applied to
those interest areas. This typology is a result of board member inclination to serve one of
three functions: 1) participate in high-level policy decisions and work closely with the
executive to grow the system and guide the organization; 2) serve as close advisor to the
executive, who will provide the mission and policy leadership and manage the
organization; or 3) act as a representational voice of the rider or impacted institution,
ensuring voice is provided to disaffected communities. Most of these powers exist under
the normal policy and oversight functions of authority boards with policy-oriented and
advisory-orientated members playing these roles. Where this typology offers the most
guidance for scholars, practitioners and board members is the identification of the
community-oriented member. This type of member has a much greater tendency to seek
involvement in areas falling under executive authority—involvement more likely to
create member-executive conflict.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OPERATION OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
This research highlights the fundamental fact that structure matters for public
authorities, especially public transportation authorities because the formal policy powers
granted to authorities impact the composition of boards, which in turn impacts
governance. This study essentially brought together several different ideas beginning
with the importance of board and executive relationships in the public authority structure
and the absence of research within the scholarly literature. Second, it identified the trend
of declining financial power among transportation authorities as a unique phenomenon in
public authority research, considering that much of the emphasis on public authority
evaluation is on financial effectiveness and accomplishment. Third, the study identified
the dichotomy-duality model of local government structure as applicable to the study of
public authorities and combined these areas into a single frame of reference for scholarly
research.
Pubic authority executives, specifically general managers of public transportation
authorities, can employ these findings to understand the factors that impact boardexecutive relationships. The findings identify how board members view roles and
responsibilities while outlining what members expect of general managers. From an
executive management standpoint, this may be single most important aspect of this
research—an understanding of how boards view responsibility. This understanding
allows executives to identify the factors that impact relationships and creates opportunity
for executives to more effectively manage relationships with individual board members
and the board as a whole.
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Organizational resources of money, personnel and equipment are of extreme
importance to operational and service effectiveness and executives manage these
resources on a constant basis. However, the results of those managerial decisions are
very different from the impact of an executive’s ability to manage the board-executive
relationship. Executives and board members spoke at length about two very important
themes that impact the board-executive relationship—trust and communication. Trust
relationships are difficult to develop because it requires considerable executive
investment and nurturing of individual interests of board members within a very diverse
and complex financial and political environment.
For executives, managing the board is not exclusive to the board-executive
relationship. Effective management of the board is also reflected in the executive’s
political astuteness and his or her ability to turn the membership into weapons for the
authority’s benefit. It is extremely difficult for managers to wield the board’s political
power on outside forces, affected communities or unwilling politicians. Maneuvering an
entire authority board in a political environment goes beyond the one-on-one aspect of
the board-executive relationship. Executives must gauge the relationships’ strength, the
members’ willingness to risk other relationships and the executive’s confidence in the
organization’s ability to ensure the members’ influence pays dividends for the authority
and the individual members. A diverse board, while challenging, can be deployed in a
number of influential areas at different points and times for great benefit to the executive,
the organization and the public.
Even when the executive cannot push the board into action because of the risks, is
inappropriate at certain junctures or will not have an effect, the members can still work
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one-on-one with the executives to them informally through technical guidance and
political leadership. Managers often do not have internal staff or outside organizations
they can turn to for moral, technical or leadership support. They may have staff they trust
but may not know the other players or understand the political environment. Authority
executives can be on a managerial island because they have no organizational counterpart
and sometimes cannot reveal their hand to lower-level staff or parent governments. As
such, executives need their boards but in a controlled fashion. This is the other key
aspect of managing the relationship—letting board members in when needed but keeping
them out when required. In many ways, the effective management of the board-executive
relationship can be likened to a traffic cop directing two-way travel on a one-way street.
The executive is standing in the middle of a busy intersection, using a whistle to get
attention when no one is looking and side-stepping obstacles traveling different
directions. The executive is waving their board members through when needed but using
signs reading “slow” and “stop”. He or she is carefully keeping an eye on other traffic
and never letting his or her guard down. The manager can take tremendous advantage of
the board but if the relationship is not effectively managed, control is lost and the
relationship crumbles.
The communication of information is the second key aspect of a successful boardexecutive relationship. Board members constantly reiterated that good executives listen
to the board as a whole or as individuals. The executive must know what to
communicate and when in consideration of group and individual preferences for what
members want to know (but actually should know) and when to deliver information to
avoid surprise. The executive must be accessible and responsive to member concerns
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with thorough and timely follow up and results. The information itself is difficult to
manage, as is the frequency and the type. Executives must provide sufficient information
to board members when they need it or request it, be careful of why they want it, serve as
informational filters to control detail and then frame issues for consideration without
giving the perception of holding anything back. The benefit to effective communication
that falls outside the usual information levels is that well-informed members can later be
relied upon for expertise and support. The key is managing the content and flow of
information and keeping actual involvement at a distance because of the danger it may
unleash. Once again, the image of a traffic cop works with the executive need to
effectively manage communication.
The structural implications of this research are far reaching as well. Public
authorities are designed to be independent arms of government service, the hybridization
of public and private organizations for the public good through more efficient, effective
and responsive service delivery. It is an organizational polemic of traditional
bureaucratic government, condemning the red tape and sluggish civil service while
extolling the virtues of flexibility and innovation. Yet, public values are not sacrificed
through mechanisms of accountability and a public board of directors appointed by a
parent government. What is seen through these five public transportation authorities is
quite different from what is prescribed by the academic and management literature;
however, what is presented is most likely an accurate reflection on the modern
conceptualization of low-power pubic authorities.
The modern public transportation authority is almost completely reliant on the
parent government for funding resources unless it is able to establish its own dedicated
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funding sources. Once it obtains its own funding stream it can fulfill the intent of the
public authority: operating an independent and fully functioning public service governed
outside the political pressures that impede typical government programs and with an
efficiency that serves the community at an otherwise impossible level. The reality of
parent government funding as the norm for public transportation authorities is the result
an authority structure that was probably not the optimal structure for the newly created
public transportation authorities of the 1950s. Rather, the authority structure was
employed because it allowed for the hybridization of formerly private resources under
public ownership and a convenient solution to the problem of protecting collective
bargaining units within the auspices of public service delivery. Authorities were formed
as a structural solution to a political problem and in many ways the structure does not fit
the organizational needs because most parent governments are yet to empower authority
boards to fully fund the transportation needs of their cities.
The impact of this inadequate power for pubic transportation authorities is a board
comprised of low-level players with street-level interest in transportation within their
community. Instead of past mayors, present council members, business executives and
university presidents we see friends of mayors and council members, past local union
officials, architects, doctors, attorneys, CPAs, ministers, persons with disabilities and
system riders with a large number of retired or flexibly employed individuals who can
commit the time. These lower level players find homes on authority boards because they
represent populations and serve a political purpose for the parent government.
Authorities were a structural solution to a political problem and the present financial
empowerment will not draw the players to effectively serve the structural needs. As
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such, mayors treat the authority board as a political solution to a structural problem and
when the individuals who need to serve will not then the authority can be
reconceptualized from a policy board to a political, representational board. A
representational board is quite different from a policy board because it brings the people
closer to their government and the government closer to their people. The question is:
What does the parent government really want?
Public transportation authority boards have become political and representational
boards, as transit ridership is statistically a minority and low-income population based in
an urban center and delivered by a collective bargaining unit. There are buses to be
procured, buildings to be developed, marketing to be deployed and contracts to be
written. The attorney and the CPA add credibility and technical advice to the contracts
while the architect is helpful during a facility construction. The ministers and social
service workers represent the working poor and usually black, transit dependent riders
while the retired union leaders represent the employees. They have a common bond in
that employee rights are working poor rights and that transit systems are well known for
promoting minority hiring, often more than doubling the rates of the minority population
in the general public. The minority interests are employee interests and vice versa. It can
be relatively certain that if there is a dominant university in the city that university will
have formal representation, as will the major industry. The person with the disability will
show that the mayor and the system are serious about accessible transportation and will
calm down the advocacy community while helping provide advice for better service and
offering more than representational lip service.
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These are board members with strong ties to their respective communities, have
inclinations toward advice and low-level policy with a borderline penchant for
micromanagement. They are experts in respective fields and in some cases represent
moral obligations closely connected to emotional issues with limited no pretenses for
involvement. The impact for executives is a board of potential micromanagers and
advisors. When things are going well for the community, they will go well for the board
members and therefore things will go well for the executive. The ability to manage the
environment when situations become difficult is what differentiates the effective
executive from his or her peers. The perception of a community-orientated board can be
highly pejorative if they are viewed solely as a collection of non-policy activists and
opportunists; however, this is far from reality. Board members and executives recognize
the limited political power and policy power available to board members but what they
offer otherwise is exceptionally valuable. They provide excellent advice and counsel to
executives and wield influence and access within different aspects of the city. Like any
other type of board member, it is more a question of whether they competently and
professionally direct the business of the authority and how well the executive manages
the relationship in regards to how influence and attention will be utilized.

AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
From the start this study acknowledged the exploratory nature of the research.
With a research gap wide enough to drive a bus through, there had to be some intellectual
and research starting point to begin the reconsideration of public authorities and boards
but along an entirely new dimension. As such, the trend of declining fiscal authority and
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the expected tendency to draw lower-level board members with lower-level agendas
provided this opportunity. Beginning with these simple issues—declining financial
policy power as an impetus for increased managerial conflict and a series of research
questions the study has identified a clear link between financial authority and how highlevel policy opportunity attracts high-level players while low-level policy attract lowlevel players. It is evident that the different types of members offer their own sets of
costs and benefits but creates an effective political machine when a comfortable mix of
orientation and focus was available for executives and the authority.
The study establishes a link between financial policy opportunity and the types of
players drawn to public authority boards but the study did not consistently find the
intense conflict expected within the board-executive relationship. Past horror stories
from board members and general managers, including experiences on other boards and
organizations, show how easily conflict can emerge and reveals a delicate boardexecutive relationship within public authorities. This study has provided some indication
as to why these relationships remain supportive—despite the ample opportunity for
conflict—through effective management, inclusion and awareness. However, there needs
to be an expansion of this research to see if conflict is more widespread outside of these
authorities and whether the potential causes outlined here have merit beyond the limited
sample. Additionally, what is included in this research is a small collective of board
members and executives focusing on the role of board members on public transportation
authorities. There were very strong connections for board members among formal and
informal responsibilities, representation, agendas and decision making. While valuable,
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the ideas must be applied elsewhere to see if the circumstances and preferences described
in the interviews occur in other types of public authorities.
Critical to public authorities is the board-executive relationship and opportunity
for conflict within this relationship is seemingly omnipresent; however, as suggested
above conflict is not necessarily detrimental to the organization or its services. Of
considerable worth to scholars and governors is a more in depth study of board-executive
conflict and its impact. Emerging from this study is the realization that most conflict is
manageable with limited negative, long-term impact on the board-executive relationship
and with limited consequence for the organization or its services. However, this research
is limited in that is offers understanding of where conflict is most likely to develop in
terms of micromanagement of executive responsibility. The next step in this area of
research is to better understand the varying aspects of conflict along lines of minimal and
maximum impact (positive and negative) and within a framework the extent to which
conflict imposes costs on the authority and its users. A fuller understanding of conflict
and its consequences would contribute significantly to evaluating organizational
effectiveness and would provide greater applicability of these findings on the boardexecutive relationship.
This study’s intent was the application of the dichotomy-duality model to public
authorities for purposes of understanding organizational frameworks. The result,
however, was a greater employment of the model that suggests the conceptual foundation
and framework has viability and utility within the study of public authorities. Svara’s
study (1985) included surveys with a large enough sample to perform quantitative
analysis for deeper applicability and established a baseline for further research. His
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model has since expanded beyond council-manager systems to numerous treatments of
local structure and governance and public authorities should receive similar treatment in
terms of determining the model’s level of applicability to the public authority structure.
The constructs of mission, policy, administration and management are widely appropriate
to most governmental organizations; however, his research spurred a series of variations
on the dichotomy-duality model to reflect strong manager, strong council and manager
incursion to describe different aspects of local government structure. It is of significant
consequence to the study of public administration and local government structure as to
whether the dichotomy-duality model has widespread applicability in authorities.
At the same time this study articulates a new dimension of personal preferences
within a typology of board members overlaid on the dichotomy-duality model. There
exists a potential to expand the model to account for the varying responsibilities existent
in local government. Just as the applicability of Svara’s model to public authorities
deserves more rigorous evaluation, this new dimension is worthy of similar study to see if
the typology has applicability outside of authorities. Can preference account for the
specific variations and conflict between council and managers in council-manager
systems, a local government framework notorious for its vicious political battles and
short tenure for city managers?
An extremely important area of further research is the board member typology
itself. The typology emerged as a byproduct from the study of board-executive
relationships and the study design was crafted around an understanding of these
relationships. A framework for understanding board member types was an unexpected
research result but emerged from the data and subsequent analysis. Now that a
277

framework for classifying board members has materialized, a much more specific
analysis is necessary to refine the members types along dimensions of orientation and
focus in addition to developing more specific and measurable variables to place board
members in the appropriate typological boxes. What is necessary at this juncture is the
formation of a typological schema to better explain classification of member types and
articulate the variables that define or describe each type of board member.
This study has established a series of potential variables and presents considerable
opportunity to expand the study of individual preferences and behaviors through more
rigorous qualitative and quantitative analysis. A more defined typology would allow for
a greater analysis of the types of board members serving on public authorities and the
extent to which authority power and responsibility predicts the types of members serving
on authority boards. This study has laid a conceptual foundation for further research and
the next level of inquiry will more effectively apply the typology and significantly
expand the understanding of board-executive relationships and public authorities in
general.
Also of consequence is the financial impact of Hurricane Katrina on the public
transportation industry. The past year saw massive fuel price increases that forced many
transportation systems to increase fares (or at least evaluate the need) in order to maintain
budgets and survive fiscally. In nearly every interview during this study the budgetary
struggles of transit systems caused by fuel prices played a significant role. What is of
curiosity and worthy of continued study is whether the increased attention to budgetary
matters raised the long-term awareness of the authorities’ financial responsibilities and
powers and whether this had significant impact on the data and findings. Considering the
278

lack of detailed financial knowledge available from a number of board members, there is
doubt as to any significant impact on this study’s findings and analysis considering
financial power was only one dynamic of the study. There is considerable value in
evaluating this trend to determine whether this short-term awareness has long-term
impact on board member understanding of higher-level policy processes, especially
among advisory- and community-oriented board members.
At the same time, this was a qualitative evaluation of responsibility, role
preferences and opinions, valid for the level of exploration needed for this line of
research but insufficient to support sweeping generalizations on board members or public
authorities. This research provides a first step toward understanding the context of public
authority boards and provides a conceptual framework for more systematic inquiries into
the subject. The next level of research needs to focus on measurement of these
ambiguous constructs of formal and informal responsibility, some typology of
representation for comparison across systems and some meaningful way to expand these
basic ideas beyond these five Southeastern cities. There needs to be extensive study to
establish whether these ideas end along I-40 and I-75 in Tennessee and Kentucky or
whether they apply to the entire industry. Even more importantly, do they apply outside
of public transportation?
The result of this study is a greater understanding of what impacts public
authority governance while contributing to the scholarly literature on quasi-governmental
institutions. Through in-depth personal interviews nuances in organizational
performance, policy development, organizational management and governance have been
discerned. This provides insight into, and a basis for future research about, board279

executive relationships in public transportation authorities. Authority managers are faced
with a very unique and multi-dimensional aspect of their boards—agenda and authority
and the impact on governance and their ability to effectively manage the organization.
Boards have varying levels of authority—representational, financial, planning and
oversight—most of which is bestowed at some level by the parent government or by the
board itself as it expands and contracts its powers. The powers the parent government
vests in the board dictates the types of members that will actually serve, driving the board
composition from an aspect of power and authority while creating a unique set of
opportunities and challenges for the authority.
Therefore, the most important next step within the study of public authority
structure is the study of parent governments. Throughout this research there has been an
implied and now explicit understanding of the impact of parent government decisions on
public authorities. The level of funding determines the level of powers available and the
mayor and staff bestow certain expectation for board members and executives through
their appointment power. Questions exist as to whether the functions of representation
and the resulting individual agendas are intentional and whether the parent government
expects these factors to play a significant role in the authority’s governance. There needs
to be a much greater understanding of the triangulation of the board, executive and parent
government and a greater definition of the expected roles of each with the governance of
the authority and the impact on service delivery. As shown, parent government do more
than establish a structure—they intentionally and unintentionally dictate the opportunities
and challenges for boards and executives to govern and manage public service delivery
and play a significant role in shaping the board-executive relationship.
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To be sure, the formal power of these authorities depends on how much authority
the parent government delegates. Distinctive in this vested power is that it
unintentionally drives the composition of the authority board. Appointees come to
represent not the powers of the authority but the absence of powers, the expectations of
service delivery and the political value of representation within the community. These
factors comprise a board of agendas, inclusive of varying levels of political power and
influence, that contribute to collective organizational direction but laden with
individuality. It is with this understanding of authority and agenda that public
transportation authorities venture. It is within this framework of authority and agenda
that the board-executive relationship takes root and grows.
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Table 2.1: Public Transportation Authority Organizational Summary
City / System
Memphis / MATA
Nashville / MTA
Chattanooga / CARTA
Lexington / Lextran
Jackson / JTA

Fiscal Year 2005 Annual Ridership (in millions)
Total
12
8
3.2
2.11
0.48

Rail
1
0.44
-

Paratransit
0.25
0.15
0.04
0.11
0.034

Vehicle Fleet (Revenue Vehicles)

City / System
Memphis / MATA
Nashville / MTA
Chattanooga / CARTA
Lexington / Lextran
Jackson / JTA

Fixed Route
10.5
7.85
1.7
2
0.46

Total
280
194
84
58
20

Fixed Route
194
137
66
58
13

Rail
20
4
-

Paratransit
65
57
14
7

System Descriptors
City / System

Memphis / MATA
Nashville / MTA
Chattanooga / CARTA
Lexington / Lextran
Jackson / JTA

2006 Annual
Fixed Routes Operating
Budget
33
$47 million
38
$37 million
16
$13 million
18
$11.9 million
8
$2 million

Employees
600
430
165
133
38

Collective Bargaining Unit Employees

City / System
Memphis / MATA
Nashville / MTA
Chattanooga / CARTA
Lexington / Lextran
Jackson / JTA

2006 Annual
Capital
Budget
$18 million
$13 million
$5.0 million
$3.7 million
$0.80 million

Total
400
320
100
110
31

Operators
260
265
100
91
25
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Maintenance
98
55
35
19
6

Other
42
10
5
0
0

Table 2.2: Public Transportation Authority Board Term Summary
Board Composition
City / System
Total
Memphis / MATA
Nashville / MTA
Chattanooga / CARTA
Lexington / Lextran
Jackson / JTA

7
5
11
8
5

Term Length
(in years)
3
5
5
4
2
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Limit on Number of
Consecutive Terms
Unlimited
2
Unlimited
2
2

Table 2.3: Public Transportation Authority Board Members and Executives and
Participation
City / System
Subject Name
Position
Memphis / MATA
Will Hudson
Executive
Memphis / MATA
Ray Holt
Chair
Memphis / MATA
Dr. Fred Johnson
Vice Chair
Memphis / MATA
Cliffie Pugh
Member
Memphis / MATA
Karl P. Birkholz
Member
Memphis / MATA
M. P. Carter
Member
Memphis / MATA
Dick Walker
Member
Nashville / MTA
Paul Ballard
Executive
Nashville / MTA
Lewis Lavine
Chair
Nashville / MTA
Gail Carr Williams
Vice Chair
Nashville / MTA
William L. Barnes
Member
Nashville / MTA
Marian T. Ott
Member
Chattanooga / CARTA
Tom Dugan
Executive
Chattanooga / CARTA
E. Stephen Jett
Chair
Chattanooga / CARTA
Joe B. Hutcherson
Vice Chair
Chattanooga / CARTA
Wanza Lee
Secretary
Chattanooga / CARTA
Robert A. Franklin
Member
Chattanooga / CARTA
Jill Hindman
Member
Chattanooga / CARTA
Kimberly Kinsey
Member
Chattanooga / CARTA
Edna Varner
Member
Chattanooga / CARTA
Warren Mackey
Member
Chattanooga / CARTA
Robert C. Diehl
Member
Lexington / Lextran
Terry Garcia Crews
Executive
Lexington / Lextran
Mary Fister
Chair
Lexington / Lextran
Ann Render
Vice Chair
Lexington / Lextran
Edward J. Kasarskis
Member
Lexington / Lextran
Jack Ballard
Member
Lexington / Lextran
Catherine Leslie
Member
Lexington / Lextran
Don Thornton
Member
Lexington / Lextran
Ted McCormick
Member
Lexington / Lextran
Priscilla Johnson
Member
Jackson / JTA
Johnny Gullett
Executive
Jackson / JTA
Donna Hodge
President
Jackson / JTA
Richard Donnell
Vice President
Jackson / JTA
Terry Wright
Member
Jackson / JTA
Clarence Boone
Member
Jackson / JTA
Rev. Lovell Hayes
Member
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Table 2.4: Public Transportation Authority Executive Interview Questions
Executive Question Structure
1
How long have you been general manager here? What was your transit
experience before becoming GM?
2

Were you familiar with the authority board/executive-staff structure before
you became GM? How has your actual experience with the board structure
differed from what you expected?

3

Do you think the structure of the authority (how it is organized) and its
responsibilities have helped or hurt your ability to accomplish your goals and
ideas? In what ways? Do you have some examples?

4

What role does the board play in the financial aspects of the authority? Has
this changed at all since you became involved in the system? In what ways?
Do you think the board should have more influence over budgetary and
spending issues? If yes, in what ways? What impact do you think this would
have? If no, why not?

5

6

7

Overall, do you think the board is effective? Why or why not? Are there
issues or duties that the board is particularly good or bad at? What are they
and why are they good/bad at them? What do you think would make the board
more effective?
How would you describe the influence of the board in your city's political
landscape? What would make the board more influential? What are the
biggest obstacles to making the board perform at its highest level?

8

Have you seen board members bring specific agendas to the table because they
are representing a particular group or idea? How often does this conflict with
your goals?

9

How would you describe your relationship with the board? At present, do you
have any particularly good or bad relationships with the members?

10

Do you think the board wishes it could be more involved in decision-making
for the system's operation? What do you think they wish they could do/what
kinds of things do they try and get involved in?

11

How often do you involve board members in making decisions related to
managing the transit system? How do you include them? What are some
specific examples?

12

Is there anything else—ideas or opinions—that you have pondered or
discussed with other executives, your staff or board members which might
shed light on the board-executive relationship?
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Table 2.5: Public Transportation Authority Board Member Interview Questions
Board Member Question Structure
1
How long have you been serving on the authority? What in your background
prepared you for this position? Was this your first foray into public service?
2

Why did you decide to serve on the authority board? When you began
serving, what was your focus?

3

What are the duties and responsibilities of the board? Are there any
responsibilities in which you wish the board had more power and influence?

4

What role does the board play in the financial aspects of the authority? Have
you seen the financial authority of the board increase or decrease since you
began serving on the board? In what ways?

5

Do you think the board should have more influence over budgetary and
spending issues? (if yes) What kinds of things would you like to be able to
influence? What impact do you think this would have? (if no) Why not? Do
you think resources are being obt

6

How would you describe the influence of the board in your city's political
landscape? What would make the board more influential?

7

In your role as a board member, on whose behalf are you acting? Is there a
particular group you feel you are speaking and voting for?

8

How would you describe your relationship with the general manager? Do you
think he/she has this same relationship with most other board members?

9

Do you think he is an effective general manager of the transit system? Are
you supportive of the job he's/she's doing?

10

As a board member, how often are you involved in making decisions related to
managing the transit system? What are some examples of where you have
been included in the decisions?

11

Are there times where you-as a board member-wish you could be more
involved in decision-making for the system's operation? What are some
examples?

12

12. Is there anything else—ideas or opinions—that you have pondered or
discussed with other board member or the general manager which might shed
light on the board-executive relationship?
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Council’s Sphere
Mission

Policy

Administration

Management
Manager’s Sphere

Figure 6.1: Dimensions of the Governmental Process: Council-Manager
Structure with Mission Management Separation and Shared Responsibility
for Policy and the Administration

Source: Adapted from James H. Svara. Dichotomy and Duality: Reconceptualizing the
Relationship Between Policy and Administration in Council-Manager Cities.
Public Administration Review 45: 221-232, Figure 2. 1985.
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Board’s Sphere
Mission

Policy

Administration

Management
Executive’s Sphere
Figure 6.2: Dimensions of the Governmental Process: Policy-Oriented,
Broad Focused Board Member Preferences

Source: Adapted from James H. Svara. Dichotomy and Duality: Reconceptualizing the
Relationship Between Policy and Administration in Council-Manager Cities.
Public Administration Review 45: 221-232, Figure 2. 1985.
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Board’s Sphere
Mission

Policy

Administration

Management
Executive’s Sphere
Figure 6.3: Dimensions of the Governmental Process: Policy-Oriented,
Narrow Focused Board Member Preferences

Source: Adapted from James H. Svara. Dichotomy and Duality: Reconceptualizing the
Relationship Between Policy and Administration in Council-Manager Cities.
Public Administration Review 45: 221-232, Figure 2. 1985.
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Board’s Sphere
Mission

Policy

Administration

Management
Executive’s Sphere
Figure 6.4: Dimensions of the Governmental Process: Advisory-Oriented,
Broad Focused Board Member Preferences

Source: Adapted from James H. Svara. Dichotomy and Duality: Reconceptualizing the
Relationship Between Policy and Administration in Council-Manager Cities.
Public Administration Review 45: 221-232, Figure 2. 1985.
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Board’s Sphere
Mission

Policy

Administration

Management
Executive’s Sphere
Figure 6.5: Dimensions of the Governmental Process: Advisory-Oriented,
Narrow Focused Board Member Preferences

Source: Adapted from James H. Svara. Dichotomy and Duality: Reconceptualizing the
Relationship Between Policy and Administration in Council-Manager Cities.
Public Administration Review 45: 221-232, Figure 2. 1985.
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Board’s Sphere
Mission

Policy

Administration

Management
Executive’s Sphere
Figure 6.6: Dimensions of the Governmental Process: Community-Oriented,
Broad Focused Board Member Preferences

Source: Adapted from James H. Svara. Dichotomy and Duality: Reconceptualizing the
Relationship Between Policy and Administration in Council-Manager Cities.
Public Administration Review 45: 221-232, Figure 2. 1985.
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Board’s Sphere
Mission

Policy

Administration

Management
Executive’s Sphere
Figure 6.7: Dimensions of the Governmental Process: Community-Oriented,
Narrow Focused Board Member Preferences

Source: Adapted from James H. Svara. Dichotomy and Duality: Reconceptualizing the
Relationship Between Policy and Administration in Council-Manager Cities.
Public Administration Review 45: 221-232, Figure 2. 1985.
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president. Also in 2000, Mr. Schneider continued his study in the Department of Political
Science’s Doctor of Philosophy program and began his public transportation career.
Accepting a senior director position at Knoxville Area Transit, he has broadly expanded
his understanding of public administration theory as a practitioner, achieving the position
of Chief Operating Officer while completing his graduate study. During his tenure,
Knoxville Area Transit received the American Public Transportation Association’s,
“System of the Year” award for 2004, the highest distinction offered by the industry.
In December 2006, Mr. Schneider was awarded the Doctor of Philosophy degree
in Political Science and in addition to his public transportation career has served as a
graduate teaching assistant and term lecturer for the Department of Political Science and
research ambassador for the Transit Cooperative Research Program of the Transportation
Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences. He has published in Public
Administration Theory and Praxis and is an established public transportation researcher.
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